Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Lot 54 D 423

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, April 19, 1951.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am transmitting herewith, for the information and consideration of the Department of State, the interim views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated April 17, 1951, concerning the documents prepared by the Japanese Peace Mission. These include: the provisional Peace Treaty, together with a covering memorandum; the draft bilateral treaty with Japan, addendum thereto covering use of Japan as a base; administrative agreements supplementing the bilateral treaty; addendum to the administrative agreement; and the draft treaty on a Pacific Pact.

At this time I should like to point out particularly the views and recommendations in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I will provide you with the final views of the Department of Defense on the various documents relating to a Japanese peace settlement at a later date when the drafting of these documents has reached the stage of completion.¹

Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

[Enclosure]

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

top secret

Washington, April 17, 1951.

Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty.

1. This memorandum is in response to the request contained in your memorandum dated 4 April 1951² for such views and recommendations as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may at this time desire to make on the documents prepared by the Japanese Peace Mission.

2. Detailed analyses of these six documents are now in progress in the several Services. This task cannot be completed for at least several weeks and additional time may be required, depending upon the extent of the revisions which may be made by the Japanese Peace Mission as a result of Mr. Dulles’ mid-month return visit to Tokyo, or for other reasons.

3. The following interim views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been formulated without benefit of these detailed analyses and without precise knowledge of any changes in the terms of the six documents.

4. The national policy as to Principles Controlling Arrangements for a proposed “Japanese Peace Treaty” is set forth in NSC 60/1, approved by the President on 8 September 1950,³ and the “Terms of Reference of Dulles Mission” as agreed to by the Departments of State and Defense on 8 January 1951.⁴ The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that all security provisions therein be adhered to without relaxation.

5. The unfavorable attitude of the USSR to the proposed peace treaty with Japan, and, in particular, to the negotiations with respect to the security of Japan, is well known. The reaction of the USSR to steps implicit in the proposed peace treaty which would lead to the rearmament of Japan cannot be foretold and might well involve the employment of armed forces.

6. It is United States policy to press forward to conclude a peace settlement with Japan as soon as possible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, believe that a satisfactory treaty of peace with Japan should be signed at an early date. At the time the treaty is agreed to, however, the date of its coming into effect must, for cogent military reasons, be determined in the light of the world situation generally, and specifically the situation in the Far East. In this connection, it should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to the terms of reference of the Dulles Mission with the understanding that they were a further implementation of the principles in NSC 60/1, and with the understanding that the Dulles discussions would not involve final commitments by the United States Government without further consideration, as appropriate, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7. The following are general comments on certain of the six specific documents submitted by the Japanese Peace Mission.

8. The provisional text of a Japanese peace treaty.

a. This draft treaty appears to be quite satisfactory with respect to the granting to Japan of its sovereignty;

b. If the USSR, or if other nations, fail to sign the treaty, the effect would be to leave Japan in a continued state of war with those nations. In such eventuality, those nations would, under the “Terms of Japanese Surrender,” have a presumptive right to occupy Japan. The risk that the USSR might take such action would, in all probability, increase as arrangements for Japan’s rearmament become firm. It is therefore essential that the proposed treaty not come into effect until the divisions which are to constitute the United States garrison forces are in place in Japan;

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from a military point of view, must insist that the terms of a Japanese Peace Treaty “must secure to the United States exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north, Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan,” as directed by the President on 8 September 1950;

d. The proposed text, which deals with the matters of Japan’s right to self-defense and its sovereign rights as to security, adequately meets the minimum vital security provisions in the President’s directive of 8 September 1950. The explanatory comment appearing in a footnote to the text, however, is objectionable in that it implies the possibility that future international negotiations might result in impairing the rights of Japan to self-defense against external attack; and

e. In any event, the proposed peace treaty must not be permitted to become effective without the coming into effect simultaneously of a bilateral United States–Japan treaty of security.

9. Draft bilateral treaty with Japan.

a. The terms of the draft bilateral treaty in general appear to meet the requirements of the President’s directive of 8 September 1950;

b. As in the case of the proposed peace treaty, it is essential that the draft bilateral treaty not come into effect until the divisions which are to constitute the United States garrison forces are in place in Japan and until the United States is exercising its rights as to base areas, installations, and facilities and

c. No final approval of the terms of the draft bilateral treaty should be made until its implementing documents, the Administrative Agreement and Addendum thereto, together with their detailed annexes of facilities, areas, and services, are approved.

10. Addendum to agreement between the United States of America and Japan for collective self-defense made pursuant to the treaty of peace between Japan and the Allied Powers and the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, find the text of the proposed Addendum to be unacceptable for the following reasons:

a. It assumes that the Japanese peace treaty will become effective prior to the termination of hostilities in Korea;

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff view with concern the fact that the basis for the Addendum is solely the United Nations resolution of 30 January 1951 concerning aggression in Korea. Current developments in the United Nations do not justify reliance upon that body for support of possible necessary future military action in the Far East; and

c. It is unduly restrictive with respect to military operations in the Far East because:

(1) The requirement on Japan is limited to a grant of permission by that country to the United Nations to support United Nations forces in Korea through Japan;

(2) It fails to take cognizance of the possible extension of hostilities between United Nations forces and communist forces into areas of the Far East other than Korea; and

(3) It also fails to take cognizance of possible unilateral action by the United States (not under United Nations aegis) in military operations in the Far East, including the mainland of China (including Manchuria), Formosa, the USSR, and the high seas.⁵

[Here follows numbered paragraph 11 of this memorandum, printed on page 207.]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Hoyt S. Vandenberg

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

1. In the course of a memorandum of April 23 to Mr. Dulles, Mr. Allison interpreted this sentence to mean that only after the treaty and all other relevant documents had been finally agreed to by the various nations concerned, and completed papers drawn up, would the JCS comment. Mr. Allison stated that the JCS would then have the opportunity of rejecting whatever they disliked, and that it was difficult to foresee how under such conditions any internationally agreed upon documents could ever be obtained. (694.001/4–2351)
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. This directive was in the form of a joint memorandum, dated September 7, from the Secretaries of State and Defense to the President. It was approved by him September 8 and circulated that day as NSC 60/1. It is printed in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 1293.
4. See enclosure 2, as annotated, to the letter of January 9 from Mr. Acheson to Secretary Marshall, p. 788.

5. At the conclusion of the paper cited in footnote 1 above, Mr. Allison stated:

   “In reading the Joint Chiefs’ comments and studying their implications it is difficult not to conclude that their basic desire is to force delay in the coming into effect of any Japanese Peace Treaty and that one of the methods by which they hoped to secure this delay is by the creation of difficulties in the conclusion of mutual security arrangements with Australia and New Zealand which it is recognized is a condition precedent to obtaining the consent of those countries to the United States draft of a peace treaty with Japan.

   “In my opinion the difficulties between the State and Defense Departments are of a fundamental character and an effort should be made to resolve them at once. I am afraid that in the past apparent difficulties have been resolved by the use of language which glossed over differences but did not in fact settle them and that we should now meet the issue head on and come to a definite complete understanding.”