H. Alexander Smith Papers, Princeton University

Unsigned Memorandum of Conversation

Memorandum re Conference Between HAS and Prime Minister of Japan Yoshida in San Francisco During the Week of September 3rd to 8th, 1951

HAS met Premier Yoshida on the introduction of Mr. William R. Castle2 and had an interesting conference of about an hour, or an hour and a half. The principal matters that HAS made a note of at the time were the following:

1. Mr. Yoshida’s special interest in General MacArthur and the gratitude which he felt for what MacArthur had done for the Japanese people. He said that he had a very special arrangement with MacArthur whereby if he had any problems of government he could quietly contact the General and get the benefit of the General’s advice. [Page 1327] He said that this had been of great value to him and that the General had never let him, or the Japanese people down. His advice had been constantly in the best interests of the development of the democratic processes in Japan among the Japanese people.

2. The recognition of Communist China. HAS discussed frankly with Yoshida the possibility of Japanese recognition of Communist China and the making of a peace treaty with the Communist Peiping Government, rather than with the Nationalist Government on Formosa. Yoshida assured HAS that there was no possibility of Japan making a peace treaty with the Chinese Communists. He said that Japan might postpone some time making a peace treaty with either group, but without committing himself, he implied that they are interested really in making the peace treaty with General Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist crowd, but under no conditions with the Communists.

3. Trade with China. Yoshida pointed out that during the period that Formosa was a part of the Japanese Empire, there was quite a brisk trade with Formosa back and forth. He said that Formosa contributed rice and sugar to the Japanese economy and also said manufactured products. He pointed out that since the war this trade had been practically cut off, but he was hopeful that the trade in rice and sugar could be built up. He said he saw little hope at the present time for a revival of manufactured products from Formosa.

With regard to the China mainland, he said that prior to the war there had been less than 5% of Japanese total foreign trade with the China mainland, outside of Manchuria. He saw no particular advantage in making a deal with the Commies in order to get this mainland China trade reestablished. On the other hand, he emphasized the great importance of Manchurian trade and the Manchurian industries. He raised the question of whether possibly some kind of a trade arrangement might be made to reestablish this Manchurian trade. He had no specific suggestion to make, but he emphasized again that it should not be in the form of a peace treaty with the Chinese Communists.

4. The China Nationalist Government on Formosa. In answer to a question from HAS he said that he did not know Mr. K. C. Wu3 personally. He said that K. C. Wu had sent a private message to him asking if he would meet with K. C. secretly in Japan if K. C. came to Japan. He said he felt very strongly that secret meetings were unwise, and, therefore, had declined to participate in any secret meeting. He seemed to be somewhat critical of K. C. for having suggested a secret conference.

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5. Ratification of the Treaty. Yoshida asked HAS whether HAS thought the Japanese or the United States should ratify the treaty first. He seemed to be unaware that the treaty itself provides for the ratification by Japan before ratification by the other treaty participants. HAS advised him very strongly that Japan should ratify as promptly as possible, even if it required a special calling of the Japanese Diet together. Yoshida said he felt that this was right and he would take immediate steps to have the treaty ratified by the Japanese Diet. HAS was not in a position to give him any assurance as to whether or not the treaty would be promptly ratified by the United States, although it may be noted here that HAS feels very strongly that as soon as Japan has ratified our Foreign Relations Committee should start holding hearings on the treaty and recommend it to the Senate for ratification as promptly as possible, as in any event there will be an extended debate on the treaty.

  1. Senator Smith’s “Diary” entry for September 4 reads in part as follows: “Yesterday I saw Dulles re developments and he told me of the conversation with Yoshida. I was angered to learn that apparently Acheson left the door open for the Japs to recognize and make a treaty [with] (Communist China and not Nationalists. Dulles was disturbed so a conference was arranged for me with Yoshida.” The “Diary” indicates also that this conference took place on the 3d. (Smith Papers) For Mr. Sebald’s memorandum of a conversation held September 3 between the Prime Minister, Secretary Acheson, and other officials, see p. 1315.
  2. William R. Castle, Jr., Under Secretary of State, 1931–1933.
  3. Governor of Taiwan.