694.001/8–951
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)
| Participants: | Mr. G. C. Fitzmaurice, |
| British Foreign Office, London | |
| Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, | |
| Counselor, British Embassy, Washington | |
| John Foster Dulles | |
| John M. Allison |
In the course of conversations about the Japanese Peace Treaty, Tomlinson asked me whether we interpreted the U.S.-U.K. understanding about China to prevent the signature of any Peace Treaty between Japan and any Chinese government until after the coming into force of the main Treaty of Peace.
I said I did not think that it was possible to give any categorical answer to this question. The principle involved was that there should [Page 1250] be no Allied coercion upon Japan to adopt an arbitrary course as regards China which might prejudice Japanese best interests for the future. Under these circumstances a good deal would depend upon the degree of freedom which might, in fact, be restored to Japan after the signature of the Treaty, but before the coming into force, particularly if the latter was considerably deferred. Conceivably events, such as the Korean fighting, might make it desirable to give Japan all of the freedoms contemplated by the Treaty except sovereignty with respect to military matters. This illustrated how the degree of independent choice which Japan in fact acquired after signing and before “coming into force” could be an element in applying our agreed principle.
Another element was the implications of any arrangement with a Chinese government. It seemed to me that we should all be concerned not to influence Japan, during the period of our control of Japanese foreign policy, into a fictitious and unrealistic course, such as, for example, might be involved if Japan entered into a Peace Treaty with the Nationalist Government which assumed that the Nationalist Government thereby effectively dealt with all aspects of its problems with China and could effectively establish a peace which would bind all of China and all Chinese. On the other hand, it would be normal that the Japanese Government would quickly re-establish peaceful terms with the Nationalist Government in so far as the latter had effective power and a right in various international organs to participate in decisions of vital interest to Japan. Japan was eager to get into various United Nations organizations and the Allied Powers recognized the voice and vote of the Chinese Nationalist delegates and ought not to require Japan to exclude friendly relations with them. Also, trade between Formosa and Japan was of great and growing importance. It seemed to me that a treaty of peace with Nationalist China which was related only to realities and which did not involve a fiction which would exclude further development of Japanese interests in relation to China, would be something which might be promptly explored so that an appropriate treaty could come into force with Nationalist China virtually simultaneously with the coming into force of the multilateral Peace Treaty.
Tomlinson indicated that he thought the interpretation I had adopted was reasonable. However, he will no doubt report it to London and his initial reaction should not necessarily be treated as authoritative from the standpoint of the U.K.
- Date of conversation; memorandum prepared on August 10.↩