Editorial Note
In his general summary of the negotiations which led to the peace treaty, Mr. Fearey wrote in part as follows:
“On June 12 Mr. Dulles was advised in Paris that the British Cabinet had decided to accept the Chinese representation formula agreed between himself and Mr. Morrison. With this major hurdle cleared, agreement was quickly reached following Mr. Dulles’ return to London the next day on a number of other outstanding issues. The United Kingdom agreed not to press its proposal for the distribution of Japanese owned gold as reparations, while the United States agreed that Japanese assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries should be turned over to the International Committee of the Red Cross to distribute for the benefit of members of the armed forces who had suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan. Explanations by the United Kingdom representatives, further consideration by the United States representatives, and certain assurances received from the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements enabled the United States to withdraw the objections which it had previousy maintained to a United Kingdom proposal that the treaty require Japan to give up its rights under the Congo Basin Treaties and to withdraw from the Bank for International Settlements.
“On June 14, the date of Mr. Dulles’ departure for the United States, a revision of the May 3 draft was prepared embodying the understandings reached, including a number of further technical amendments worked out by United States and United Kingdom experts during Mr. Dulles’ stay. The June 14 draft represented full agreement on treaty terms, subject to confirmation by the two Governments, on all but four points: the British Government still reserved a proposal, advanced primarily on behalf of certain of the Commonwealth Governments, for an additional provision in the fisheries (article to cover the period prior to the conclusion of the contemplated bilateral fishing agreements; the United Kingdom still reserved a proposal that Japan not be permitted to include measures in respect to [Page 1119] shipping and navigation among the measures it might take to safeguard its external financial position or balance of payments without derogating from the grant of national or most-favored-nation treatment; and both the British and United States positions were reserved on the question of the inclusion of certain assets in Thailand in the above-mentioned fund for the benefit of former prisoners of war. Finally, the United Kingdom was unwilling to commit itself to the acceptability of the legislation then being drawn up by the Japanese Government in consultation with United States experts to provide compensation for war damage to Allied property in Japan, until it had had further opportunity to examine that legislation.” (Robert A. Fearey, “Summary of Negotiations Leading Up To the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace With Japan,” September 18, 694.001/9–1851. The June 14 draft is infra.)
Text of the joint United Kingdom–United States press release issued in London June 14 is printed in the New York Times of June 15.
Mr. Acheson and Mr. Dulles met with the President on June 15. No confidential record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files. A copy of the White House press release regarding this discussion, issued June 15, is in file 694.001/6–1551.