Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/8–2151: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

secret

Washington, August 21, 1951—3 p. m.

164. Reur 213 Aug 14² and 222 Aug 15³ Dept approves line you have taken with FonMin and desires you explore further with him suggestion last para ur 222 on understanding any formula wld require reference to Wash for consideration and approval.

Dulles has discussed this problem at length and on several occasions with Am Koo who is believed to be sympathetic and is understood have put to Taipei certain suggestions along these lines. Apparently he has failed however to secure approval his ideas or alternative language and for this reason Dept believes scene of effort shld now be transferred Taipei as nearer Gimo.

In present situation our overriding concern is to restore sovereignty to Japan and liquidate the occupation, an object which is equally in the Natl Govts interest. To achieve this, first essential is that the Jap peace treaty be signed by majority members FEC. Otherwise it might be easy for USSR and other possible non-signatory FEC powers to claim inheritance of occupation rights and take action contrary to US interest in Japan. Such action wld be made more difficult in proportion to number FEC countries who sign multilateral treaty. Careful early poll of FEC members showed majority wld not sign multilateral treaty if Natl Govt were signatory, despite US desire and open efforts for Chi Natls participation.

Solution worked out by Dulles with Morrison was maximum US practically able to obtain. This left to Japs bilateral negot with China with Jap as free agent and not in response to occupation directive.

FYI only we have written assurance from Yoshida that Jap Govt has no intention negotiating with Commie China, Deptel 185, Aug 17⁴ reports Dulles conversation Aug 9 with rep Brit Emb Wash⁵ setting forth Dulles understanding his agreement with Morrison re timing and any action our part vis-à-vis Japs in matter.

In discussion with FonMin you shld point out US has endeavored protect rights China as fully as possible in multilateral treaty. Note Arts 21 and 26. US will accordingly facilitate in all appropriate ways conclusion bilateral between Natl Govt and Japs. We agree with FonMin it shld be unnecessary for Chi Govt to negotiate with Jap Govt re any provisions covered in multilateral. Under Art 26 Jap is obligated to extend these to China. Negot therefore wld in US view be ltd to those additional subjs of Chi–Jap interest not covered in multilateral which either of parties might desire discuss.

During such negots or possibly as condition precedent their start, Japs may well insist on acknowledgment by Chi Natl Govt inability latter to enter at this time into treaty which wld bind all of China and all of Chi. Extent to which US wld feel itself capable of exercising influence on Japs to proceed with bilateral negot wld be determined by willingness of Chi to devise or accept some formula which wld ack such limitation. We cld not in good conscience exert our admittedly important influence with Japs to agree to treaty with Chi Natl Govt which failed to recognize latters present inability to bind all China for performance under treaty. Difficulty of arriving at such formula is fully recognized here in light possible effect on Natls position in UN and related factors.

You shld emphasize to FonMin US objective from start has been to protect prestige Chi Govt to maximum feasible extent in difficult situation. You may wish, however, at some point to remind Chi that Chi Govt chose course directly contrary advice given Koo by Dulles by making public issue on prestige when it had opportunity to minimize damage by taking initiative itself and publicly asserting greater length of war and other factors required separate bilateral fol gen multilateral terms but reflecting elements peculiar to Sino-Jap war.

In answer to first question urtel 213 US has had in mind throughout that Sino-Jap bilateral wld faithfully follow multilateral terms.

Reur second question same reftel US unable give categoric answer at this time. Whereas it wld directly counter our agreement with UK for Sino-Jap treaty to be signed prior to signature multilateral, or within such few days thereafter as to raise matter of Jap free choice we by no means exclude Sino-Jap signature prior to multilateral going into force. Much wld depend upon Jap attitude and effective powers of Japs which wld in turn depend upon how far and how fast SCAP might turn back powers to Jap Govt in interregnum.⁶

Acheson

1. Telegram drafted by Mr. Merchant and cleared by, among others, Mr. Perkins. Repeated for information to the U.S. Political Adviser’s Mission in Tokyo as telegram Topad 291.
2. Ante, p. 1267.

3. In this telegram Chargé Rankin had in part stated he had told Minister Yeh that the Department would not wish actually to use the word “obligation” as describing the Japanese position toward the Chinese Government in arranging a bilateral treaty due to the delicacy of the entire situation. He had concluded:

   “In discussing matter with Amb Koo on basis FonMin’s verbal statement (mytel 213, August 14) Dept might consider attempting satisfy legitimate Chi Govt desires by some form of assurance US will do its best to see that Japs sign bilateral treaty with Chi Govt shortly after San Francisco signing, on condition Chi Govt seek no significant changes from multilateral draft and accept suitable clause re scope of application.” (694.001/8–1551)

4. Not printed.
5. Ante, p. 1249.
6. In telegram 273 from Taipei, August 24, Mr. Rankin replied to this message as follows: “Substance Deptel 164, August 21, re Jap treaty discussed with FonMin who promised expedite draft formula for scope of application.” (694.001/8–2451)