694.001/6–551: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

6377. From Dulles for the Secretary. No. 3. At mtg this morning with Younger in chair all members of both delegations went thru draft treaty, art by art, to determine main questions of policy to be decided upon as distinct from drafting and technical points of difference. During afternoon delegates divided and Dulles and Younger, with principal advisers, discussed main points of difference in respect to policy, while remainder of both delegations considered drafting and technical questions.

Chief policy questions discussed this afternoon were participation of Chi and ques of Formosa. UK originally proposed that neither Chi sign treaty initially and that provision be made that when two-thirds of the fourteen states principally concerned concluded on which govt is legitimate rep of Chi that wld be the govt which wld then adhere to treaty. Brit reluctant to agree to a suggested formula which wld provide for both Chi govts signing or adhering in maimer making clear precise nature of de facto auth of each. Brit contention was that any signing by Chiang Govt wld by implication at least confirm his auth over Formosa and wld give his govt greater status than wld be acceptable. UK believes important some formula be found which will make possible greatest number of signatories to treaty and claim that any solution which includes Nationalist Chi to any degree will automatically eliminate most, if not all, of Asian states and probably other. Both dels agreed consider matter further and it is hoped definite recommendation can be made to Morrison at mtg with him tomorrow evening.

On question of Formosa, UK initial position was that it shld be ceded to Chi with some provision that it wld not be turned over legally to Chi until question of which Chi shld adhere to treaty is resolved. However, at end of discussion Brit del apparently was inclined to accept US contention that treaty shld merely require Jap renunciation of sovereignty over Formosa, leaving future status to be decided later. This was made easier for UK by earlier US suggestion that Sakhalin and Kuriles be similarly treated and not definitely ceded to USSR by treaty.

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Remaining principal topic to be discussed is security question on which UK has expressed concern that Brit Parl and public opinion will find it difficult to accept treaty whch sets Jap free from all restrictions on rearmament and does not provide in itself any safeguards. After detailed explanation of basis for US position and significance of bilateral US–Jap pact in this connection, UKDel suggested that problem of Cab wld be greatly simplified if US cld at appropriate time make more clear to public method by which in fact it believes dangers from a resurgent aggressive Jap can be avoided. In this connection it was interesting that at FonMin’s luncheon this noon Secy of State for Commonwealth Relations1 expressed opinion that while govt wld be hard pressed on lack of security restrictions in treaty, nevertheless greatest difficulty over obtaining popular acceptance for treaty wld be psychological one caused by lack of some reparations or other payment to large numbers of prisoners of war who have recd harsh treatment at hands of Japs. He suggested that if something cld be done along the lines of providing compensation for these individual sufferers at Japs hands, it wld go far toward easing pressure on the govt.

I have appointment 10:30 tomorrow to discuss question of Jap’s gold and assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries with Chancellor of Exchequer2 and we are considering possibility of some provision by which Jap transfers its assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries to some internatl agency, perhaps internatl Red Cross, which wld be able to use them for the benefit of prisoners of war and families who have suffered undue hardship at hands of Japs.

Tone of mtgs to date has been cooperative and there has been evident real desire to reach agreement altho difficulties ahead have in no way been minimized.

Attlee and I had mtg this morning where problems discussed generally in same spirit. [Dulles.]

Gifford
  1. Patrick Gordon Walker.
  2. Hugh Gaitskell.