Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Lot 54D423

Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

secret

[Tokyo —1951.]

Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting January 30, 10 A M

Meeting with British Ambassador

Ambassador Dulles said that the meeting with the British Ambassador the previous day had been an interesting one.¹ Sir Alvary had read aloud an informal statement of current UK thinking on a Japanese treaty which there was every reason to believe was actually the conclusions of the recent Empire Conference on the subject. He could not leave the statement in writing because the text was in process of clearance by the Commonwealth Governments. Ambassador Dulles summarized the main points of Sir Alvary’s presentation as follows:

1. It was important that a formula be worked out for deciding what should be done with Formosa and the Pescadores, instead of leaving the matter up in the air as in our latest proposal.

2. Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles should be turned over to the USSR in the treaty. Ambassador Dulles had asked why we should go out of our way to clear the Soviets’ title to these territories if they were not parties to the treaty, a view with which Sir Alvary indicated personal sympathy.²

3. Some kind of war guilt clause should be included. Ambassador Dulles had indicated that he did not look with much favor on this idea.

4. The principal Allies should set up a system of economic controls outside the treaty to prevent Japan from accumulating a war potential. Ambassador Dulles had not been very sympathetic to this proposal, which he suspected had originated with Australia and New Zealand.

5. Consideration should be given to the distribution of Japanese-owned gold as reparations. Japanese assets in neutral countries should be confiscated and similarly distributed. Part of the Japanese assets in Switzerland consist of money remitted by the UK through the Red Cross for British prisoners which had not got through.

6. A ceiling should be placed on Japanese shipbuilding capacity, all capacity in excess of that ceiling being destroyed or dismantled. Mr. Allison said that the British appeared willing to leave Japan enough capacity for its own normal needs but not for the production of ships for export, in competition with British industry. Ambassador Sebald noted that Sir Alvary had previously told him that this point would not be pressed.

7. Japan should accord the Allies no less favorable civil aviation rights in Japan than they enjoyed before the peace treaty.

8. The treaty should obligate Japan to negotiate fishing agreements to limit poaching and intelligence activities of Japanese fishermen.

9. Consideration should be given to continuing certain occupation ordinances such as the purge restrictions for a period of years.

10. A regional defense pact with Japan was probably impractical at the present time but should be kept in mind for the future. A U.S.–Japan bilateral security agreement should be concluded coincident with the treaty.

11. Claims for damage to Allied property in Japan should be fully met by Japan.

12. Pre-war treaties should be revived at the option of the Allies alone.

Mr. Johnson noted that the UK proposed no restrictions on Japanese rearmament except the exclusion of submarines and strategic air. General Magruder said that the JCS favored no restrictions but hoped that Japan would concentrate on land forces at least initially. Mr. Allison recalled that Sir Alvary had said that the UK was thinking in terms of eight Japanese divisions. Ambassador Dulles said that he did not believe that the British intended to put any restrictions in the treaty but only to encourage the Japanese along certain lines. They proposed reliance on economic measures to achieve desired security controls. Ambassador Dulles thought the idea of long-range economic controls utterly impractical, citing the difficulties now being experienced in controlling shipments to the USSR and Red China. The proposal would simply lead to a black market in the prohibited items. He considered the UK views of the first importance, however, and suggested that the Defense members review them from a military point of view while the State members did so from a political and economic point of view. He said that a further meeting with Sir Alvary was scheduled for Thursday or Friday.

Meeting with the Prime Minister

Ambassador Dulles described the meeting as a curious one, “a puff ball performance”. He had found it very difficult to get the conversation around to a point where he could get any reaction at all from Mr. Yoshida. The Prime Minister had let drop some clues, however, and perhaps more would be revealed by further study of his remarks.

[Here follows a detailed résumé of the meeting with the Prime Minister along the lines of the memorandum of conversation, page 827.]

Mr. Johnson questioned the wisdom of Mr. Dulles’ dealing with Mr. Yoshida’s designee, Sadao Iguchi,³ on the grounds both that he had had a record of militaristic tendencies and that he was of insufficient rank. Mr. Allison, on the other hand, expressed the belief that he was no more culpable than any other career official, and Ambassador Sebald did not consider his rank an important obstacle. Ambassador Dulles pointed out that one government cannot dictate to another who it is to have represent it. He said that he did not expect to have extensive personal dealings with Mr. Iguchi but would be entrusting the discussions to Mr. Allison, who would represent him as his deputy in the same way that Mr. Iguchi did the Prime Minister.

It was decided that Ambassador Sebald would arrange for several of the opposition leaders to call on Ambassador Dulles the following day.

Ambassador Dulles described his and the Prime Minister’s visit to General MacArthur as a purely courtesy call. The General had wished them well and said he would be glad to try and help out if they encountered difficulties. Ambassador Sebald suggested that Mr. Yoshida’s decision to drive to the meeting with General MacArthur separately and to use the back entrance may have been intended to indicate to Ambassador Dulles that he did not wish the discussions to appear to be under the influence of the occupation authorities.

1. For text of part of what is apparently a transcript of this meeting, see the Editorial note, p. 825.
2. According to the document cited in footnote 1 above, Sir Alvary had also stated: “Agreements should also be recorded that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands should be placed under United States trusteeship.”
3. Mr. Iguchi shortly became Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.