790.5–MAP/12–2751

Memorandum by the Economic Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Gay) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)1

confidential

Subject: Attached paper2

The objectionable features of earlier ECA drafts on this subject are not removed. This draft still carries the thesis of long term “substantial economic assistance” (going much beyond mere technical assistance), set up in terms of specific goals such as a “substantial stepping-up of per capita income” and combining all aid into single country programs presumably to be handled by ECA. It still calls for the dramatic approach, a Presidential declaration of “particular support” for the newly independent countries of Asia and for keeping it a “readily distinguishable” part of MSA for 1953 and presumably thereafter.

This approach runs all the dangers of creating United States enslavement to partnership responsibilities, unfulfillable expectations in the minds of Asiatics, and possible political entanglements which we are not now able to envisage.

Effective assistance to these countries requires a flexible, cautious approach. While this does not preclude discreet guidance in the way [Page 130] we want countries to develop, it is, I think, incompatible with the long range, single program, pre-established goal concepts still held by ECA.

The present programs can and should encourage economic development financed with funds available through other than MSA channels, but should by and large leave the particularized technical assistance that goes with economic development activities to be arranged between the government concerned, private interests, and UN agencies.3 This latter approach will, I believe, be more likely to create in the recipient countries the feeling of proper association with us toward mutually beneficial ends and by the same token run less danger of suggesting to them the will of the United States to dominate or paternalistically direct their course of development. If this be true, our desired results may more surely and quickly be achieved by this course than by that implicit in the ECA paper.4

  1. Memorandum addressed also to Deputy Assistant Secretary Johnson.
  2. A redraft of “Action Program in Asia” dated December 13, not printed. For an earlier draft, see the ECA telegram of November 9, p. 103.
  3. A handwritten footnote at this point in the source text reads as follows: “Not intended to preclude J. G. White type of operations. My comments are also predicated on the assumption of no drastic change in military outlook for the area. In such case something spectacular might be in order. MG.”
  4. In a memorandum of December 27 to Mr. Allison, Mr. Samuel T. Parelman, Special Assistant in FE for Regional Programs, also commented on the December 13 redraft of “Action Program in Asia”. He stated that the revision did not reflect a change in the basic position of ECA and that he was “inclined to recommend that FE maintain the position which was clearly expressed in your letter [of November 27 to Mr. Cleveland, p. 118] and that we continue to object to the proposal that the President make a policy pronouncement as recommended by ECA.” (790.5 MAP/12–2751)

    Neither response by Mr. Allison to these memoranda, nor indication of further discussion of the “Action Program in Asia”, has been found in Department of State files.