Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

756C.00/12–751

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Lacy) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

secret

[Washington,] December 7, 1951.

Subject: United States Relationships with the Netherlands, Australia, and Indonesia in Western New Guinea Dispute

Discussion

1. Three powers whose friendship is valuable to the United States have strongly committed themselves on the problem of the political disposition of Western New Guinea. Indonesia claims sovereignty, The Netherlands claims sovereignty. Australia, which administers the eastern half of New Guinea, has indicated it will accept no solution which provides for Indonesian administration over the western half.

2. In an effort to minimize prejudicing its good relations with any of these three powers over the New Guinea issue, the United States has adopted a position of neutrality and has emphasized the procedural aspect of the case, consistently urging that Indonesia and the Netherlands seek a mutually satisfactory settlement through negotiations within the framework of the Round Table Agreements.

3. The value of neutrality in this issue, however, depends upon the value of the negotiations. The Netherlands-Indonesian negotiations, which are understood to have just commenced at the Hague, however, barely reached the starting line and may seriously falter or fail. If this happens, the Department must be prepared to consider the possibility that the welfare of the United States requires a compromise solution to the New Guinea problem unpalatable in varying degree to one or more of the interested powers. This would require the Department to replace its previously held position of neutrality with a positive policy dealing with the substance of the issue.

4. The Netherlands is a NATO partner of the United States in Europe. It is no longer an effective power in Southeast Asia, and whatever destroyers or battalions it sends to New Guinea diminish its NATO effectiveness.

5. Australia is a partner with the United States and New Zealand in a Pacific Security Pact.¹ Australia believes that Western New Guinea forms part of its defense perimeter. In the event of war, Australian and United States’ defense interests in Southeast Asia would widely overlap, and Australian and U.S. troops would probably be used interchangeably in operations in that area.

6. Indonesia, with its population of 75 million, is the largest country in Southeast Asia and is important both as a source of raw materials and because its landing sites and safe anchorages control the approaches from Asia to Australia and from the Pacific to the Indian oceans. The availability of these resources in time of crisis will be greatly affected by the attitude of the Indonesian Government and people toward America and Australia. In recognition of Indonesia’s importance, the United States Government participated in the United Nation’s successful efforts to establish an independent Indonesia, as a means of enabling the strong revolutionary forces which sprang up in Indonesia after World War II to find outlet in genuine nationalism instead of Stalinism.

7. The basic relationship of Australia and the Netherlands to the United States has already been determined: a solution of the New Guinea problem is important in each case but not decisive. Indonesia’s relationship with the United States is still in the balance. Its Government repressed Communists at Madiun and has since taken a series of actions favorable to the United States, but feels strong pressure to pursue an independent policy vis-à-vis Russia and the United States. The political disposition which is made of New Guinea may, for reasons many of which are set forth in Djakarta’s telegram 817 of December 6 (Tab A),² have a decisive effect upon the relationship of Indonesia to the United States.

Recommendation:

The Department should recognize that United States interests

(1) may no longer be served by a position of neutrality if the current Netherlands-Indonesian negotiations fail;

(2) require a compromise solution which should probably take the following lines:

• Indonesia should be given a clear promise of political sovereignty over Indonesia [New Guinea] in the near future;
• The Netherlands should receive from Indonesia clearly established economic rights and privileges in New Guinea;
• Australia should receive recognition and protection of her security interests in Western New Guinea;

(3) require that the Department prepare a substantive policy within the above framework and study the methods by which it may be put into effect.

1. For documentation, see pp. 132 ff.
2. Not here printed; in telegram 817 from Djakarta, December 6, Ambassador Cochran recapitulated a conversation which he had had earlier that day with President Sukarno, who urged a rapid and satisfactory settlement of the Union Statute and Netherlands New Guinea issues. Otherwise, the President averred, the Indonesian Parliament would probably vote a unilateral denunciation of the union; if the present government opposed such a move, it undoubtedly would fall from power; and any successor cabinet would be more to the Left politically. Ambassador Cochran commented privately that if Indonesia did resort to unilateral action and thereby incurred the ill will of the West, the United States and her allies might receive an equally strong reciprocal reaction from Indonesia. The net result, he said, might be to lose an essential link in an eventual Pacific security chain. In conclusion, the Ambassador warned the Department that to prevent such possible eventualities, the United States should be prepared to change its position on Netherlands New Guinea in order to accommodate Indonesia at the expense of America’s other friends, the Netherlands and Australia. (656.56D/12–651)