751G.00/10–451: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (Gullion) to the Secretary of State 1
763. In course of courtesy call on Adm De Bourgoing naval commissioner in IC, actually No. 3 admin IC today, the foll points discussed:
1. Adm was much satisfied with arrival of American matériels; stated his current problem was to obtain sufficient men to maintain and handle equip; the assignment of officers and men from Metropolitan France was behind sched.
Comment: As Dept is aware, this is chronic complaint of Fr naval staff here.
2. So far as naval missions were concerned, Adm was optimistic and found situation better than he had expected on arrival, especially in the south.
3. He did not expect Viet Minh to attack in force again on the Vinh Yenh scale. If they were to attack it wld only mean repetition of reverses for them.
Comment: Leg understanding is that most milit echelons expect repetition of VM attack.
[Page 527]4. He is completely unable to understand De Lattre’s estimate that VM might be eliminated as effective force in eighteen months to two yrs. The war in IC could not be finished with the means at hand unless there were a gen settlement “somewhere else”. The Fr cld only stay on, waiting for such a settlement. In the 60 years that Fr had been in Tonkin, for example, the area had never been truly pacified and active war was conducted there for first 30 yrs. Abilities of Fr for pacification of Tonkin depended upon Chi disposition to support VM. He cld not understand an assumption attributed to Gen De Lattre, that VM level of supply wld remain the same. Surely the Chi wld continue to aid VM at least on the present scale in order to keep war going. Adm questioned me about disposition Chi Air Force in view airport construction South China. Intervention of Sino-VM air wld, of course, transform situation. The situation in the south might possibly be solved or got in hand by milit means “if the Gen were to free, say, 10 battalions for operations in South”. With a hearty laugh, Bourgoing said we might ask the General what he meant by an eighteen-months war but that he certainly cld not unless he meant to go home right away.
5. I hazarded as my guess that Gen was psychologically attracted to offensive operations toward Langson since, in his opinion, its fall represented the nadir of Fr prestige. The Adm thought this was not improbable but asked change it wld make.
Fear a situation if Langson were retaken [sic].
Comment: Gen once told me he was dedicated to the taking Langson. Once it was in Fr hands, De Lattre cld point out he had regained all lost territories, had united Bao Dai and Viet Govt behind him, and had laid foundations of Natl Army. At this time, his mission cld be said to have reached fruition—Gen is nearing IC and still has European ambitions. But whether these IC successes which do seem within his reach are solid and durable shld be prime question for our policy and our aid programs.
Those of us now Saigon uniformed of explanations or assumptions upon which De Lattre has based estimate, or of plans for offensive which he may have developed for US auth. I may say De Bourgoing’s reaction is typical of that of most Fr officers to whom one talks and of foreign attachés; e.g. Br attaché’s estimate of duration is 15 to 20 years. It is of course, conceivable that Viet Army could tip the balance although it is not being fitted more rapidly than the Viet Minh Army. Even if Natl Army shld reach maximum effectiveness with De Lattre’s two year time estimate, which is I think hardly possible, the average Fr officer here does not foresee defeat of the VM in the field in the sense that the country wld be pacified, freedom of movement restored, and guerrilla warfare exterminated. Incidentally, as [Page 528] is now not often recalled, De Lattre is pledged to his govt to return some portion of his troops to France next spring.
The state of our knowledge about the VM (and I think same true of Fr) does not permit accurate assessment of VM morale.
It is always possible that the privations to which they are subject and their dissatisfaction with police state and Communist control may so erode their will to resist, that their whole structure wld suddenly give way before an assumption of the offensive by the Franco-Viets. Frankly, I doubt it. In any case, there is no present indication that their military strength is declining.
Lacking the background of De Lattre’s analysis Leg will not now comment further on this estimate attributed to him except to say that the meaning of victory in field over VM is susceptible of various definitions. Possible criteria for victory might be:
- a.
- Is it of such character as to permit the relief of Fr troops and their transfer to Metropolitan France?
- b.
- Is it independent of an international political settlement involving (1) arrangements with Communist China, and (2) some form of compromise with the VM?
Dept pass Hanoi. Sent Dept 763, rptd info Paris 311, Hanoi 47.
- This telegram was transmitted in two parts.↩