Smith Papers

Unsigned Memorandum of Conversation1

Memorandum About December 18, 195[1] in Tokyo re Conversation HAS2 had With Prime Minister Yoshida of Japan

HAS had a special conference with Prime Minister Yoshida at a dinner which the Prime Minister gave to the Dulles–Sparkman–Smith party. Yoshida in a private conversation with HAS sent his special regards to General MacArthur, He said that General MacArthur saved the Royal household in Japan and this made the Japanese people eternally grateful to the people of the United States. He went out of his way to ask me to express to General MacArthur, which I have done in a personal letter, his high regard for him.

Yoshida in discussing the policy with regard to China and whether Japan should recognize Communist China, or Nationalist China, expressed the view that he was embarrassed because the U.S. and Great Britain had different policies. He pointed out that Britain recognized Communist China and wanted Japan to ultimately do the same, and Britain also desired to keep some of East Asia as its own hunting ground for trade, and therefore wanted the Japanese to trade with Communist China and not interfere with the British in southeast Asia. On the other hand, the United States which has recognized [Page 1448] Nationalist China and Chiang Kai-shek’s government, wants the Japanese to make at least a limited peace treaty with the Nationalist Government on Formosa, and Yoshida took the position that if Britain and the U.S. could find a common policy, Japan would be very happy to go along with this because she has no desire in any way to recognize the Chinese Communists.

The later developments seem to be that Britain reluctantly will permit us to go ahead and help the Japanese to make an arrangement with Nationalist China for a limited recognition, which will give Nationalist China the important place in the picture. It is possible, however, that the Japanese will also make some trade arrangements with Communist China, but not under any conditions recognize Communist China. I just want to note at this point the personal talk I had with Yoshida.

I might add that Mr. Iguchi, who is the Japanese Foreign Minister, and a member of Yoshida’s Cabinet,3 had assured HAS that as far as the Japanese were concerned, they would definitely not recognize the Chinese Communists and they were prepared to go ahead and make some kind of a peace settlement with the Nationalists. Iguchi was even more on the side of the United States position than Yoshida was, and did not indicate the same cautions that Yoshida had.

  1. The memorandum bears Senator Smith’s handwritten initials.
  2. H. Alexander Smith’s “diary” entry of December 18, which deals with events of the previous day, reads in part: “Dulles has prepared a form of letter for Yoshida to sign re intention of Jap Government to make bilateral peace treaty with Nationalists—Also saying no recognition of Communists—then [defense?] of UN etc. While Dulles was working on this Sparkman and I attended the SCAP Monday morning session bringing us all up to date.” (Smith Papers)
  3. Prime Minister Yoshida was also Foreign Minister. Mr. Iguchi, who was Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, was not of cabinet rank.