Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563

Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

Washington, April 11, 1951—11 a. m.

Extracts

Present²

General Bradley	Mr. Dulles
General Collins	Mr. Matthews
Admiral Sherman	Mr. Ferguson
General Vandenberg	Mr. Marshall
General Bolte	Mr. Lay
Admiral Davis	Mr. Gleason
Admiral Duncan
Admiral Lalor
General White
General Maddocks
Admiral Wooldridge
Admiral Robbins
General Rogers
Colonel Cress
Colonel Carns

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mr. Dulles cited the relief of General MacArthur as requiring quick progress on a Japanese peace treaty because of: (a) a wide impression—encouraged by the General himself, believed by the Japanese public, and, as implied by queries from the British Embassy, given some credence by the U.K.—that General MacArthur has been a protagonist of a Japanese peace treaty as against alleged Pentagon opposition; and (b) the need to dispel interpretations of the Mac-Arthur removal as indicating abandonment of interest in the Pacific in favor of concern for Europe.

General Vandenberg inquired whether a simple unilateral statement would not do this.

Admiral Sherman said, and Mr. Dulles agreed, that to be effective such a statement would require accompanying action.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General Bradley referred to rumors of Pentagon blocking of the Japanese peace treaty. Why JCS papers should be made public, the Chiefs could not understand. He emphasized the purely advisory role of the JCS and said their military advice did not have to be accepted. He said their concern was as to (a) the necessity of a free hand in the Ryukyus; they felt the State Department was depending too heavily on the Japanese Government in this matter; (b) the need to defer the treaty until conclusion of the Korean conflict, so as to permit freedom to operate during the period the fighting continues. He added that he understood from Mr. Dulles that this problem was covered in the proposed arrangements.

Mr. Dulles said that it was not his view that the Pentagon was holding up a treaty; he was merely reporting the views of certain quarters in Japan and certain British representatives.

He said the draft treaty and agreements met the JCS view 100% as to the Ryukyus.

General Bradley asked whether the U.N. trusteeship should not be a strategic trusteeship so as to provide safeguards against a veto of our actions.

Mr. Dulles said, to the contrary, a strategic trusteeship would involve the veto.

General Bradley asked whether the trusteed area would not be open to inspection by anyone who wanted to come in and look.

Mr. Dulles said there could be closed areas.

As to timing in relation to the Peace Treaty, Mr. Dulles pointed out that what we have in mind is that we would get the treaty signed this summer, but that it can’t come into force for nine months with any country without our consent and it can’t come into effect with respect to the U.S. until ratifications are exchanged. If the treaty is signed this summer, we would not ask the Senate to consider it until the January 1952 Session. It would probably be better to get it out of the way during the first quarter of 1952, because later the country will be involved in a Presidential election. We also will have an agreement with the Japanese Government drawn up in a form Johnson and General Magruder thought adequate, but the agreement could be changed, if necessary. We could specifically say that if the treaty comes into effect before the fighting ends in Korea, then the Japanese will give us the same rights and facilities we now have.

Mr. Dulles made observations along the following lines: (a) his desire to be sure that the treaty plans meet the JCS requirements; (b) the precariousness of the situation in Japan and the Western Pacific; (c) the wholehearted commitment to our cause by Japan which we have had and the fact that the situation can change very rapidly; (d) the elements of crisis due to (1) the relief of MacArthur, (2) the Russiah buildup and intensification of the war of nerves, (3) the apparent growing orientation of the Chinese mainland régime toward Moscow control, (4) increased Russian activity at Sakhalin, (5) use of repatriated Japanese soldiers as potential threat to Japanese security.

He emphasized: (a) the need for the United States to consolidate its position without delay; (b) the danger in waiting until the situation changes; (c) the worthlessness of a treaty brought off in a situation where we would have “to pound our fists”; (d) the concentration in the U.S. of responsibility in Japan where there is no middle ground between success and failure for us; (e) the imminence of the chance to strengthen our position in the whole Pacific by bringing off this treaty. He asked the confidence of the JCS in the project. He said we would have to get out of Japan with credit or great loss, and he thought we had in our grasp a great success.

General Bradley noted the potential danger in the circumstance that Russia, after refusing to sign the treaty, might seek to exercise its rights of occupation before the restoration of U.S. strength sufficient to protect Japan. He said that by the middle of May the U.S. would have two divisions instead of the four considered as a minimum for security, and these won’t be fully effective until September.

Mr. Dulles reemphasized that the treaty was still a year off.

General Collins noted the reservation of U.S. rights during the term of the Korean fighting. He asked whether this would serve in event of extension of operations into Manchuria or the Chinese littoral.

Mr. Dulles said it would be well to amend the language to take care of this contingency. He noted this part had been written by Defense representatives, but that the situation had changed since the language was drafted.⁵

Admiral Sherman asked whether the contemplated status of the Ryukyus and the Bonins would be like that of the former mandated areas and whether, when trusteed, this territory would be detached from Japan. Mr. Dulles answered in the affirmative.

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1. The source text represents a State Department draft, not cleared with any of the participants. For other portions of this memorandum, see pp. 192–201.
2. Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations; Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Plans; Vice Adm. Arthur C. Davis, Director of the Joint Staff; Vice Adm. Donald B. Duncan, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations; Rear Adm. William G. Lalor, (ret.), Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Maj. Gen. Thomas D. White, Director of Air Plans; Col. Edwin H. J. Carns, Deputy Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; John H. Ferguson, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff; Charles B. Marshall of the Policy Planning Staff; James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council; S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.
5. Reference is to draft Addendum to Agreement Between the United States and Japan for Collective Self-Defense. See Annex III to the letter of February 10 from Ambassador Dulles to Mr. Acheson, p. 876.