694.001/5–1951: Telegram

The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Topad 2001. For Dulles from Sebald. Re your 1626, May 16.1 As requested conferred with Yoshida yesterday regarding alternate choices reftel. Yoshida desired consult with Iguchi and others and Iguchi called today on behalf PriMin. Iguchi said Japanese Govt under no circumstances desires signature by Chi Commie regime. Basically Japanese Govt wishes make peace with Chi National Govt which it considers deserves support by Japan.

Iguchi said Japanese Govt considers it desirable have Chi National Govt sign concurrently and at same ceremony with other allied powers (choice 2a). I commented that this is obviously best choice but for reasons explained to PriMin was probably not feasible. Iguchi had obviously not been briefed on my conversation with PriMin with result that I explained to him some of considerations set forth reftel. Following my explanation Iguchi stated that choice 2b wld be logical and preferred procedure. If for reasons presently not apparent, choice 2b impracticable, then no objection to choice 2c.

Iguchi said that choice 3 shld be followed only as last resort because of possibility that failure to give National Govt opportunity to become party to treaty might unduly delay ratification US Senate.2

Iguchi said that because of fervent desire for an early “majority” peace Japanese Govt wld be much disappointed if signing of treaty were delayed by reason of procedural question.

Iguchi was unable suggest any alternative course.

Sebald
  1. Ante, p. 1044.
  2. In the course of summarizing and commenting on this telegram in a draft memorandum, not printed, of August 30, Mr. Dulles stated: “The foregoing assurances from Japan were what made the present formula [in the peace treaty regarding Chinese signature] acceptable to us.” (Lot 54 D 423)