Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/1–651: Telegram

The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

Tokyo, January 6, 1951—8 p. m.

Topad 1318.1 have today discussed substance Deptel 1000 January 3¹ with General MacArthur who has shown me text his C–52713² January 4 sent in reply DA message 80222.³

I find myself in agreement with such of those views expressed in General MacArthur’s message as lie within my province. I believe, however, that early arrival Dulles mission is of considerable importance and that its arrival should not be delayed beyond time absolutely essential for adequate preparation, as I agree with Department that under present state of Japanese public opinion and psychology it is of great importance that US clarify its intention proceed expeditiously with Japanese treaty. I also believe that publicity attendant upon such visit, if placed in proper perspective, could only further strengthen US position, as purpose is exploration of road to peace, not war.

General MacArthur has also shown me text his C–52202,⁴ December 28 sent in reply to JCS 99159⁵ December 18. Subject following comments, I am similarly in general agreement with General Mac-Arthur’s replies to 9 numbered questions:

With regard his reply No. 3, while agreeing with specifications re necessary control over Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, I believe same objective might be accomplished without unduly antagonizing Japanese public opinion, or doing violence previous public commitments re no territorial acquisitions to resort to formula which, while allowing retention effective strategic control over Ryukyus and Bonins, would avoid appearances of outright and irrevocable alienations over 80 from Japan.⁶

Re reply to question 6, under present regime of control believe Japan would find it most difficult undertake program of rearmament except behest of SCAP, but foresee no overriding difficulties this course once Japan has obtained full sovereignty.

With regard to my return for consultation at this time, while General MacArthur has given me complete freedom of action, we both feel that I would be of maximum usefulness to Dulles mission by remaining here pending its arrival, in order to be close to Japanese scene and make such preparations as mission might suggest could enhance its success. Unless Department should nevertheless immediately desire my presence, I therefore propose remaining here until and during mission arrival and stay in Japan. It is probable my presence in Washington at later time would serve more useful purpose. In any event in view numerous press reports and speculation by many government and other quarters, would appreciate ETA Dulles mission.

Sebald

1. Ante, p. 778.
2. Ante, p. 780.
3. Of January 3, p. 780.
4. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 1383.
5. For partial text, see ibid ., footnote 1.
6. The latter part of this sentence is apparently garbled.