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  4. Document 492

Lot 54D423

Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

secret
[ Tokyo —1951.]

Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting February 2, 9:30 AM

Meeting with British Ambassador

Ambassador Dulles said that he would be meeting with the British Ambassador at 11:00 to give him our comments on the UK views. He said that there was complete agreement on all but one point (shipbuilding) where we could not accept the British position.1

Australian Military View

Mr. Johnson said that he had been informed by General Robertson2 that no matter what the Australian Government might say, the Australian military desired the type of agreement with Japan which we have in mind.

Participation of Allied Forces

General Magruder said that he had asked the Japanese representatives at a recent meeting how they felt about the stationing of non-US forces in Japan. The Japanese had strenuously objected, at least prior to the conclusion of a general collective security arrangement. General Magruder said that since the JCS did not desire token forces, the Defense members of the Mission had excluded the possibility of non-US forces from the proposed agreement.

[Page 841]

Ambassador Dulles said that this was probably better. All that token forces would do would be to satisfy the national pride of the contributing countries, giving them a voice in everything which they had not really earned. The situation is different in Korea where we wish as many nations as possible to be committed on our side. Colonel Babcock noted that one reason the Japanese had objected to non-US forces was that they feared that an Allied force would create the impression in Japan that the occupation was continuing.

Farewell Reception

It was decided that Ambassador Dulles would give a farewell reception at the Imperial Hotel on February 10. The Ambassador said that it would be desirable for the Mission to stay together until it finished its work, and that he would accordingly telegraph Secretary Marshall and Secretary Pace requesting that Mr. Johnson be permitted to remain through the end of the week.

Meeting with Ryokufukai 3

It was decided that Ambassador Dulles would meet with representatives of the Ryokufukai Tuesday afternoon.

Public Statements Regarding Ryukyus

Ambassador Dulles said that he was worried about reports from Washington that the Mission was considering Japanese desires for the return of the Ryukyus. He said that such statements tended to undermine the position the Mission had taken regarding the Ryukyus. It was agreed that Ambassador Sebald would send a cable in the matter to Washington.4

Inspection of National Police Reserve

Ambassador Sebald mentioned that General MacArthur had suggested that Ambassador Dulles visit units of the Police Reserve incognito. It was decided that such a visit by Ambassador Dulles or by any other member of the Mission might give rise to undesirable comment and should therefore not be made.

  1. In a memorandum of the conversation held February 2 between Ambassador Dulles and Sir Alvary Gascoigne, Mr. Fearey stated in part that the Consultant had said that the United States thought it would be fatal to the peace treaty to require destruction of any industrial property and that no government required to carry out such destruction five or six years after the conclusion of hostilities could be expected to survive. “Sir Alvary said that he understood our position perfectly but was afraid that his government felt very strongly in the matter.” (Tokyo Post Files: 320.1 Peace Treaty) Concerning this conversation see infra.↩
  2. Lt. Gen. Sir Horace Clement Hugh Robertson, Commander in Chief of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan.↩
  3. The Green Breeze Society, a political faction with a number of adherents in the House of Councillors.↩

  4. Telegram 1491, February 2 from Tokyo, marked “From Dulles for Rusk”, reads as follows:

    “Reference UP despatch dateline Washington February 1, reporting administration officials stated desire Japan retain Ryukyus, Bonins and Kuriles matter for discussion SCAP and myself with Japanese leaders.

    “In statement to press January 31 I stated ‘neither our present consultations nor future decisions can be expected to reopen specific decisions already made and accepted by surrender terms.’ Purpose this statement was to stop growing inclination on part Japanese raise Ryukyus and Bonin Islands question and to obviate further discussions with Japanese on this point at this time.” (694.001/2–251)

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