Lot 54 D 423
The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: I am transmitting herewith, for the information and consideration of the Department of State, the interim views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated April 17, 1951, concerning the documents prepared by the Japanese Peace Mission. These include: the provisional Peace Treaty, together with a covering memorandum; the draft bilateral treaty with Japan, addendum thereto covering use of Japan as a base; administrative agreements supplementing the bilateral treaty; addendum to the administrative agreement; and the draft treaty on a Pacific Pact.
At this time I should like to point out particularly the views and recommendations in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I will provide you with the final views of the Department of Defense on the various documents relating to a Japanese [Page 990]peace settlement at a later date when the drafting of these documents has reached the stage of completion.1
- In the course of a memorandum of April 23 to Mr. Dulles, Mr. Allison interpreted this sentence to mean that only after the treaty and all other relevant documents had been finally agreed to by the various nations concerned, and completed papers drawn up, would the JCS comment. Mr. Allison stated that the JCS would then have the opportunity of rejecting whatever they disliked, and that it was difficult to foresee how under such conditions any internationally agreed upon documents could ever be obtained. (694.001/4–2351)↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- This directive was in the form of a joint memorandum, dated September 7, from the Secretaries of State and Defense to the President. It was approved by him September 8 and circulated that day as NSC 60/1. It is printed in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 1293.↩
- See enclosure 2, as annotated, to the letter of January 9 from Mr. Acheson to Secretary Marshall, p. 788.↩
At the conclusion of the paper cited in footnote 1 above, Mr. Allison stated:
“In reading the Joint Chiefs’ comments and studying their implications it is difficult not to conclude that their basic desire is to force delay in the coming into effect of any Japanese Peace Treaty and that one of the methods by which they hoped to secure this delay is by the creation of difficulties in the conclusion of mutual security arrangements with Australia and New Zealand which it is recognized is a condition precedent to obtaining the consent of those countries to the United States draft of a peace treaty with Japan.
“In my opinion the difficulties between the State and Defense Departments are of a fundamental character and an effort should be made to resolve them at once. I am afraid that in the past apparent difficulties have been resolved by the use of language which glossed over differences but did not in fact settle them and that we should now meet the issue head on and come to a definite complete understanding.”↩