I attach herewith a memorandum of the talk I had at the Pentagon this
morning.
[Attachment]
Memorandum
I have just come from a meeting at the Pentagon with Secretary
Marshall, General Bradley, the three Joint Chiefs and the three
service
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Secretaries,1 also Earl Johnson. I reported on my trip to
Japan and gave my estimate of the situation.2 We discussed the
present program.
The meeting was informal and no formal decisions were taken, but
Secretary Marshall expressed the conclusion, in which all seemed
to concur, that we should proceed to push ahead for an early
Japanese Peace Treaty signature, keeping a string on the
situation through the timing of ratification.
It seems to be the general view that it would be very difficult
to conduct a major Korean campaign from a Japanese base if
Japan’s full sovereignty were restored. Also there was some
feeling that Japan needed to be further strengthened from the
standpoint of United States ground forces.
Secretary Marshall seemed to feel that we were warranted to
proceed on the assumption that if the present offensive were
repulsed the Korean situation might settle down to a point where
there would be a more or less stabilized line largely held by
South Korean forces with some United States troops in reserve as
against a renewed major thrust and some troops presently in
Korea moved back to Japan.
In any event there was no disposition at this time to seek the
reopening of the Presidential directive of January 10, 19513 calling for
an early Japanese peace settlement, subject of course to the
reservation therein expressed with respect to the effective date
of the treaty through ratification.
I said that it was not yet apparent whether the British really
wanted to go along with us or whether they wanted to split with
us on Japan as they had on China. I said this would probably not
be developed for a few weeks, during which time I might have to
go to England. I said that if there was going to be a definite
split on policy with Japan that might introduce new elements
which would make it desirable to review the situation.
I also said that in my opinion it was undesirable at the present
time to attempt to formulate a so-called “addendum” attempting
to define our rights if the Japanese Peace Treaty should come
into effect through ratification at a time when fighting in
Korea and perhaps elsewhere was still in progress. I said that
recent attempts to figure out all the contingencies might
involve demands on Japan that could be frightening. I thought
that if it should later seem wise to have the
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treaty come into force through
ratification while the fighting was still on, the “addendum”
could then be better drafted and accepted than so far in
advance. This last suggestion was made after the meeting was
breaking up and I got no sense of the judgment of the group on
this point.
