Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/6–2251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

confidential
niact

Washington, June 22, 1951—noon.

3273. For Allison.¹ Urtel 4133, June 21.² Re revised text reparations clause Dulles considers you shld stand on present draft in your discussions Phil Govt. Reparations provisions June 14 draft not yet even discussed with Japanese. If any changes are to be made these provisions they shd only be as result subsequent formal consideration. Elimination reference Japan’s lack of capacity make adequate reparation while maintaining viable econ and mtg other obligations might result in impression reparation of prior or at least equal status these purposes. Safeguards estab last sentence para (a) (1) Art 14 are in int other powers as well as Jap. Considering its responsibilities re Japanese econ US cld not agree omission these safeguards, opening way for reparations arrangements ultimately at our expense.³

Acheson

1. Mr. Allison arrived in Manila on June 22.

2. In this telegram, Mr. Harrington had in part reported:

   “In order clarify issue I asked Romulo to state position from which Phils cld not recede. He gave me fol revised wording of reparations clauses ‘the allied powers recognize that the Japs shld in principle pay reparations for the damage and suffering caused by them during the war and that Jap shld agree promptly to enter into negots with allied powers so desiring whose present territories were occupied by Jap Forces and damaged by Jap with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done by making available the skills and industry of the Jap people in manufacturing, salvaging and other services to be rendered to the allied powers in question.’

   “I told Romulo his insistence and apparent lack of appreciation our problem very disappointing but promised transmit his views and revised text reparations clause. As Allison will be subjected to strong pressure here guidance in light of foregoing will be appreciated. Advise soonest.” (694.001/6–2151)

3. In telegram 4165 from Manila, June 23, marked “For Dulles from Allison”, the latter reported in part:

   “Reason for inclusion of last sentence (a) (1) Article 14 as outlined Deptel 3273 June 22 explained. Principal Phil objection to US reparation clauses is fact that it seems to place too much emphasis Jap inability to pay. After considerable discussion Quirino and Romulo made further revision of para forwarded Embtel 4133 June 21 as fols: ‘Japan recognizes that it shld pay reparation for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war and therefore agrees promptly to enter into negots with allied powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Jap forces and damaged by Japanese with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the skills and industry of the Jap people in manufacturing, salvaging and other service to be rendered to the allied powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other allied powers’.

   “I told President that cld give him no hope that this wld be satisfactory but that I wld pass it on to Wash, with his observations. Quirino made it clear that if US cld accept working along above lines he wld be able to satisfy public opinion in Phil and that Phil Govt wld then be able to go along with peace treaty.” (694.001/6–2351)