Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

751G.5/10–1651: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (Gullion) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Saigon, October 16, 1951—midnight.

852. Fol are further Leg views on additional four div project.

1. Leg agrees and has for many months urged that truly Viet army able and willing fight within Fr Union framework and against Commie led Viets is most important immed objective our policies and programs in IC. It provides vindication of reality Fr claim of independence Viets, and wld be matrix and shield for development polit institutions. If fighting in IC is to be ended in our lifetimes, if Vietnam to be source strength rather than weakness for free world, respected Viet Natl Army essential.

2. We believe, therefore, that we shld welcome any feasible initiatives toward construction of such force and that Viet-Franco-Amer alliance cannot afford fail to support this additional project.

3. At same time we must be certain that any specific army project soundly conceived, and that its risks calculated not gambled. As initial material endowment and subsequent maintenance this increased force, as well as majority its financing will, in one form or another, be US responsibility, we are more directly involved in new four div plan than in any previous Franco-Viet project. Our appraisal must reckon with fol considerations:

a. First of all, we shld be clear as to exactly what new project can accomplish. We doubt that this increase involving about 30,000 lightly armed inf natives can achieve objectives of reducing IC war to proportions Malay guerrilla action or of permitting significant return troops to France. If Fr declarations to US correct, Viet Minh “Peoples Army” has been increased at rate at least equal new project rate, and as De Lattre has claimed, their admin and supply facilities in Chi make it possible constitute their entire force inside IC as combat effectives. New Viet divs shld as minimum maintain present level IC stabilization. They cld also doubtless accomplish pacification South Viet, bringing measure of peace to Cochin-Chinese economy, and lifting trans-Bassac rice blockade and open possibilities for increased govt revenue. It not certain, however, what Fr plan or prefer use new units in south.

b. Second, we seriously concerned by slap-manner in which four div figure presented to us and then hailed in private as fruit of Wash mtgs. Gen De Lattre may have had project in mind but it has never previously been discussed here nor advanced to MAAG or Leg, nor does it appear have been introduced into Wash conversations until they drew to close. Yet since last Sept MAAG had tried get from Fr provisional estimate which might serve as basis for supplemental 1952 program if one became possible. De Lattre seems have been sufficiently encouraged by his reception in Wash to raise his sights from 17 battalion tentatively mentioned in Paris before Wash talks, to additional four div figure. Not until Oct 8 was list of requirements for four divs presented in Saigon.

In meantime, Fr must be aware, as we have frequently told them that no appropriated funds available for any substantial increase over material already programmed.

MAAG has now been furnished preliminary phasing schedule showing formation of divisions to begin next month and to be finished at end 1952, but in absence Chief of Staff, G–4 and others, no Fr mil here sufficiently briefed on project to discuss it with us prior arrival Gen. De Lattre.

c. Third, we must consider results so far obtained in Natl Army activation. In one project or another, Vietnam Army has been under construction since March, 1949; first four division project dates from Dec 1950, prior De Lattre’s arrival, aid was to have been completed in July 1951. At end of 1951 it was five battalions behind schedule but has made the lag good. It has to date been formed chiefly by transfers of already indoctrinated troops from auxiliaries and from Fr forces. The native officer corps includes not much more than 800 junior officers, with deficit largely supplied by Fr training cadres. It has had few combat tests. It has no officers above lt. colonel (two only), no gen staff, practically no service echelons, no chief of staff, no full time Min of Def, no senior officers to sit with Fr opposite numbers on permanent staff committee.

d. Fourth, expansion to eight divs before first four are activated will introduce new political element and resultant final product may not be what Fr anticipate. Fr were hypercautious in approaching natl army project and only launched it when the Cao Bang disaster and concurrent war threatening Europe made them look for means reducing their commitment in IC. The initial four div plan was also cautious and dominated by concern to produce solid professional army officered by cadres of which Fr cld be sure and whose training was under close Fr control. The new project involves stepping up pace, and successive cadres will necessarily be somewhat faded off from the Fr originals and facsimilies. Moreover, even though first elements will be created by transfers of some ten bns from FTEO, the army will have to resort more direct recruiting and reserves derived from as yet unproved mobilization machinery. Will thus tap levels whose allegiance to Franco-Bao Dai solution not been proved beyond doubt. Thus to the degree that Vietnam’s army begins to be natl army its attitudes become less predictable.

e. Nevertheless, we believe this element of risk can be safely accepted because: (1) to degree the Fr control weaker and more remote the more ardent and patriotic the army will become; (2) this plan not likely to get out of hand long as rate of formation is not headlong and not likely to be, since De Lattre must be aware sentiment in country requires prudent approach. This realization, and financing and cadre difficulties may slow process, at least to rate obtaining for first four divs.

4. Whether the task of creating additional div calls for direct US financing or not equipping of armies certainly involves increasing and indefinite heavy burden on us. Moreover, for each weapon and truck brought here we create potential demand for ammo, maintenance and spare parts. It appears to us that as US moves into this new commitment we have right to ask and require certain things of Fr Indos. For example:

a. Exact current financial outlay, plans and capabilities of each with respect financing AS armies.

b. True picture Fr mil over-all expenditures IC, and future plans.

c. Capabilities for providing equipment from France or local production.

d. Status of plans for building up command, staff and service structure of Vietnam and AS armies, including Chief of Staff and Min of Def. As presently composed consists chiefly of light inf troops. Until natl armies possess own armature and leadership, they can hardly permit transfer Fr troops to France in any significant quantity.

e. Offensive plans of Fr C-in-C and how he intends use force and our aid. He has rather freely stated in three capitals that war will be over in matter of months and has created impression that he bases this estimate on assurances of matériel support given him by US following presentation by him of his plans. We do not know of such plans although doubtless he has them. It is to be hoped that during forthcoming visit of Chief of Staff of United States Army,² De Lattre be able to furnish him with such estimates and plans on the ground.

f. We shld need to follow evolution and development of Vietnamese Army much more closely and responsibly than we now able to do. Operating under existing pentalateral agreement, we have no training mission, our end-use inspection facilities are reluctantly accorded, and in general we approach the natl army only through fine Fr filter. As the emphasis of our MDAP program shifts to AS armies and we assume more responsibility for equipping, paying, maintaining them, we shld require something like the direct contact with the client army as we have under MDAP programs other countries. Even if this contact does not involve training programs it will require change in Fr attitudes.

g. We shld need to know from what sources (i.e. direct recruiting, vs. transferers) the men will be raised as well as in what tempo, if we are to know whether army increases represent real rather than bookkeeping transfers.

h. We shld have much better information about VM plans and situation and about Chinese intentions than we are now getting from French who have not granted our repeated requests for access to POWs for interrogations, for documents and for timely news on Chinese infiltrations. Closely allied to this field is better cooperation in psychological warfare. We are sometimes at disadvantage in assessing true position because French estimates on VM strength for purpose getting foreign aid and support do not always tally closely with intelligence estimates.

i. There shld be no repetition of instance in which “secret military assistance pact” was concluded between France and Vietnam, fact and terms of which were, and still are, unknown to us.³

j. We shld begin actively considering whether all or part of the material brought in by us for French forces is to be left in the SEA theater for AS armies or to be transferred with French forces when and if they are returned to France. It will be recalled Dept did not wish pentalateral so worded or negotiated as to preclude recapture of material or transfer to other theaters in accordance strategic necessity.

5. We do not believe that our inquiries with respect to French and Viet intentions need be limited military field. For example, we shld use our aid as lever to insure better probity and performance by Vietnam officials, and to insure realistic budgeting.

6. Finally we can not compartment military and political aspects of the activation and commitment of the Vietnamese natl army. If it fails, we cld perhaps afford the loss of the money and the material, we cld less well afford the strategic and psychological debacle of building another Asian army which lost the will to kill Communists of its color and natl. The new army must be equipped with an acceptable ideal and sure morale. The Viet Minh is helping forge this moral by its own excesses, but the men in the new army must also believe they are fighting for their own good and for independence. Way must be found in the present transitional stage of IC independence to make the future real. As our own contribution in IC is indispensable and steadily increases, we are justified in concerning ourselves with the political base of military success; the prospects for democratic institutions, forms of suffrage, admin of justice, the economic and social improvement of the IC masses, the progressive relaxation of the police control over individual and civil liberties, the constitution of a govt more representative of the entire country, the definition on viable terms of Vietnam’s place in French Union. These are also weapons in this war; their institution in Vietnam may also require close US concern. End message.

Sent Dept 852, rptd info Paris 339. Dept pass Defense. Paris pass MAAG.

Gullion

1. This telegram was transmitted in three parts.
2. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, visited Indochina on October 21–22.
3. Reference is to the secret Military Assistance Pact Between France and Viet-Nam, executed on September 1. Basically, the agreement provided for French assumption of the obligation for organizing, equipping, and maintaining the Vietnamese National Army. France undertook to provide training personnel, material, and financial support. The U.S. Legation obtained a copy of the agreement on January 11, 1952, as the result of a direct request to French authorities. The text was transmitted to Washington as an enclosure to despatch No. 333, January 18, 1952, not printed. (651.51G/1–1852)