Under Secretary’s Meetings, Lot 53 D 250
Memorandum of the Under Secretary’s Meeting, Prepared in the Department of State1
UM N–321
[Here follow sections of the memorandum which summarize discussion of the military situation in Korea and of budgetary matters.]
Japanese Peace Treaty
3. Mr. Dulles reported that he is ready to distribute our draft of the text of a Japanese peace treaty to other interested governments. He plans to give fifteen governments this tentative text. The text has been reviewed in the Department. Defense has not formally approved the text but this probably is not necessary at this time. However, they have raised no objections to the various parts of the treaty.
4. Mr. Dulles reported on various aspects of the text. Japan will renounce title to Formosa and no mention will be made of Formosa’s future. With respect to the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands, the United States may propose a UN trusteeship administered by the United States. The article on Sakhalin and the Kuriles quoted the verbatim [?] Yalta agreement.2 If the USSR refuses to accept a treaty we will be prepared to reconsider whether reference to Sakhalin and the Kuriles should be totally eliminated from the treaty. The treaty gives recognition to the sovereignty of Japan and provides an enabling clause for our stationing troops in Japan. With respect to reparations, the treaty recognizes that Japan cannot make payments. Claims may be taken out of Japanese assets available in individual signatory countries. Claims under GARIOA are not waived. The text also states that Japan will not grant a treaty or privileges to any other [Page 943] government better than those granted to the signatory powers under this treaty. In regard to putting the treaty into effect, we contemplate that nine months after Japan ratifies the treaty, it can be brought into force only by deposit of ratification of the majority of the states which are members of the Far Eastern Commission, including the United States. After nine months any ratifying country can bring the treaty into force between it and Japan. States which do not sign the treaty and which were in a state of belligerency with Japan may adhere to the treaty any time within three years.
5. Mr. Dulles plans to place the Japanese peace treaty draft in the hands of the Far Eastern Commission governments, Indonesia, Ceylon and Korea. He pointed out that there is a possible complication because of the general election in Australia and the absence of any provision in the proposed treaty with respect to Japanese rearmament. Mr. Dulles felt that this may be used as an issue in the Australian elections.
6. In response to a series of questions by the Secretary, Mr. Dulles explained the following points:
- a.
- The President has asked us to push ahead on the treaty. His previous directive authorized us to approach interested governments on a Japanese peace treaty text. Mr. Dulles has gone over the text with the Foreign Relations Committee and the appropriate subcommittee. The Committee has specifically approved the discussion of this text with other governments.
- b.
- Mr. Dulles agreed that we must contemplate that this text will become available to the public. In fact, it might be desirable for the United States to make it public, especially if the USSR begins to use it in a propaganda way.
- c.
- Mr. Dulles stated that we have prepared a statement which deals with Japanese rearmament. We agree that Japan should not be rearmed so as to menace her neighbors. Rearmament should be developed only under a cooperative arrangement. We have a declaration from the Japanese saying that they would arm only to an extent consistent with the provisions of the charter of the United Nations.
- d.
- With respect to the possible reaction of the Chinese Communists, Mr. Dulles pointed out that we have not decided on the treatment of China. He believes that this problem can not be solved at the present time. He pointed out that Australia, New Zealand, and Canada are reluctant to be co-signers with China.
- e.
- With respect to possible Russian response, Mr. Dulles explained that Malik had said that the USSR would not resume negotiations with the U.S. on a Japanese peace treaty. This subject has not been placed on the agenda for a possible CFM. If it were so placed, we would not consider it a proper subject for discussion.
7. The Secretary asked Mr. McWilliams3 to get him all the material which has been made available to the public on the Japanese peace treaty.
[Page 944]8. Mr. Byroade4 pointed out that we may be headed for inconsistencies with respect to treaties for Japan and Germany as it affects military restriction. Mr. Dulles agreed and pointed out that the two situations are different. However, we might have to come to some military restrictions in the Japanese treaty. We would prefer to rely on bilateral talks to accomplish this.
9. Mr. Bonbright felt that we should have a go ahead from Spender before we make the treaty text available to other governments. He asked whether a month’s delay was too much of a price to pay for the effect that the treaty might have on Australian elections. Mr. Nitze felt that it was important to make the text available to other governments, especially while fighting is going on in Korea. Mr. Dulles also pointed out that there might be many reasons to delay at different times and we should not use this as one.
10. The Secretary suggested that this discussion might be continued with the interested parties at an appropriate time.
- The Secretary and W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, neither of whom were regular attendants at the Under Secretary’s Meeting, were present on this occasion.↩
- For text of the agreement regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, signed at Yalta, February 11, 1945, by the Heads of Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see Foreign Relations, 1945, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 984.↩
- William J. McWilliams, Director of the Executive Secretariat.↩
- Henry A. Byroade, Director of the Bureau of German Affairs.↩