PSA Files: Lot 54D190
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)
Subject: Southeast Asia
| Participants: | Dr. J. G. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary, Netherlands Embassy |
| Philip C. Jessup, S/A |
Mr. de Beus called on me chiefly for the purpose of giving me a copy of an article which he had written on which he would be interested to receive my personal comments. In the course of his conversation he touched on several other matters.
In regard to Southeast Asia he said that the defense of Indochina was vital. If Indochina fell the Thais would not resist and admit as much. Burma was very weak and could not defend itself. Malaya would fall and so would Indonesia. He assumed in reaching these conclusions that a very large factor in the situation in Siam, Singapore and Indonesia would be the large Chinese populations.
I told him that I agreed that the defense of Indochina was extremely important in this whole picture and that we had been acting on that assumption. I told him however that personally I thought it would be a mistake to throw in the sponge if the French were defeated [Page 27] at Tonkin. There would be the possibility that the French might be able to hold the southern part of the country. There was the possibility that the British could hold the Ka Isthmus. I admitted the problem created by the Chinese populations in the various countries but pointed out that the absence of Communist China’s sea and air power made the situation somewhat different from that which existed when the Japanese overran this area. I also noted that there was a difference between the situation in Singapore and Indonesia. The British might not be ruthless in dealing with the Chinese in Singapore but Indonesian history indicated that the Indonesians might exterminate the local Chinese if they gave trouble. De Beus conceded these points.
In regard to India, de Beus said that their representative in New Delhi had recently talked with Nye,1 the British Commissioner. Nye had said that the relations between the UK and India were now probably better than they had ever been before. He thought, however, that Nehru2 would not make any basic decision regarding lining-up with the East or the West until the very last moment when the show down came and then it would be too late. Moreover, he was not at all sure which way Nehru would choose at that point.