The Department of Defense accepts the suggestions made in your letter
and confirms the understanding expressed in the penultimate
paragraph thereof. In particular, the Department of Defense agrees
that none of the heavy armament in question should be placed in the
hands of the Japanese without the specific prior agreement of the
Department of State or approval at the highest governmental
level.
There is inclosed a draft letter in which I propose to forward our
joint recommendations to the President. In view of the urgency of
this matter, I should appreciate receiving your comments or
concurrence in this letter at the earliest practicable date.
[Enclosure]
Dear Mr. President: The Joint Chiefs
of Staff have advised me that the Soviet capability to mount
amphibious and airborne attacks against Japan, in conjunction
with the present lack of defending ground forces, constitutes a
grave and immediate threat to the security of Japan. I strongly
concur in their estimate of the gravity of this threat.
There is now in existence a Japanese National Police Reserve of
75,000 men organized into four partly equipped divisions. In
view of the precarious security situation, the Commander in
Chief, Far East, has urgently requested sufficient arms to equip
these units as full combat divisions. Accordingly, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the Department of the Army
be authorized, as a matter of urgency to furnish full equipment,
including heavy armament, for the existing four divisions of the
Japanese National Police Reserve.
[Page 1002]
The Secretary of State, however, has pointed out several serious
political considerations which weigh against the provision of
heavy armament to Japanese forces at this time. These
considerations may, I believe, be summarized as follows:
- (1)
- Such action would violate decisions of the Far Eastern
Commission which are, in effect, international
obligations of the United States.
- (2)
- It would jeopardize support both in Japan itself and
among our allies for a Japanese Peace Treaty of the type
which the United States is seeking. Such a treaty would
itself be the best means to remove existing restrictions
on Japanese rearmament and to obtain maximum Japanese
support for the cause of the free world.
- (3)
- It might isolate the United States from its allies and
make it difficult for us to obtain international support
for counteraction in the event of a localized Soviet
attack on Japan.
- (4)
- It might have adverse effects on the possibility of
any degree of success of a meeting of the Council of
Foreign Ministers.
In view of these considerations, the Departments of State and
Defense have agreed to recommend your approval for the
establishment, from U.S. Army stocks, of a “Special Far East
Command Reserve”, which would be available as a stockpile of
equipment for the four JNPR divisions, but which would not be
placed in the hands of the Japanese without specific prior
agreement by the Department of State or approval at the highest
governmental level.
I further recommend, on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, that you
authorize the Department of the Army to undertake planning and
budgeting for matériel sufficient fully to equip an overall
total of ten JNPR divisions by July 1, 1952.
This recommendation means that the Department of the Army would
have authority to plan and budget a program to equip an overall
total of ten JNPR divisions, but the decision to stockpile such
equipment for an additional six divisions will be made by
appropriate military authority at a later date, and in view of
the then existing situation. The authority immediately to ship
heavy armament for the four existing JNPR divisions will cause
some extension of the period during which Army units in the
United States must train with a 50% allowance of major critical
items of equipment, and may also result in some delays in MDAP deliveries.
With great respect,
Faithfully yours,2
