694.001/9–651: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
Cosan 16. For Webb from Rusk. Fol are comments on events first full day San Francisco conference which Dept may wish repeat Defense and Ridgway.1
1. Conference moved with unexpected speed and with large majorities to brush aside procedural obstacles and adopt US UK sponsored rules of procedure which insure that conference is for purpose signing present text peace treaty, with such preliminary statements as govts wish to make prior to signing. Cloture of debate by conference after two hours procedural wrangling was not at US instigation. In fact USDel and conference chairman were prepared to spend somewhat more time to insure right of minority to be heard and to allow Soviets to demonstrate that majority must act firmly to protect rights of majority from abuse. It was apparent, however, that by time cloture motion was put by Latin American dels there was little interest in further debate on rules of procedure. US, UK and Soviets abstained in vote on cloture. Of great significance was fact that, despite timing and method of cloture action, irritating to some dels, vote on adoption rigorous rules of procedure was 48 to 3, which was a grand slam vote (excluding Commies) for US–UK position. That this overwhelming majority included Indonesia, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Phils was especially gratifying.
2. Attitude Soviet del deserves special notice. Gromyko was either caught off balance by speed of developments or was clearly not trying to make major and determined fight. It seems unlikely that experienced and clever parliamentarian such as Gromyko could not, even by improvisation, have caused considerably more difficulty than was in fact produced. He missed number opportunities to make damaging moves on points of order which would have created confusion and possibly differences of view among majority. Difficulties which we had anticipated on important points did not materialize. It seemed strange that his amendments to US–UK draft rules of procedure did not include attacks on fundamental concepts such as those contained in Articles 1 and 7.
3. Soviet fight for admission Red China was miserable failure, possibly Gromyko was disconcerted by fact that majority which was itself [Page 1335] sharply divided on Chi recognition presented solid front in refusing consider invitation Peiping. Possibly Gromyko was under instruction not to make last ditch fight on admission Peiping for reasons unknown.
4. Gromyko’s statements on substance were more moderate in language than Soviet statements in UN usually are and re-hashed themes already presented in Soviet notes and propaganda re Jap treaty in recent months. Many dels surprised that Gromyko was not more menacing in tone.
5. In seeking explanation Gromyko tactics beyond range of surprise and parliamentary ineptness, question is raised whether Soviets may not wish San Francisco conf to end quickly in relation to time table other events for which Jap treaty would provide at least partial pretext. Or Soviets may wish cast themselves as innocent victims of aggressive US preparatory some serious development Soviet policy or action. For example, they may be preparing politically for resumption large scale offensive in Korea, perhaps going beyond previous Communist offensive Korea as to scale, area and nature.
On optimistic side would be possibility that Soviets are worried and possibly confused and that increase US and free world strength and momentum behind this treaty is beginning to make impression particularly when backed by overwhelming majority other govts from all important world regions. British del here split on whether today’s development shld be interpreted with pessimism or optimism. Matter obviously requires urgent and careful intelligence assessment.
6. USDel has been somewhat surprised by strong surge of support from 48 dels in non-Commie majority. Although we felt when we reached San Francisco that 40 or more signatures would be good result, there is outside chance that 48 signatures will be forthcoming. There remains some difficulty with both Netherlands and Indonesia on economic clauses and domestic situation both countries may prevent signature. Pakistan, Ceylon, Philippines and Arab States are now expected to sign.
7. Shld not be overlooked that Soviets still have many opportunities to pursue obstructive tactics at this conference as, for example, proposals to amend rules and that their instructions on tactics cld be changed from day to day. Above comments relate only to events of first full day conference final results of which shld by no means be taken for granted. Dulles, Bohlen and Rusk concur this message. [Rusk.]
- Telegram relayed to General Ridgway through Department of the Army channels.↩