Office of the Historian

694.001/6–451: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State 1

secret
London, June 4, 1951—4 p. m.

6344. From Dulles for the Secretary.2 With Gifford, lunched with Massigli.3 He stated French view that we shld not now seek Japanese peace treaty as this wld be an additional irritation of the Russians. He advocated policy of gradually relaxing controls as in case of Ger. I expressed surprise that this viewpoint, expressed now for first time after nine months of negotiating, had created publicly and particularly in Japanese minds the impression we wld promptly complete peace treaty. I said that now to change our policy on ground that we feared to offend Russia wld almost surely lead Japan to conclusion that Soviet Union was dominant power and under those circumstances they wld not genuinely align themselves with free world. I referred to the preponderant role played by US in winning Japanese war and conducting occupation and said in fact that in my opinion US wld not now publicly take a cowardly role in Japan which wld almost surely lose all we have struggled for past ten years. I said that US, if forced to choose between disunity with France on Japanese issue or forfeiture of all our hopes for Japan, wld probably accept disunity with France on this particular matter as lesser evil. Massigli made it obvious that French wld be willing to sacrifice Japan in hope of gaining more time for strengthening Western Eur. As subsidiary point, Massigli suggested that US might be willing to make security pact with Indochina as with Australia or New Zealand. He also suggested possibility of series of similar bilateral peace pacts with Japan [Page 1105] rather than a single instrument, feeling that series of bilaterals wld less obviously exclude Soviet Union and Commie China.4

Massigli said he wld be in touch with the Brit during our current negots and wld want exchange views with me again before I left for France. [Dulles.]

Gifford
  1. Repeated to Paris as telegram 2580.↩
  2. Mr. Dulles had arrived in London June 2. With him were Mr. Allison and Colonel Babcock.↩
  3. René Massigli, Ambassador of France in the United Kingdom.↩

  4. In telegram 7611 from Paris, June 8, repeated as 2010 to London for the information of Mr. Dulles, the Embassy stated in part:

    “In discussing views given by Massigli to Dulles re Japan peace treaty (London’s 6344, June 4 to Dept) Baeyens, Director Asian Div FonOff, stated that French had no intention hold up or sabotage in any way US plans for Jap peace treaty. FonOff, however, was inclined to consider timing of great importance and Baeyens felt that too precipitate conclusion of treaty might jeopardize possible settlement Korean conflict.

    Baeyens appeared to be impressed with Dulles’ arguments to Massigli, and stated that French, in considering problem, had not taken into account Jap and Amer public opinion.

    Referring to Massigli’s suggestion concerning US–Indochina security pact, Baeyens said that this was apparently personal idea of Amb since he had never heard it raised in FonOff.” (694.001/6–8510)

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