In order to facilitate the discussion of a possible Pacific Ocean
Pact set for 11:00 a. m., January 5, I have prepared the annexed
comment on the draft already circulated.
[Annex]
Comment on Draft (1/3/51)2
of Pacific Ocean Pact
1. Parties: The proposed parties are the
six nations having major island positions in the Pacific Ocean.
The question mark regarding
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Indonesia is suggested by doubt as to
whether it would be willing to come in. It is treated as a
desirable, but not indispensable party. The “major island”
formula excludes the UK. This is desirable to avoid possible
complication with Hongkong, which the JCS feel must be excluded. Also, if the UK is
included it would be difficult not to include France, with
possible complications in relation to Indo-China. Query: Would the UK be sensitive about
a pact which included the US, Australia and New Zealand and did
not include the UK? Could this point perhaps be met by a Pact
paragraph that specifically stated that nothing therein in any
way impaired the ties and obligations of the British
Commonwealth relationship in so far as Australia and New Zealand
are concerned?
2. Article 1 is designed with primary regard to Japan. It may be
undesirable to include provisions on human rights as a contractual provision in a Japanese peace
treaty. But it would be appropriate as a “declaration” in a
Pacific Ocean Pact.
3. Article [2] is a “declaration” as distinguished from the
“agreement” of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.3 The language “dangerous to its own peace and
safety” is taken from the Monroe declaration. The provision that
action would be “in accordance with its constitutional process”
corresponds to the provision of Article II of the North Atlantic
Treaty.
The reference to “armed attack in the Pacific Ocean upon any of
the parties” designedly includes the possibility of attack by
one of the parties, e.g. Japan, upon one of the others. It is
sought in this way to meet one of the two primary purposes of
the Pact, namely to give sufficient reassurance to Australia,
New Zealand and the Philippines so that they will consent to a
peace with Japan which will not contain limitations upon
rearmament.
4. Article 3 is designed to meet the second major purpose, namely
the creation of an international framework within which Japan
could create military force as part of an international security organization rather than merely
as a national force. This would be
responsive to what seems to be the preponderant wish of the
Japanese people and their leaders and might make it possible for
Japan to rearm without a head-on collision with the present
Japanese Constitution.
Since Japan is not, and presumably will not soon be, a full
member of the United Nations, the appeal to create UN units contained in the “Uniting
for Peace” Resolution does not extend to it. (Perhaps the
resolution could be enlarged at the next GA session.) However, the
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Collective Measures Committee set up under
this Resolution is instructed in its work to take account of
“collective self defense and regional arrangements”. Accordingly
it is suggested that in the Pacific Ocean Pact reference should
be made to this Resolution and the Collective Measures
Committee, as this further plays up the idea that Japanese
forces would be affiliated with the United Nations.
The Council has only authority to make recommendations.
5. Article 4 dealing with termination, relates only to the
Pacific Ocean Council and not to the declarations contained in
Article 1 and 2. These stand without any definitive terminal
date. Article 1 embodies a basic principle upon which the United
States society is founded, and therefore there is no occasion
for us to contemplate its termination. Article 2 states a fact
similar to that stated by the Monroe Doctrine and while
circumstances might alter this fact, the mere lapse of time
would not do so.
Two possibilities of terminating the Pacific Ocean Council are
suggested:
- (a)
- United Nations action, presumably in the form of
Article 43 agreements, which would adequately cover the
field.
- (b)
- Action by Asiatic and Pacific members of the United
Nations which might create a broader regional,
collective security pact into which the present pact
could appropriately be merged.
It is thought safe to leave the decision in these two matters to
“a majority of the parties”. It would be unlikely that the other
parties, who get more than they give, would want to terminate
the pact so long as the United States was supporting it. Also,
each party is given the right to withdraw upon one year’s
advance notice. The theory in this respect is that in a pact of
this sort continuing membership is of no real value unless it
involves interested goodwill.
However, to meet the contingency that Japan might withdraw and
thereby create a new and more dangerous situation, it is
stipulated that upon receipt of any notice of intended
withdrawal, the other parties would immediately confer to
consider the situation thereby created.
6. In view of the fact that the substantive articles 1 and 2 are
merely declarations and not agreements, and since the Council is
merely a recommendatory body, it would not seem constitutionally
necessary that the pact be submitted to the Senate as a treaty.
It might, however, be practically desirable to give the Pact the
added authority which would come from Senate ratification or
Joint Resolution of Congress. However, the Pact is drafted so
that it could probably stand merely as an executive act without
any Congressional action at all.
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It may be noted that the Act of Chapultepec4 was cast in the form “The Governments
Represented … Declare:” and this Act was never submitted to the
Senate or to Congress.
7. In view of the inter-dependence of the Pact and the proposed
Japanese peace, the United States should not become committed to
the Pact unless it is assured that the other Parties will agree
to the kind of a Japanese peace that the United States feels is
necessary. This does not technically preclude a separate negotiation on the Pact, but practically
there would be danger in dealing first with the Pact as public
opinion in Australia and New Zealand might then treat the Pact
as so assured that they would feel that they could, without
jeopardizing it, revive a strong position against Japanese
rearmament.
