Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Lot 54D423

Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] April 13, 1951.

I have examined the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense¹ on the subject of security arrangements between the United States and Pacific island nations.

1. It seems to me that there can be agreement in substance in that we can probably arrange for a United States statement with reference to the Philippines which would give them adequate reassurance without any enlargement of the scope of Philippine participation in United States security arrangements over that presently in effect. This is being further explored.

2. In the case of the tri-lateral arrangement with Australia and New Zealand, we can, I think, make it clear that any organization thereunder will not have the right to demand knowledge of and to participate in planning by, the North Atlantic Treaty organization, the Organization of American States or any other security organizations not directly related to the Pacific area.

On the foregoing assumptions, I have redrawn the proposed President’s statement and it is annexed hereto.

In my opinion, the whole program for Pacific peace on which we are working will be in danger unless we can move quickly along these lines.²

J. F. D[ulles]

[Annex]

Draft Presidential Statement

In connection with the reestablishment of peace with Japan, we are discussing with the Japanese Government the implementation of its expressed desire for a posttreaty security arrangement pursuant to which United States Armed Forces might on a provisional basis remain in and about Japan.

The United States maintains, and expects to continue to maintain its Armed Forces in the Ryukyus, particularly at Okinawa.³

In the Philippines, the United States is accorded certain military operating rights and facilities pursuant to an agreement with the Government of the Philippines and the whole world knows that the United States recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines, would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly.

The Governments of Australia and New Zealand, in connection with the reestablishment of peace with Japan, have now raised the question of whether there might not be an arrangement between them and the United States, pursuant to Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter which would make clear that no one of the three would be indifferent to an armed attack upon the other in the Pacific; and which would establish consultation to strengthen security on the basis of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.

The possibilities of such an arrangement were fully explored by Mr. Dulles at Canberra, Australia, and Wellington, New Zealand, and have since been informally discussed with the appropriate sub-committees of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House.

I have now asked the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and Mr. Dulles, as my special representative in relation to the Japanese Peace Settlement and related matters, to pursue this matter further concurrently with the prosecution of the other negotiations necessary to bring the Japanese peace settlement to an early and satisfactory conclusion.

The series of arrangements and dispositions outlined above, would strengthen the fabric of peace in the whole Pacific Ocean area, where security is strongly influenced by sea and air power. They constitute natural initial steps in the consolidation of peace in that area and also will contribute to the building of universal peace as sought by the United Nations, and under which great goal the sacrificial⁴ efforts of our nation are now being largely dedicated.

1. April 11; see footnote 4, supra.
2. On April 13 the Dulles Mission once more left Washington for Tokyo. Concerning the background of this visit, see Mr. Dulles’ memorandum of the conversation held April 11 between himself, President Truman, and Secretary Acheson, p. 975.
3. In a memorandum of April 13 to Secretary Marshall, which forms the enclosure to his covering letter of April 16 to Mr. Acheson, the JOS stated they had no objection to this paragraph unless it was “intended to serve as a basis for departure in any way” from numbered paragraph 4 of the March 23 draft Japanese peace treaty printed on p. 944. General Marshall concurred with this comment and with the other comment of the JCS, cited in footnote 4 below, on Mr. Dulles’ draft. (694.001/4–1651)
4. In the memorandum cited footnote 3 above, the JCS stated their belief that the word “sacrificial” should be deleted.