Department of Defense Files: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Department of the Army 1
C 59752. Ref DA 89795.2
1. The staggering implications of DA 89795 have yet to be completely analyzed here, but it is obvious from preliminary review that [Page 1452] the entire NPRJ project and, ultimately the defense of the Far East would be jeopardized, if the US were to adopt the action outlined and failed to allocate a sum of money which is purely nominal in terms of the US defense budget for FY 52. It is to me incredible that from a national defense budget of 57 billion dollars, we cannot find the relatively meager funds required to support the rapid establishment of a small Japanese Army. Upon such an Army, in the final analysis, the entire Far East will be dependent for stability and protection—unless the United States is willing to make financial outlays, and perhaps ultimately to sustain casualties entirely disproportionate to requirements of our existing project.
2. Viewed thus the NPRJ program is certainly one of the most important projects in which the US is now involved. For each dollar expended, it is my considered opinion that the US can purchase more security through the creation of Japanese Forces than can be purchased by similar expenditures in any other nation in the world, including the United States. The importance of creating at the earliest possible moment consistent with its political feasibility a well equipped, well organized, properly motivated Japanese Ground Force—with fighting spirit and ability equivalent to that displayed by Japanese Forces in World War II—is to my mind—presently paramount over any other long range project in the Far East.
3. Until such a force is in existence, the security of the Far East will demand the retention in Japan of a sizeable proportion of US Ground Forces unless the entire Far East is to fall by default to Communism. It would seem to me to be to the best long range interests of the United States, that an inexpensive but effective Japanese force be created as rapidly as possible to replace the capable but expensive United States Ground Forces which must otherwise remain in Japan, and which, if Communist Far East military potential continues its present rate of increase, will require substantial augmentation.
4. It will be impossible for me to conduct further meaningful discussions with the Japanese on the questions of rearmament and expansion of the NPRJ, except in very general terms, until a firm statement of United States intentions is received. I cannot stress too strongly the importance and necessity of impressing the Japanese at this crucial period of preliminary negotiations with our firm intention to cooperate fully with them in the years ahead, and in accord with the letter and spirit of the security treaty. It is as obvious to the Japanese as to me, that they cannot in the immediate future provide from their own resources all the materiel required for a modern Army. Vacillation and indecisiveness on our part during preliminary discussions [Page 1453] as to the scale of our proposed support of Japanese defense efforts can only result in the creation of profound doubts in the minds of the Japanese as to the seriousness of our intentions, and as to our reliability. This doubt has already been expressed by an influential segment of Japanese public opinion. It has been vigorously combatted by this Hq on every occasion in every way. Ambassador Dulles, I know, Senators Sparkman and Smith, I think, have done likewise. To do otherwise, to feed this doubt in the slightest degree, is to invite destruction of our entire Japanese policy as I understand that policy.
5. It is entirely possible that the requirements stated by DA 89795 may be partially met through a necessity to compromise with Japanese desires as to the size and composition of a defense force. This may perhaps result in the expansion of the NPRJ on a more austere basis and on a more decelerated schedule than is now planned. I nevertheless propose to suspend further preliminary discussions, except in the very general terms required to assure the maximum Japanese effort, until I am provided firm policy on US intentions with regard to the scale on which Japanese rearmament will be supported.
6. In the light of this intention I urgently request that the negative implications of DA 89795 be reconsidered and that I be provided, as a matter of priority, firm guidance as to US intentions with respect to the expeditious creation and support of a balanced Japanese Ground Force which will protect not only Japan but also the Far East Flank of the United States.
7. In all seriousness, I consider the potential consequences of the course of action now under consideration as nothing less than catastrophic to the vital interests of our country.3
- Telegram marked “For JCS”.↩
- Dated December 17, p. 1441.↩
- In telegram DA 90318 to CINCFE, December 22, marked “From Chief of Staff”, the Department of the Army replied: “Secretary Lovett yesterday approved for inclusion in Army FY 53 budget request an amount of three hundred million dollars for JNPR program. Therefore, your discussions with Japanese should not be affected.” However, this change was not to affect the necessity for action along the lines of DA 89795, such as the establishment of an accounting system, utilization of surplus U.S. equipment where possible, and the stimulation of Japanese production of military equipment. (Department of Defense Files)↩