Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/7–651: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China ¹

secret

Washington, July 9, 1951—8 p. m.

18. Reurtel 33, July 9.² Regret impossible now delay publication of July 3 draft on July 12, 3:30 p. m. London DST, Washington 10:30 a. m. DST. Many govts in many places are involved and Morrison has scheduled concurrent statement to Parliament.

We continue desirous do all possible handle with regard for Natl Govt. We do not object that Govt making statement clarifying its position and see no reason why FonMin shld not concurrently announce that Chi Govt plans negotiate bilateral treaty along lines similar to multilateral with earlier date for beginning of China war, but we wld urge that statement to be made now shld not specify “coming into force same time”. We wld think in fact bilateral cld be discussed shortly fol signature multilateral and with view to its coming into force shortly after coming into force of multilateral if as suggested Deptel 10, July 6, there were some definition of implications so far as Jap concerned so that it wld put treaty relations on a realistic basis related to de facto power of Natl Govt rather than upon highly artificial assumption of power to bind all China to peace, a result which Koo has repeatedly disclaimed.³

We have emphasized to Koo that timing in relation to China–Japan bilateral might well be influenced by this consideration. We have been discussing with Koo since July 3⁴ possible formula and are now awaiting positive suggestions. Until, however, this point is further developed we wld think that Natl Govt wld be wiser not to be so precise as to “coming into force” as suggested by urtel 33. We apprehend this might lead Allied Powers which recognize Chi Peoples Govt to exert themselves to block result forecast before the other Allied Powers are in a position to put forward their best case.

Acheson

1. Telegram drafted by Mr. Dulles. Repeated to the U.S. Political Adviser’s Mission in Tokyo as Topad 39.

2. This telegram (in part) follows:

   “Specifically FonMin desires be in position announce at time July 3 treaty text made public that Chinese Govt plans undertake negots for bilateral treaty along lines similar multilateral and coming into force same time.

   “FonMin assures me bilateral treaty project not yet discussed with Japanese since prior US agreement essential. However, he learns from reliable sources Japanese now plan await coming into force of multilateral before ‘choosing’ which China they will deal with. Since only US ‘encouragement’ cld prevent such action FonMin feels decisive consideration in Dulles–Koo discussions is whether US willing provide necessary encouragement. If so, is statement … above satisfactory to us and can he be assured Japanese will not repudiate it? If not, he again requested urgently publication July 3 draft be delayed until Dulles–Koo reach agreement.” (694.001/7–951)

3. In telegram 10, drafted by Mr. Dulles, the Department has stated in part: “Since Chi Amb [V. K. Wellington Koo] has himself expressed doubt regarding ability his Govt to provide ratification which wld bind all China, we have asked him to consider whether his Govt wld, at time of signature of bilateral, accept some defined qualification of its power and if so, what wld that qualification be. We pointed out that this might facilitate and expedite China–Japan bilateral but also that it might embarrass Natl Govts position in the UN and its organs. We have had no reply on this point but expect to continue talks.” (694.001/7–651)
4. Mr. Dulles’ memorandum of his talk held July 3 with Ambassador Koo, not printed, is in Lot 54 D 423.