Dulles Papers
Memorandum of Conversations, by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)
Subject: Ratification of Treaties
| Participants: | Secretary Acheson |
| John Foster Dulles |
I first saw Secretary Acheson about 12 noon. I told him that since I had seen him last week I had had the opportunity to talk with Senators Milliken, Wiley, H. Alexander Smith, and Hickenlooper, With reference to the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty and related Security Treaties. Without in any way asking their consent, and without getting any commitment from them, I had indicated that I was considering, at the request of the President and the Secretary of State, the suggestion that I should assume responsibility for handling the case for ratification before the Senate, and that they had not indicated that they felt there was any objection to my doing so. I accordingly told the Secretary that I was prepared to assume this responsibility if the President and he wished to delegate this task and corresponding authority to me, but only on two conditions; namely, first, that it was the intention of the President to seek prompt action by the Senate immediately upon its reconvening in January, and second, that the President was aware of the fact that any major action in 1952 would have political significance and there would be efforts on the part of both parties to gain credit or distribute discredit, and no doubt there would be some people around the President who would try to represent me as lacking in loyalty because of the way I would probably handle the case for ratification on behalf of the Executive. I would want the President to anticipate this and be prepared to assume my loyalty in this matter, despite what might be said to him to the contrary.
With reference to the first point, I pointed out that it was quite likely that the Department of Defense would want to postpone ratification in order to preserve the command relationship and to bargain for position under the Security Treaty and Administrative Agreement, but that I considered that there was ample time for Defense to make whatever arrangements were necessary between now and the probable date of the Treaty coming into force after the Senate took it up in January. I would not, I said, be responsible for getting ratification of the Treaties if their consideration by the Senate were deferred, as every day of approach to the Presidential campaign would increase the difficulty of getting the requisite Senate vote.
[Page 1379]The Secretary said he would at once discuss this matter with the President and would let me know the President’s conclusion. He said he entirely concurred in the position I had expressed.
I then met with the Secretary at 1:30 p. m., he having had an appointment with the President in the meantime. The Secretary told me that the President was in full agreement with my position and accepted it. He said that he knew quite well that the Pentagon would probably seek delays but that he was determined to push the Treaties through to ratification at the earliest possible moment. He also foresaw the political hazards I had mentioned but was determined not to allow rumors or political representations to dislodge his faith that I would loyally and in a non-partisan spirit seek the ratification of the Treaties.
I told the Secretary that in view of the President’s and his desire that I should proceed under these conditions, I was prepared to do so.