Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/6–1451

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) and the Second Secretary of the Embassy in France (Utter)¹

secret

Paris, June 11, 1951.

Participants:	M. Alexandre Parodi2
	M. Jean Chauvel3
	M. James Baeyens
	M. Emile Naggiar4
	M. Jacques Roux5
	M. Pierre Charpentier6 and
	M. Pierre Cerles,7 all of the French Foreign Office.
	The Honorable John Foster Dulles, Department of State.
	The Honorable David Bruce, Ambassador, Paris.
	John E. Utter, Secretary of Embassy, Paris.

At the request of M. Parodi, Mr. Dulles reported briefly on the status of the London negotiations.

The French Delegation seemed particularly interested in the proposed handling of China. Mr. Dulles stated that various formulae were being considered and that the U.S. had suggested either to invite both Chinese Governments or neither. The matter was being considered by the British Cabinet.

M. Parodi indicated that France would be disposed to go along with any solution on this matter that was agreed to by the U.S. and U.K.

M. Parodi then asked what the plans were for concluding the treaty. Mr. Dulles stated that we hoped that there could be soon a text which substantially reflected all the known points of view, except probably that of the Soviet Union; that thereupon this text would be transmitted to all the countries which had been at war with Japan, requesting with short delay any comments they had, with the understanding that there would then shortly be held a conference to sign the treaty, subject to such final minor changes as might be generally agreed upon in advance of the final engrossing of the text. We hoped that this final signing conference could be held by the end of the summer, although probably ratification and coming into force of the treaty could not occur until some time in 1952.

M. Baeyens said that he had heard it suggested that Japan would have discretion to deal with the question of China. Mr. Dulles stated that if there was a multilateral treaty which China was not invited to sign, that would automatically leave to Japan the problem of dealing with other states at war by means of bilateral treaties which the multilateral treaty would permit, on the understanding that if they granted more favorable rights, the parties to the multilateral treaty would participate pari passu.

Mr. Dulles stated that the U.S. would like to see Japan at peace with all the countries, including the Soviet bloc, which had been at war, and that it might be more convenient for the Japanese to work this out directly than on a multilateral basis.

M. Parodi raised the question of accession clauses and said he assumed that if we proceeded on the theory now being discussed, there would be no accession clause. Mr. Dulles confirmed this.

M. Naggiar asked whether this would mean that Article 19 of the U.S. March draft⁸ would be dropped. Mr. Dulles said no, that Article 22 would be dropped and Article 19 might be modified somewhat. The French Delegation seemed to attach considerable importance to modifying the last part of Article 19.

M. Parodi raised the possibility of a series of bilateral pacts. Mr. Dulles stated that this was one possibility that the U.S. was prepared to entertain but that the U.K. had indicated a preference for a multilateral treaty limited to certain invited states, as otherwise it would be difficult to prevent the conclusion of a simultaneous bilateral treaty between Japan and the National Government of China.

M. Parodi raised the question of whether we would consider that any of the provisions of the Japanese peace treaty would be a precedent for Germany. Mr. Dulles stated that the U.S. did not consider that the two situations were comparable and that it was definitely understood within our own Government as between those working upon the Japanese and German peace settlements, that neither constitutes a precedent for the other, and he could assure M. Parodi that the U.S. would not claim that acceptance by the French of a certain solution for Japan in any way implied acceptance of the same solution for Germany. M. Parodi said this reassurance was of the utmost importance to the French Government.

M. Parodi asked whether we considered it impractical to proceed with Japan through a series of liberalizing steps as were contemplated in the case of Germany. Mr. Dulles stated that for better or for worse the Japanese had been led to expect a peace treaty which would as a single act restore their sovereignty. He believed that any alteration of that program at the present time would have serious, perhaps disastrous repercussions upon Japanese good will and that this change ought not now to be considered.

M. Parodi raised the question of the bearing that proceeding with a Japanese peace treaty might have upon other relations with the Soviet Union, notably the matters which were being discussed at the Palais Rose.⁹ Mr. Dulles stated that in his opinion weakness and timidity shown in relation to the Japanese peace treaty would have bad repercussions upon other negotiations with Russia because it would encourage the Russians to be stronger and threatening. He pointed out that the Soviet Union had no legal, practical or moral basis for obstructing the Japanese peace; that it had neither made a major contribution to winning the Japanese war nor had it a veto through the Council of Foreign Ministers, nor had it a practical control through occupation. If under these circumstances we allowed ourselves to be intimidated, that would only encourage the Russians to be more threatening in other matters. To show that we were not afraid to act when we had a clear and moral right to do so was the best way to win Russian respect.

M. Chauvel said that the question raised was not merely of substance but of tactics, but he thought it had been answered by Mr. Dulles’ reply.

Mr. Dulles went on to say that what was at stake was not merely the relations with Russia regarding Europe but the maintenance of Japan within the free world. Communists in Japan were threatening and boasting that the U.S. and other Western nations were not really prepared to stand firm in the Pacific but would abandon Japan in order to gain time for Europe, therefore they said it would be foolish for them to cast in their lot with the Western powers. If we did anything which seemed to confirm this Communist propaganda in Japan, it would be fatal and almost surely result in an eventual tie-up between Soviet Russia, Communist China and Japan, which would be a very formidable combination which for a considerable time at least would dominate most of the entire Pacific area and Southeast Asia.

M. Parodi stated that this was a most important explanation and decisive for the French Government.

M. Naggiar asked Mr. Dulles what he thought might be the Soviet reaction, having regard to the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance of 1950. Mr. Dulles stated that he doubted that the Soviet Union wanted now to precipitate a general war. If, however, they did, it would not be because they felt compelled to do so by treaty but because for other reasons they wanted to do so. They might under these circumstances make the Sino-Soviet treaty a pretext in view of rearmament under NATO. Actually there was no prospect of any early Japanese rearmament which could honestly be regarded with fear by the Soviet Union and intrinsically be a reason for Soviet action. Mr. Dulles then explained at considerable length the present lack of armament by the Japanese and pointed out that the real concern of the Soviet Union was with the U.S. position in Okinawa which would exist whether or not there was a Japanese peace treaty.

At this point the discussion turned to particular terms of the proposed treaty, as follows:

1) War Guilt. The French suggested there might be some war guilt clause similar to the Italian treaty. Mr. Dulles, referring to the Treaty of Versailles, said he did not much favor these clauses, but that the U.S. would consider in the reparations section some reference to Japanese responsibility in principle for damage done to the Allied powers by the Japanese war. M. Parodi said that France did not really feel very strongly on the question of war guilt.

2) Territorial Clauses. M. Chauvel raised the question of Article 5 which, read in conjunction with Article 19, would seem to leave Japan with sovereignty over South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands on the assumption that the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty. He suggested that it might be better to include reference to Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands in the formula of Article 3. Mr. Dulles said the U.S. would be prepared to consider sympathetically this suggestion.

M. Chauvel raised the question of whether it would be desirable to include a reference to solution of the territorial problems by the U.N. as had been originally proposed in the U.S. statement of Seven Principles. Mr. Dulles stated that exchanges of views already had indicated that there was strong opposition to this solution. The Soviet Union took the position that the Yalta Agreement was not subject to review by the U.N., and both Chinese factions took the same view regarding Formosa. It seemed therefore better to limit the Japanese peace treaty to liquidating the Japanese interest and not going into the question of how the future might be dealt with. He felt that it was dangerous by treaty to impose upon the U.N. a responsibility so heavy that it might even disrupt the U.N. itself. There seemed to be acquiescence in this point of view.

It was suggested that the treaty might actually define Japan’s future territory. Mr. Dulles stated that the British had suggested this and had presented a map¹⁰ which showed that the Habomai Islands belonged to Japan. Mr. Dulles said that the U.S. believed that these were not historically a part of the Kurile Islands but that we felt it better to leave the issue of what was a correct definition of the Kurile Islands to subsequent arbitration or World Court decision rather than to precipitate the issue in the Japanese peace treaty itself, particularly since the Russians were already in occupation of the Habomai Islands. At this point the French produced a copy of the British map and after scrutiny of it there seemed to be acquiescence in the U.S. point of view.

M. Baeyens brought up the question of two small partly submerged islands to the East of Hainan. One, he said, was now occupied by 50 Chinese Communists and the other by 20 Vietnamese. He asked that Japan should renounce any claim it might have to these islands. Mr. Dulles said he was not familiar with this territorial problem and asked that a note on the subject be given him.¹¹

3) Security. M. Chauvel raised the question of whether Article 7 was necessary. Mr. Dulles stated that he considered that at least the first part of it was necessary because Article 51 of the Charter referred only to members of the U.N. Japan might not be a member, and unless there was reference to the right of self-defense, it might seem to be taken away by Article 6, requiring Japan to refrain from use of force. The British lawyers felt that Article 51 was an essential counterpart to Article 2 of the Charter. M. Chauvel suggested that it might be useful in Article 7 of the treaty to refer to the Charter article in question, namely, Article 51. Mr. Dulles stated that the U.S. was considering the elimination of all of Article 7 after the word “arrangements” as unnecessary and possibly subject to misconceptions such as India had expressed.

At this point there ensued a considerable discussion about the implementation of Japanese security through a bilateral pact. Mr. Dulles described the relationship of mutual security sought with Japan under which presumably the military power would be so apportioned that Japan could not itself be an offensive military threat and the relationship between the victor and vanquished would be so intimate and integrated as to make incredible a war of revenge. He stated that the U.S. hoped that eventually this bilateral security pact with Japan could be merged into a Pacific security pact of larger import. He described what President Truman had referred to as “initial steps” for Pacific security as between the U.S. and Japan; the U.S. and the Philippines; and the U.S., Australia and New Zealand. He reported the U.K. opposition to a geographical pact at this time as exposing the mainland areas to greater danger. He said, however, that the triangular pact of the U.S., Australia and New Zealand would probably provide for consultation with other states in a position to further peace in the Pacific area. In this connection M. Parodi mentioned that of course France had interests in this area, as New Caledonia and other islands.

M. Parodi said that it would be helpful if at an appropriate time the U.S. would make an official statement regarding the proposed bilateral pact with Japan, as otherwise the French would not have official knowledge concerning it. They also asked to be informed regarding the terms of the tripartite pact. Mr. Dulles said he saw no difficulties with reference to these two requests.

At this point the meeting adjourned for lunch and resumed at 3 p. m.

4) Associated States. M. Parodi raised the question of participation of the three Associated States of Indochina. Mr. Dulles stated that he did not think the U.S. would be opposed in principle to such participation provided it did not constitute a precedent and commit the U.S. to treating these States as in all respects sovereign for other purposes, for example, membership in the U.N., as to which matter Mr. Dulles did not know what U.S. policy would be. Mr. Dulles stated however that he anticipated that some of the other prospective co-signers, such as India, Burma and Indonesia, might object to signing with the three Associated States as sovereign, particularly as there was a rival government of Viet Minh recognized by the Soviet bloc. He said that if this created serious difficulties it might be necessary for these States to participate through subsequent identical bilateral pacts with Japan. M. Parodi reiterated that it was very important for France to secure recognition of the independent sovereign status of these States.

5) Economic. M. Chauvel stated that France would prefer it if Japan were required for a period to give most-favored-nation treatment to the Allied Powers without regard to whether or not there was reciprocity. Mr. Dulles stated that the U.S. would find it very difficult to accept this point of view and that the U.K. was disposed to accept the present text but wished the time enlarged from three to five years. M. Charpentier said that in any event it would be preferable to rearrange the language of Article 13 and he promised to prepare a note on this subject.¹²

The French Delegation also raised the question of the Congo basin treaty. Mr. Dulles said this was being very actively discussed in London, that the U.S. was very reluctant to do more than have a clause similar to Article 42 of the Italian treaty, but that probably if everything else was agreed to, there would not be final breach on this particular point.

6) Official Language. M. Chauvel said that the French felt that one of the official texts of the treaty should be French. M. Naggiar said that English and French were the two official working languages of the U.N. Mr. Dulles said that Spanish was now also an official working language. It was then asked whether there would be Spanish-speaking countries parties to the treaty and Mr. Dulles stated that we hoped there would be many South American countries. M. Chauvel said there would be no objection to three or four official texts, English, French and Spanish, and perhaps Japanese.

It was then decided to issue a brief communiqué to read as follows:

“Mr. Foster Dulles, Special Representative of President Truman, has had with the experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs an examination of the draft treaty of peace with Japan.

“The particular concerns of the French Government were presented to the Representative of the American Government. It seemed that there was no difference of views between the two countries on the questions of principle taken as whole which are involved in the preparation of this treaty. Mr. Dulles gave explanations on a certain number of points of particular interest to France, and contacts will be maintained between Paris and Washington with a view to clarifying definitively the problems which are still pending.”

1. This memorandum is the enclosure to despatch 3607 from Paris, June 14, not printed.
2. Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador.
4. Former Ambassador of France to China (1938) and the U.S.S.R. (1938–1940).
5. Assistant to M. Baeyens.
6. Director General for Economic Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
7. Assigned to the French Foreign Ministry with the rank of Secretary of Embassy.
8. All references to specific articles throughout this conversation are to those in the draft of March 23, p. 944.
9. Reference is to exploratory four-power conversations of France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States held in Paris from March to June of 1951. Documentation on these conversations is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
10. Included with the British draft of April 7, not printed. (Lot 54 D 423)
11. Not found in Department of State files.
12. For information on subsequent negotiations on this matter between France and the United States, see the editorial note, p. 1220.