Editorial Note
Special Estimate 11, “Probability of a Communist Assault on Japan in 1951,” was printed in final form by August 15. It bears this notation: “The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in producing this estimate.”
The authors of this Estimate stated that the USSR had the capability of invading Japan and described this capability in some detail. However, in a section headed “Indications” they stated that there was no reliable evidence of a Soviet intent to undertake an early invasion of Japan. There were “reports alleging Sino-Soviet plans to initiate expanded hostilities in the fall” but these reports were of unknown reliability. Under “Probabilities” the Estimate reads in part: “Available indications do not suggest that an early Soviet invasion of Japan is probable. However, these indications would not in themselves necessarily be conclusive.… The USSR might take the risk of precipitating [Page 1272] general war if it foresaw an immediate threat to its vital interests. We do not believe that the Kremlin is likely to conclude that the signing of the US–UK sponsored Japanese Peace Treaty and/or Japanese rearmament alone constitutes a threat to its vital interests during the remainder of 1951.” (Files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research)