At this time I should like to point out particularly the views and
recommendations in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the memorandum of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. I will provide you with the final views of
the Department of Defense on the various documents relating to a
Japanese [Page 990] peace settlement
at a later date when the drafting of these documents has reached the
stage of completion.1
[Enclosure]
Memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense
top secret
Washington
, April 17,
1951.
Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty.
1. This memorandum is in response to the request contained in
your memorandum dated 4 April 19512 for such
views and recommendations as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may at
this time desire to make on the documents prepared by the
Japanese Peace Mission.
2. Detailed analyses of these six documents are now in progress
in the several Services. This task cannot be completed for at
least several weeks and additional time may be required,
depending upon the extent of the revisions which may be made by
the Japanese Peace Mission as a result of Mr. Dulles’ mid-month
return visit to Tokyo, or for other reasons.
3. The following interim views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
been formulated without benefit of these detailed analyses and
without precise knowledge of any changes in the terms of the six
documents.
4. The national policy as to Principles Controlling Arrangements
for a proposed “Japanese Peace Treaty” is set forth in NSC 60/1, approved by the President
on 8 September 1950,3 and
the “Terms of Reference of Dulles Mission” as agreed to by the
Departments of State and Defense on 8 January 1951.4 The Joint
Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that all security provisions
therein be adhered to without relaxation.
5. The unfavorable attitude of the USSR to the proposed peace
treaty with Japan, and, in particular, to the negotiations with
respect to the security of Japan, is well known. The reaction of
the USSR to steps implicit in the proposed peace treaty which
would lead to the [Page 991]
rearmament of Japan cannot be foretold and might well involve
the employment of armed forces.
6. It is United States policy to press forward to conclude a
peace settlement with Japan as soon as possible. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, believe that a
satisfactory treaty of peace with Japan should be signed at an
early date. At the time the treaty is agreed to, however, the
date of its coming into effect must, for cogent military
reasons, be determined in the light of the world situation
generally, and specifically the situation in the Far East. In
this connection, it should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff agreed to the terms of reference of the Dulles Mission
with the understanding that they were a further implementation
of the principles in NSC 60/1,
and with the understanding that the Dulles discussions would not
involve final commitments by the United States Government
without further consideration, as appropriate, by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
7. The following are general comments on certain of the six
specific documents submitted by the Japanese Peace Mission.
8. The provisional text of a Japanese peace treaty.
-
a.
- This draft treaty appears to be quite satisfactory
with respect to the granting to Japan of its
sovereignty;
-
b.
- If the USSR, or if other nations, fail to sign the
treaty, the effect would be to leave Japan in a
continued state of war with those nations. In such
eventuality, those nations would, under the “Terms of
Japanese Surrender,” have a presumptive right to occupy
Japan. The risk that the USSR might take such action
would, in all probability, increase as arrangements for
Japan’s rearmament become firm. It is therefore
essential that the proposed treaty not come into effect
until the divisions which are to constitute the United
States garrison forces are in place in Japan;
-
c.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from a military point of
view, must insist that the terms of a Japanese Peace
Treaty “must secure to the United States exclusive
strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of
latitude 29° north, Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto
south of Sofu Gan,” as directed by the President on 8
September 1950;
-
d.
- The proposed text, which deals with the matters of
Japan’s right to self-defense and its sovereign rights
as to security, adequately meets the minimum vital
security provisions in the President’s directive of 8
September 1950. The explanatory comment appearing in a
footnote to the text, however, is objectionable in that
it implies the possibility that future international
negotiations might result in impairing the rights of
Japan to self-defense against external attack;
and
-
e.
- In any event, the proposed peace treaty must not be
permitted to become effective without the coming into
effect simultaneously of a bilateral United States–Japan
treaty of security.
[Page 992]
9. Draft bilateral treaty with Japan.
-
a.
- The terms of the draft bilateral treaty in general
appear to meet the requirements of the President’s
directive of 8 September 1950;
-
b.
- As in the case of the proposed peace treaty, it is
essential that the draft bilateral treaty not come into
effect until the divisions which are to constitute the
United States garrison forces are in place in Japan and
until the United States is exercising its rights as to
base areas, installations, and facilities and
-
c.
- No final approval of the terms of the draft bilateral
treaty should be made until its implementing documents,
the Administrative Agreement and Addendum thereto,
together with their detailed annexes of facilities,
areas, and services, are approved.
10. Addendum to agreement between the United States of America
and Japan for collective self-defense made pursuant to the
treaty of peace between Japan and the Allied Powers and the
provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, find
the text of the proposed Addendum to be unacceptable for the
following reasons:
-
a.
- It assumes that the Japanese peace treaty will become
effective prior to the termination of hostilities in
Korea;
-
b.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff view with concern the fact
that the basis for the Addendum is solely the United
Nations resolution of 30 January 1951 concerning
aggression in Korea. Current developments in the United
Nations do not justify reliance upon that body for
support of possible necessary future military action in
the Far East; and
-
c.
- It is unduly restrictive with respect to military
operations in the Far East because:
- (1)
- The requirement on Japan is limited to a grant
of permission by that country to the United
Nations to support United Nations forces in Korea
through Japan;
- (2)
- It fails to take cognizance of the possible
extension of hostilities between United Nations
forces and communist forces into areas of the Far
East other than Korea; and
- (3)
- It also fails to take cognizance of possible
unilateral action by the United States (not under
United Nations aegis) in military operations in
the Far East, including the mainland of China
(including Manchuria), Formosa, the USSR, and the
high seas.5
[Page 993]
[Here follows numbered paragraph 11 of this memorandum, printed
on page 207.]
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
