Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/9–1751

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

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[Washington,] September 17, 1951.

Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and Acting Secretary Webb September 17

Item 3. Japanese Peace Treaty Ratification

I explained to the President the various factors affecting the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty,¹ and he agreed that it should be all right for us to try to work out the arrangements of a sub-committee to consider the matter, and hope for ratification in early January. However, the President was unwilling to modify his publicly-stated position that he hoped for early ratification, and stated he wanted us to get the papers together and arrange for him to submit the treaty to the Senate promptly.

Note: This creates considerable difficulty as the majority leaders and other members of the Senate are extremely irritated at what they regard as an effort to put them in an unfair position.² They feel that if the President and the Executive Branch do not wish immediate ratification, the treaty should not be submitted at this time. They also feel that if we are not anxious for immediate ratification, the President should not publicly state that he will submit the treaty promptly and hope for prompt ratification. In my opinion, this matter requires the most careful handling both at the White House and at the Senate.

James E. Webb

1. See supra.
2. In a memorandum of a telephone conversation held September 19 with Senator Theodore Francis Green of Rhode Island, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, William C. Sherman of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs stated in part: “The Senator indicated that he found it impossible to determine just what the desires of the Department of State were with regard to ratification of the treaty and added that he felt that they were trying to blame the Senate for the delay.… He said that though he, for one, would work as hard as he could to get the treaty passed if it were presented, he would not stand for any attempt to make the Senate appear responsible for delays which were really the fault of the Department of State. He added that this was the view held by most of his colleagues although the ‘majority leaders might not have expressed themselves so strongly’.” (694.001/9–1951)