Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/4–2251: Telegram

The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

Tokyo, April 22, 1951—6 p. m.

Topad 1853. For Rusk, Allison from Dulles. Following my preliminary comments on preliminary comments JCS on draft treaty and related documents as reported by your 1507, April 20.¹

I assume JCS comments relate to coming into effect of treaty which is dependent on Senate ratification and not to signing which of course does not bring treaty into effect. Addendum not intended in any way alter agreed Presidential directive in this respect. That directive commissions me to seek “early Jap peace settlement” directs me proceed “without awaiting favorable resolution military situation in Korea” but recognize that peace settlement “could not come into formal effect except by normal constitutional processes” which “would give us an opportunity to control, in light of existing circumstances, time at which any peace settlement will become fully effective” suggested addendum committing Jap Govt to provide same facilities in relation to UN’ operation after treaty effective as before was in no sense designed to qualify or alter the directive of January 10² and UN control over effective date which is consequent upon our control over timing of our ratification processes.

Addendum does not assume as JCS comments say that Jap peace treaty “will” become effective prior to termination of hostilities in Korea, it merely assumes peace treaty “might” become effective prior to that time and that it is accordingly wise precaution to take this possibility into account. If JCS think it unnecessary take this contingency into account and willing rely wholly on constitutional processes as adequate to protect US position that is entirely satisfactory to me and we gladly drop addendum.

However, in my opinion it would be grave misjudgment of situation to assume constitutional steps to bring proposed treaty into effect can surely be timed to meet purely dispositions in relation to garrisoning Japan or to meet convenience of administration in Japan with reference to Korean operation. Ratification will inevitably be influenced by many factors of which technical military considerations only one. Other factors will be (a) Senate’s own parliamentary time table, (b) hopes, fears of Jap people, (c) status of Sov war of nerves against Japan, (d) actual state of fighting in Asia, (e) sentiment of American people and their leaders reacting to imminence of national election, (f) expectations of other peoples and govts in relation to matters related to treaty, such as security elsewhere in the Pacific, (g) attitude of Allied govts, (h) the importance of maintaining US initiative in Japan and US leadership and prestige in world. To believe the balance of all such factors can be made to produce precise synchronization with still undated future troop movements and with military administrative convenience is in my opinion to expect the impossible.

If JCS attach importance they seem to attach to synchronization, I suggest they give thought to synchronizing their own arrangements with the great world forces which will surely be conclusive rather than to assume that I, or anyone else, can so regulate these forces as to suit their as yet unformulated and unpredictable military time table.

Under circumstances it wld seem to me course of prudence to get Jap commitment involved in proposed amended addendum but this is purely for JCS and Defense to decide and I repeat if they do not want addendum that is all right with me.

I am carrying on under President’s directive of January 10 unless and until it is changed and I need, want and anticipate full cooperation of JCS. Subject to Presidential directives I expect fully to take account military considerations. However I point out that since agreed Presidential directive January 10, 1951 calling for “early Jap peace settlement” (a) White House release February 27, 1951³ states President wishes us “carry on with a view to achieving earliest practical consummation of objectives entrusted to mission last January.” (b) March 26, 1951, President after examining tentative text Jap peace treaty advised Secretary State “hope you may be able to implement this treaty as quickly as possible.”⁴ (c) On April 11, 1951 White House states “President has made clear it is firm policy of US Govt press forward to conclude peace settlement with Japan as soon as possible.”⁵ (d) April 13, 1951, President sent me message to airport stating “determination of US to work earnestly for prompt conclusion of Jap peace settlement.”⁶

In addition to these Presidential statements on March 9, 1951, Senator Connally following my meeting with Senate Foreign Relations Committee said committee members expressed “satisfaction with progress made and hoped for early conclusion of Jap peace settlement.”⁷

On April 19, Secretary State, in major address said “We are moving rapidly to make prompt and enduring peace with Japan.”⁸

In view of all of these public statements emphasizing prompt quick action to conclude Jap peace settlement it would in my opinion be disastrous to US prestige in Japan, Pacific, Asia to adopt any course other than press for promptest possible signing of peace treaty leaving ratification date under our control. I do not assume JCS and Defense take any other view. If perchance I do not assume correctly in this respect I must request most urgently present matter to President.

New subject:

[Here follows the portion this telegram printed in the editorial note, page 211.]

[Dulles]
Sebald

1. In this telegram, marked “For Dulles from Allison,” the Department had stated it had just received preliminary comments of the JCS on both the draft peace treaty and the defense arrangement with Australia and New Zealand. The portion of the telegram concerning the peace treaty follows: “While no objections voiced to terms of Treaty JCS raise definite reservations about time of coming into effect of Treaty and state inter alia, ‘It is therefore essential that the proposed treaty not come into effect until the divisions which are to constitute the US garrison forces are in place in Japan.’ Additionally JCS raise objection to addendum to agreement referring to continuing rights of UN forces after treaty on initial grounds that ‘It assumes that the Jap Peace Treaty will become effective prior to the termination of hostilities in Korea.’ This apparently assumes that the peace treaty can under no circumstances become effective until Korean hostilities terminated.” (694.001/4–2051) For the remainder of this telegram, see the editorial note, p. 211. For complete text of the JCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defense of April 17, see the enclosure to Mr. Marshall’s letter of April 19 to Mr. Acheson, p. 990.
2. For text, see enclosure 2 (as annotated) to Mr. Acheson’s letter of January 9 to Secretary Marshall, p. 788.
3. For a summary of this press release, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951, p. 176.
4. See footnote 5, p. 950.
5. For text of the White House press release of April 11, see Department of State Bulletin, April 23, 1951, p: 654.
6. Text of this statement by Under Secretary Webb in behalf of the President is printed ibid.
7. Reference statement not found in Department of State files.
8. Reference is to Mr. Aeheson’s address of April 18, “Our Far Eastern Policy: Debate, Decision, and Action.” For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 30, 1951, p. 683.