Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Lot 56D527

Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

secret

[Tokyo —1951.]

Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting February 5, 9:30 AM

Japanese Memorandum re US–Japan Bilateral

Ambassador Dulles said that the Japanese revised draft of a US–Japan bilateral¹ submitted Saturday evening² called for a US guarantee of Japan’s security, and went further than the terms of the Atlantic Pact.³ Until Japan is in a position to undertake corresponding obligations of its own the US would want rights rather than obligations. The US cannot press the Japanese to assume military obligations until they have dealt with their Constitutional problem and are in a position formally and publicly to assume such obligations.

Colonel Babcock commented that the Japanese had shown willingness to assume certain obligations, but Ambassador Dulles noted that it was not clear what those obligations could at present be. Colonel Babcock replied that that was the question, and that that was why the Defense members wished to have Chapter VIII of their draft retained, clarifying that the Japanese would use their police forces or whatever other forces they possessed to assist in the defense of Japan. Ambassador Dulles agreed that it probably would be desirable to retain Chapter VIII in some form. He went on to say that when Japan, following amendment of its Constitution, is in a position to make precise commitments such as we are trying to obtain from European countries, commitments to contribute a certain number of divisions by a certain date, then we will be in a position to make more concrete commitments ourselves. Until then we must maintain a flexible position. Ambassador Dulles’ instructions from the President were that the US was prepared to station troops in Japan and desired the right to station such troops, but it was not stated that the US was prepared to guarantee Japan’s security. By not assuming such an obligation we remain free to pull our troops out at any time.

Ambassador Dulles continued that the practical consequences of our keeping troops in Japan would be more important than any paper guarantee. Whether we would want to go further and guarantee Japan in any sense was a question we would wish to discuss in Washington. The coming exchange of views in the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand about a Pacific Pact might place us in a better position to proceed along that line by eliminating the danger Mr. Johnson had referred to of giving Japan guarantees which we did not give the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

Mr. Allison inquired how much the Mission could tell the Japanese about the contemplated Pacific Pact in order to help the Japanese to buy our proposal. Ambassador Dulles replied that we would not want to dangle the pact before them since we did not yet know whether the idea of a pact would be realized. He said that he had informed certain Japanese at one of Ambassador Sebald’s receptions that the military agreement would initally be just between the United States and Japan but that it might later be broadened out. This had been hinted in our Provisional Memorandum⁴ regarding the content of a general treaty. Ambassador Dulles said that the United States was not in a position to guarantee indefinitely a totally disarmed country.

Ambassador Dulles then read the text of a draft agreement⁵ which he had prepared to be concluded by the United States and Japan for their collective self-defense pursuant to the treaty of peace between Japan and the Allies and the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In commenting on the draft Ambassador Sebald said that the Japanese do not have executive agreements. Any such document must be clearly based on authority granted by the Diet. Executive agreements, he said, are unkown in Japanese jurisprudence. Ambassador Dulles questioned how the government could operate if it had to submit every international engagement to the Diet. Ambassador Sebald said that he had sought to convince the Japanese Government of this fact but thus far without marked success. Mr. Allison suggested that the phrase “administrative agreement” be used, and this suggestion was adopted.⁶

Meeting with Mr. Yoshida

Ambassador Dulles said that the Mission’s time was running out and that it might be advisable for him to see the Prime Minister that day or the next to attempt to achieve a definite understanding. It was agreed that the meeting should be held on Wednesday.⁷

Meetings with Diplomatic Representatives

Ambassador Dulles said that the British Ambassador had asked to see him again. Mr. Allison questioned the advisability of a third extended meeting when Ambassador Dulles had seen so few other diplomatic representatives in his office. Ambassador Sebald mentioned that he had invited the Chinese Ambassador, who had requested an interview with Ambassador Dulles, to dinner at his house on Thursday. Ambassador Dulles said that he had seen the British and French Ambassadors because the United States has special relations with those countries, but that he did not want the Chinese National Government to feel that we were running out on it. It was decided that Ambassador Dulles would see the British Ambassador again and that he would have lunch with the Australian Ambassador.

Fishing

Ambassador Dulles raised the question of Japanese fishing, saying that there would be considerable criticism if he returned without some understanding on this question. He referred to the proposal submitted by the Japanese, which seemed quite satisfactory, and suggested that it would be desirable to have the Japanese send him a signed letter embodying agreed views on this problem before his departure.⁸

1. Perhaps the undated, revised draft of an “Agreement Concerning Japanese-American Cooperation for Their Mutual Security”, p. 843.
2. February 3.
3. For text of the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington April 4, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iv, p. 281, or Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1964, or 63 Stat, (pt.2) 2241.
4. Of February 3, p. 849.
5. Apparently the document supra.
6. No draft of a separate administrative agreement has been found in Department of State files earlier than that printed as Annex IV to the letter of February 10 from Ambassador Dulles to Secretary Acheson, p. 876.
7. February 7.
8. The exchange of letters dated February 7 regarding fisheries between Prime Minister Yoshida and Ambassador Dulles, released to the press February 13, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 26, 1951, p. 351.