694.001/6–2351: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State
priority
Topad 2224. For Dulles from Sebald. Mytel 2219, June 23.1 Herewith my preliminary comments on latest draft treaty as a whole and without reference to specific provisions which will be subj of separate tel from CINCFE to DA and Dept.
June 14 draft is, of course, in many respects entirely different document from preliminary draft handed to and agreed upon by Jap during your last visit and I, therefore, believe we must bear in mind [Page 1142] that Jap thinking and concepts of treaty are largely conditioned upon language and provisions of earlier draft. While I agree that June 14 draft perhaps does not do undue violence to publicly announced concept of “treaty of reconciliation” and similar public assurances to Jap people, latest draft nevertheless appears to me to be somewhat unfriendly in tone and to some extent arbitrary in its attempt to tie up numerous loose ends which we had hoped cld be deferred for later determination. Although I do not as yet know whether Allison will be authorized hand latest draft to Jap for their study and comment, I believe it most essential that Jap thinking on proposed treaty be reoriented by preliminary preparation and careful explanation of difficulties which arose in negots with UK (both in Wash and London) and made acceptance some of latter’s concepts necessary or desirable.
In light of numerous public statements both in US and Japan regarding seven basic principles upon which treaty wld be founded I anticipate considerable shock on part Jap Govt and people when latest draft becomes known. While it is entirely possible that Jap Govt at some subsequent date can successfully prepare Jap public opinion for what is to follow, one of intangible difficulties which will probably arise is question of govt’s ability ward off opposition attacks in light of previous implications only really onerous provisions related to territory. There is also possibility resultant dissatisfaction with treaty will primarily be directed against UK (and secondarily against US) especially as previous draft published in Japan will form basis of comparison and clearly indicate where and how US gave way in consequence assumed Brit pressure. Widespread criticism against our principal ally wld not, it appears to me, be in interest of healthy atmosphere for wholehearted acceptance and implementation treaty by Jap and it therefore behooves us, in our subsequent negots with Jap, to convince them that present draft is minimum acceptable within realms of practicality and that govt must do best possible assuage criticisms, withstand opposition, and strongly support signing and ratification treaty earliest possible date.
I hope that line can be held from here on out and that no further onerous or quasi-punitive provisions will be written into treaty in consequence pressure from other govts which appear to be committed to some such provisions for real or fancied reasons.
Notwithstanding above, I feel you are to be congratulated on completion most difficult portion of thorny road leading toward peace and sound future Amer-Jap relations.
Above are solely my own views and to be evaluated as such.
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