Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/5–2951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)¹

confidential

[Washington,] May 29, 1951.

Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty

Participants:	Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
	Dr. Shao-Hwa Tan, Chinese Minister
	Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary
	Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

The Ambassador of China called on me this morning at his request to discuss the two recent memoranda² of the Embassy on the subject of the draft peace treaty³ with Japan.

At the outset I made clear that I had not had sufficient time to study these communications and that consequently, whereas I was sympathetic to their purposes as I understood them, I was in no position to give a final answer at this meeting.

Ambassador Koo first raised the question of the selection of 1937 as the date from which hostilities ran and urged that the year 1931 be substituted in its place. He pointed out that in the minds of the Chinese the Marco Polo bridge incident in 1931⁴ was regarded as the onset of the Japanese aggression against China. There followed some inconclusive discussion of this point which brought out the fact that it was not in fact until December 1941 that the Republic of China declared that a state of war existed with Japan. No effort to arrive at a decision on this point was made and I told the Ambassador that we would give careful consideration to the suggestion of his Government.

Ambassador Koo then moved on to his first main point, which was the desire of his Government that Formosa be treated in the draft treaty exactly as were the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. I interjected that I believed he must have missed the point since the latter territories were treated in the fashion proposed in order to make clear that no legal title would be given Russia unless the USSR signed the treaty. The Ambassador pressed his point that the Chinese did not consider the treaty went far enough in requiring merely that Japan renounce the sovereignty and all claim to Formosa. He insisted that title should be specifically renounced in favor of the Republic of China, thereby avoiding what he termed as a serious blow to the morale, not only of those on Formosa but of non-Communist Chinese on the mainland.

I pointed out that the language in the draft treaty was chosen with care with a view to avoiding dispute as between “China” and “the Republic of China” and also to avoid a result which would end any basis for international concern regarding the future of Formosa such as was the basis for the President’s order to the Seventh Fleet.

Ambassador Koo did not press the point further and moved on to his second point, which was the vital importance of participation by the National Government of China in the making and signing of the treaty. He asked me whether in the light of certain press stories emanating from London this was in any way open to doubt. I replied that this posed very difficult problems and that I was extremely anxious to have the suggestions of his government since we must find an acceptable solution. I stated that out of the 12 FEC members, other than China, the great majority—probably ten—would decline to be co-signers with the National Government and that it seemed to me that there was valid question as to the power of the National Government effectively to bind the 450,000,000 people of China for all time to the terms of the treaty. I said the question of power was a different question from that of the “legitimacy” of the National Government. I reminded him that certain countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which still recognized the National Government nevertheless regarded the National Government as incompetent in these terms.

Ambassador Koo launched into an eloquent but slightly confused argument on the feasibility of separating signature from ratification. He insisted that the right of the National Government to sign the treaty should not be questioned, whereas ratification might be left to the future. The Ambassador emphasized that the National Government had fought the war, that it controls Formosa and that, in any event, the Peiping regime would only accept the treaty on terms which would be unacceptable to the United States.

I brought the conversation back to practicalities, explaining the importance of concluding an early treaty with Japan lest with delay Japan should fall under Communist control and as a consequence sweep over Formosa and the Philippines as well. I emphasized the necessity of arriving at a procedure which would commend itself to a majority of the members of the FEC, and I touched on the patent impossibility of embarking on a course which might satisfy the Republic of China and the United States but leave a majority of the FEC countries unwilling to sign and technically at least in a position to inherit our occupation responsibilities and powers. I concluded by stating that we have not finally satisfied ourselves as to the answer to this problem but that the answer must be found and we must both seek it. I explained that I was leaving on Saturday⁵ for London, following which I would be in Paris for two or three days. If the Ambassador had any further suggestions or views to give me before my departure I said I would be delighted to see him, and that in any event I would look forward to talking to him again upon my return.

1. Memorandum drafted by Mr. Merchant and approved by Mr. Dulles on June 1.
2. Reference uncertain.
3. Reference is to the draft distributed to the FEC powers, Ceylon, South Korea, and Indonesia late in March and printed under date of March 23, p. 944.
4. The Marco Polo Bridge incident occurred July 7–8, 1937; for documentation, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i and ibid., 1937, vol. iii, pp. 313 ff. and 128 ff., respectively.
5. June 2.