400.46D31/5–1151: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia
1226. Indo Amb called at his request on Asst Secy Rusk May 10. He said he leaving on consultation by plane from NYC 16 May, and will proceed Djakarta with one day layover Rome. He expects to return within three or four weeks.
Amb began gen discussion Far East problems by mentioning Fon Min Subardjo’s statement to effect Indo wld “trade with devil” and repeated explanation offered to Dept by Maramis1 May 8 (Deptel 1211, May 9).2 Amb was informed that we were not particularly concerned with words which might have been uttered under pressure domestic considerations, but that we did hope historic pattern Indo’s [Page 648] trade wld not change at this time when UN faces serious problem aggression in delicate world situation; that we hoped Indo wld not jeopardize its independent policy by changing pattern of distribution its products; that if at this juncture, Indo took action this sort which wld, in effect, do violence to its neutral position, Indo cld expect strong reaction from US. In this connection, allusion was made to fact that US public opinion, increasingly aroused by casualties resulting from operations in Korea, was growing more and more critical Brit position on problems trade with Chi, Russia and its satellites; in view good relations enjoyed with US by Indo, we hope Indo will not subj itself to risking approbation US public by untoward move in opening new trade channels. Amb stated he understood our position and indicated some sympathy therefor. He raised question goods which Indo needs and was informed we wld continue do our best accommodate Indo and our other friends in world from our production resources which, as Amb knew, were very considerable, but our ability do so wld be, in part, dependent upon continuing good relations with Indo which have been so friendly during period since Indo independence.
It was then pointed out to Amb we were concerned that Indo understood our position re security arrangements in Pac; that we, out of deference Indo views, had decided not proceed with Pac Pact as such, but had broken our security arrangements into component parts for (1) Austral, NZ, (2) Phils (3) possibly Jap; that we hoped Amb wld explain to his Govt, US did not wish be put either in position of excluding Indo from such arrangements or pressing Indo into agreement which Indo, in its natl interest, did not feel prepared to enter; that Amb cld give his Govt flat assurances that US was convinced it cld find much common ground with Indo if latter adheres to its policy of independence within framework UN Charter; that US has no designs on Indo.3 Amb informed strictest confidence, whether world situation deteriorated or improved, US wld be willing at any time to discuss question security arrangement with Indo in any manner which Indo Govt believed wld not be embarrassing. Amb asked if this concerned question raised by ex-FonMin Roem with Secy last Nov re procurement of arms in this country, and was informed it had no connection that problem. Amb was requested to use this info cautiously and in confidence to which he seemed to assent.
Amb then inquired re our views on Korea. He informed that, as mentioned above, US public opinion had grown restive as casualty lists lengthen; that we believe Chi Commies might be willing negot [Page 649] settlement after present offensive blunted, but on other hand, they might begin build up for future late summer or fall offensive; that it was known Peking and Moscow UN is willing negot settlement around 38th Parallel, but Peking’s announced objective was to push us out of Korea, and that this publicly announced objective of forcing us entirely out of Korea had not been renounced or modified by Chi Commies. Amb informed US desired bring about settlement Korean war without spreading hostilities; that as Amb knew from current investigation Far Eastern policy now going forward in Cong, US had, despite some mil considerations to contrary, prevented spread hostilities; that, of course, if our opponents wished make such extension hostilities, they had resources within their control to accomplish this end. Amb then asked whether settlement wld have to be made, in our view, through UN. He informed that while matter one for discussion at some point in UN, we certainly were not going to allow procedural considerations to prevent settlement in Korea. Amb also informed that we considered UN opposition to aggression in Korea had been factor in preventing Chi aggression in SEA which wld, of course, be ultimate threat against Indo.4
Amb inquired re story carried N.Y. Times, May 9 which stated in contrast Russian recommendation for Jap Peace Treaty conference of US–UK Soviet Union and Commie Chi, in “consultation” with other states involved last war in Orient, US proposes that treaty be worked out by sixteen members FEC. Amb informed story baseless, that we discussing Peace Treaty with nations who are members FEC, but we are also discussing proposed treaty with nonmember nations, and that we do not intend use FEC as such in connection with treaty problems.5
Amb inquired re reports Secy was to be replaced. He informed there was no truth such rumors; that Pres has repeatedly reiterated his support of Secy; that Secy had no intention of resigning; that rumors this type cld be expected in view fact US now in pre-Pres election period.
Amb Ali subsequently saw Director PSA briefly who reiterated remarks made by Asst Secy Rusk re US hope and desire that historic pattern Indo trade continue. Amb asked for informal memo re his conversation with Mr. Rusk which will be prepared containing above info.
- Max Maramis, Secretary, Indonesian Embassy in the United States.↩
- In telegram 1211 to Djakarta, May 9, Ambassador Cochran was informed of Mr. Maramis’ explanation of Foreign Minister Subardjo’s press statement of May 7, 1951. Mr. Maramis said he believed the statement was made as a result of pressure from the Indonesian press, and that the remarks were not indicative of any change in Indonesia’s attitude. (856D.2395/5–951)↩
- For documentation, see pp. 132 ff.↩
- Documentation is scheduled for publication in volume vii.↩
- For documentation, see pp. 777 ff.↩