Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

693.94/9–951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)

secret

On the Plane From San Francisco to Washington, September 9, 1951.

Participants:	Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison
	John Foster Dulles

Secretary Acheson remarked to me that Mr. Morrison wanted to discuss the Japanese-Chinese situation and asked me to talk with him, which I did. Mr. Morrison said that he hoped that nothing would be done to crystallize the Japanese position toward China until after the Treaty of Peace came into force. He said that otherwise he might have difficulty about ratification. I said to Mr. Morrison that if nothing was done we, too, might have difficulty about ratification. I told him that, of course, we had not made any secret arrangements or understandings of any kind with the Japanese, as had been rumored. There was, however, the reality which had not been disguised, namely, that the present Government of Japan was strongly anti-Communist and did not want to favor or encourage the Communists either in Japan or on the Asian Mainland. The Communists themselves were violently attacking the Yoshida Government and were continuing to demand the trial of the Emperor as a war criminal. As against this, the Japanese Government had good relations with the Nationalists. It was their representative, General Ho, who was in Japan as Chinese member of the Allied Council, and trade relations with Formosa were satisfactory and important for Japanese economy. Under these circumstances it could hardly be expected that the Japanese Government would long preserve complete neutrality. We had in fact understood that Yoshida had thought of stating in his speech at San Francisco that he did not intend to do business with the Chinese Communists, and we had urged against any such public commital at this time. We could not, however, suppress indefinitely the natural desire of the Japanese Government which, we assumed, included at least such recognition of the Nationalist Government as would assure their good will in various United Nations organizations where that Government had a vote and a voice which the Japanese needed on their behalf as applicants for membership in these United Nations agencies. Also, we assumed the Japanese would want quickly to put trade, diplomatic and consular relations with Formosa on a normal, peacetime basis. None of this, however, necessarily implied Japanese acceptance of the Chinese Nationalist Government as empowered to speak for and to bind all of China. I recalled that I had expressed this point of view in London.

Mr. Morrison indicated that he saw no serious objection to what he referred to as a “de facto” arrangement between the Japanese Government and the Chinese Nationalist Government which, in substance, covered the points I had made. He indicated, however, that a full recognition of the Nationalist Government as having legitimacy and power to bind all of China so as wholly and forever to pre-empt the field of future relations would, in his opinion, be seriously objectionable and if this occurred prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty would seriously embarrass his Government and expose it to the charge of having been deceived by the United States.¹

1. In telegram 586 from Tokyo, September 19, Mr. Sebald reported in part:

   “Clutton today asked me whether I had any info re Jap intentions negot bilat treaty with Chi Natl Govt. When I replied to effect this was matter for Jap consideration and that I was without info re their intentions at this time, Clutton pointed out that Brit FonOff construes understanding with Dulles to mean that Jap wld not make choice re Chi until treaty comes into effect and that any negot between signing and return full sovereignty to Jap wld be considered breach of spirit if not letter this understanding.” (693.94/9–1951)