Office of the Historian

Lot 54 D 423

Memorandum by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison) to the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)

secret
[Washington,] May 16, 1951.

Subject: Talk with Sir Oliver Franks Regarding Japanese Peace Treaty1

In addition to any general remarks which you may wish to make regarding your trip to London and the general spirit back of our concept [Page 1043] of the Treaty, it is suggested you may wish to discuss briefly the following specific points:

1.
U.S. will accept U.K. positions on War Crimes.
2.
U.S. accepts U.K. redraft2 of Article on Fisheries with exception of U.K. substitution of word “states” for “Allied Powers”.
3.
U.S. is inclined to accept U.K. idea that Korea should not be a signatory and is drafting an article which will give Korea certain rights under the Treaty.
4.
U.S. is preparing a redraft3 of the Article on Civil Aviation which more nearly accords with U.K. point of view and will submit it shortly.
5.
U.S. agrees that Japan should relinquish its position of a director in the B.I.S. but believes that question of sale of shares should be left up to private negotiation.
6.
U.S. believes that with respect to the Congo Basin Treaty Japan should receive the same treatment as Italy.
7.
U.S. cannot recede from its position that gold and precious metals in Japan should not be made available for reparations.
8.
U.S. is preparing a redraft4 of Article 13 of Joint U.S.–U.K. Draft on Commercial Treaties and will submit it for U.K. consideration shortly.
9.
As indicated by Allison to Tomlinson the U.S. wishes to restore the paragraph waiving further reparations claims by Allies and desires to re-introduce a time limit in the adherence clause.
10.
U.S. is still considering its position with respect to treatment of Japanese assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries. Suggestion might be made that Japan be urged to agree to having such assets turned over to U.N. Children’s Fund or some similar international benevolent agency for use in Asia as partial recompense for devastation caused by Japanese troops.
11.
With respect to Formosa problem appreciation should be expressed for Morrison’s statement5 as indicating a move in the right direction and the hope expressed that in view of Morrison’s statement that the disposal of Formosa should not be permitted to hold up a Japanese Peace Treaty, that agreement can be reached speedily on this matter.
12.
With respect to participation of Communist China in Japanese Peace Treaty, suggestion might be made that neither Communist nor Nationalist China be original signatories. The hope should be expressed that if this commends itself to the U.K., the latter for obvious reasons allow U.S. to decide how to lay the ground work and make the eventual announcement.

  1. Other reference to this talk has not been found in Department of State files.↩
  2. Reference uncertain.↩
  3. Probably that enclosed with the letter of May 18, 1951, from Mr. Allison to F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor of the British Embassy. Neither is printed. (Lot 54 D 423)↩
  4. Probably the draft enclosed with the letter cited in footnote 3 above. It is not printed.↩
  5. Apparent reference to Mr. Morrison’s public statement of May 11.↩