751G.551/9–1251
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Visit of General de Lattre
Purpose and Importance of Visit
1. General de Lattre’s visit to the United States by invitation of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff is in recognition of his record as Commander of the 1st French Army during World War II. American troops of the 6th Corps were attached to his command during part of the campaign in Germany. General de Lattre’s present assignment as High Commissioner and Commander and Chief in Indochina makes it desirable for officers of the Department to take advantage of his visit to discuss political-military matters concerning Indochina. The President receives General de Lattre on September 14th and he will be in conference with officials of the Department and ECA on September 17th. He speaks and understands English very well. Mr. Merchant and Mr. Perkins will accompany him when he calls on you at 3:00 p. m., on Friday, September 14th. (An interpreter will be present.)
Biographical Sketch
2. General de Lattre is an officer of extreme personal courage, intelligence and ability but whose strong sense of mission and dignity makes for occasional incidents of explosive friction with his associates and superiors. It is hoped that his visit to America and his opportunities to meet American officials will improve his understanding of American aims in Indochina. In many ways his success or failure in the military campaign in Indochina may mean the loss of all of Southeast Asia to the Communist world or its retention within the Western orbit.
The Present Situation in Indochina
3. Concurrent with the arrival of Chinese Communist troops on the border in December, 1949, the nature of the war in Indochina changed from one of an apparent internal movement directed against French Colonialism to one of an effort of world Communism to add Indochina and probably Southeast Asia to the list of communist satellites. The accession of Southeast Asia to the communist bloc would very greatly add to the communist strategic and tactical capability in the Far East and would extend the area of Soviet domination to within 800 miles of the Philippines. The loss of rubber, tin and petroleum of Malaya and Indonesia would constitute not only a serious blow to the Western military capabilities but would constitute new and important [Page 495] sources of those same strategic matériels for the use of communist armies all over the world.
The forces now under General de Lattre’s command are considered capable of containing the internal communist threat in Indochina and possibly holding north Indochina against a Chinese Communist invasion consisting of no more than 50,000 to 100,000 men. A larger invasion force would be expected: to overrun at least Northern Indochina. Our military aid has been directed toward maintaining the capability of existing forces and concurrently at equipping additional forces in each of the three states.
We assess the situation as now being dependent upon four factors:
- a.
- A continuing French effort in men and matériel. (Since 1945 the cost of the Indochina military operation has been over 28,000 killed and missing and an expenditure of over United States two Million dollars (in francs).)
- b.
- Continued United States military assistance in order to maintain French Union Forces and to permit the establishment of State armies in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. These troops offer the only substantial new source of manpower to the anti-communist effort. With American equipment, French financial support and native manpower they may turn the tide of advancing communism.
- c.
- The establishment of viable anti-communist Governments in the three States. Moving slowly to take over the responsibilities transferred to them on January 1, 1951 they lack trained administrators. Given time to establish elected parliaments they could attract the people away from the false promises of the communists. This time can only be secured behind the protection of anti-communist arms.
- d.
- Continued delay in Chinese Communist aggression. The Viet Minh (Indochinese Communists) and the Chinese Communists combined could have overrun Indochina during 1950. Since then the anticommunist forces have had time to consolidate themselves, and under General de Lattre’s command, are growing stronger.
4. General de Lattre is scheduled to have meetings on September 17th with Messrs. Merchant and Bonbright1 and members of their staffs to discuss Indochina. He may, however, bring up with you the question of increased United States military assistance to Indochina. If he does, it is recommended that General de Lattre be invited to describe the proposition to the Department of Defense. It should be pointed out to him, however, that the fiscal 1952 Military Aid Program has been planned in an amount for Indochina which could not be increased without supplemental legislation.
If General de Lattre again raises the question of the United States supplying money for the payment of troops in Indochina, it is recommended that you state that this matter can only be considered when [Page 496] the entire French budgetary situation has been studied as a result of the talks previously held with Mr. René Mayer.2
5. The program for the visit is enclosed as Attachment A.3