Office of the Historian

694.001/8–251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald)1

secret
priority
Washington, August 2, 1951—7 p. m.

Topad 173. Your 154 July 21 and 175 July 25.2 Continuing absence contacts and conversations between Jap Govt and Natl China Govt giving rise to news stories and rumors that Jap Govt may intend to deal with Commie Govt. This question raised yesterday by some Senators. We denied categorically, stating that we had every confidence that Jap Govt wished to make peace with Chi Natl Govt. Our reliance for this is Yoshida statement reported your 2001, May 19.3 However, present bipartisan support for treaty and prospects ratification could be seriously damaged unless Jap Govt now takes some steps to give public impression corresponding your 2001, upon which we have relied in working out formula embodied in Art 26 of the draft treaty.

We suggest it may be desirable Jap Govt quickly move to estab overseas agency relation with Chi Natl Govt as suggested your 154. We further suggest that in this connection there shld be attached to the agency at Taipei someone of sufficient polit stature to initiate informal discussions with Natl Govt designed to pave way for formal negots to conclude arrangements contemplated by Art 4 (a) of the draft treaty and perhaps also lay basis for expediting the Bilateral when this is in order. We have not changed our view that it is not practical to have Bilateral signed contemporaneously with multilateral, nor our view that the scope of Natl Govt authority is an element that must be taken into account so that act of concluding peace does not have unrealistic implications for Japan. We are however giving thought to possibility of letting it become known unofficially that along lines of Yoshida’s statement reported your 2001 Jap Govt wishes peace with Chi Natl Govt as govt which a) was signatory of the UN Declaration referred to in Art 26, b) declared war on Jap, c) exercises authority over substantial Chi forces and resources, d) votes and speaks in intl bodies to which Jap aspires to mbrship, and e) has authority over [Page 1237] Formosa with which Jap has increasingly close commercial relations; that the present capacity of Natl Govt to bind all of China and all Chi nationals to a state of peace is obviously a factor to be taken into account, but it is not looked upon as a factor which excludes the achievement of at least the peaceful objectives indicated above, leaving others to be achieved in due course.

We wld appreciate your prompt personal reactions on the foregoing which is being rpted to Taipei for Rankin’s personal info and report of his personal reactions.4

Acheson
  1. Telegram drafted by Mr. Dulles and cleared by Mr. Merchant.↩
  2. Neither printed. In telegram 175 Mr. Sebald had reported in part that the Japanese Government had decided to delay establishment of an overseas agency at Taipei until after the signing of the peace treaty, but definitely expected to establish one at that time. The decision had apparently been taken partly in deference to the wishes of the United Kingdom. However, the Japanese Government had approved a request by Chiang Kai-shek that Isao Kawada be appointed a finance adviser to the Nationalist Government. “Iguchi commented this appt wld serve as stopgap until opening overseas agency and probably mollify hurt feelings Chi.” (693.94/7–2551)↩
  3. Ante, p. 1050.↩

  4. Telegram repeated to Taipei as number 89. In reply Mr. Rankin stated in part his general approval of the “constructive approach” contained in it. (Telegram 171 from Taipei, August 6; 694.001/8–651)

    However, see telegram 257, from Tokyo, August 4, p. 1239.

    ↩