Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

751G.00/8–1851: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (Gullion)¹ to the Secretary of State ²

[Extracts]

top secret

Saigon, August 18, 1951—midnight.

419. Re Legtel 352, August 9.³ Following are suggestions for forthcoming conversations with General De Lattre based on present estimate situation Indochina generally, Vietnam particularly:

A. Situation estimate

1. Political

Over-all situation shows real improvement over that De Lattre inherited when series military defeats were rapidly creating polit crisis. French morale has rebounded, measure of Viets confidence has been restored, energetic projects for prosecution war have been launched. Degree improvement measured from beginning Bao Dai solution is, however, less marked. De Lattre’s bold new design for action presently dominates political situation. In manner characteristic his military campaigns, he has decided that nothing is so decisive as decision; nothing succeeds like audacity. Where his predecessors have faltered or parleyed or deferred endlessly to Viets inhibitions, he forges ahead largely regardless of them, in noting sacred cows, scorning to placate or cajole fence-sitters and hold-outs. General says to Viets, “in fighting for independence, he who is not with us is against us”. He has embarked on conscious plan confront divided and listless Viets with bold new move each week, orchestrating the whole toward total material and moral mobilization. He hopes shock inspire and drive Viets out of their hesitancy in spite themselves.

He leads passionately this effort with wholly sincere faith, tremendous energy and unbounded will which has galvanized French Union forces and may yet transform political picture.

But returns are not all in. Policy is at best calculated risk, and general seems not always concerned about how many eggs he breaks for his omelette. To force pace, many individual feelings are wounded, strong-arm measures are used and condoned, the Dai Viet Political Party was broken up, subsidies to Cao Dai cut, an editor clapped in concentration camp, lukewarm Viet bureaucrats forced from office.

De Lattre has also been more than vigilant check any US activity he thinks may encourage Viet skepticism or aloofness re French Union. He expects US see whole picture just as he sees it, to let him play hand, tailor and cut programs accordingly. His impatience with any “fence-sitting” among US operatives may account for much of the pin pricks and surveillance to which US reps have been subjected. These have not, in any event, been important in whole scheme, and to large extent have now been settled.

More serious questions will now have be faced since dialogue between French and Viets has turned to nature of French Union itself. Is De Lattre going interpret its organic acts broadly in accordance with evolutionary principle stipulated inferentially by US when we recognize Bao Dai and since confirmed to US by French or will there be standstill or retrograde stage? And will kind French Union set up unilaterally by French constitution, March 8 accords and Pau provide kind independence for its members we have hoped and believed, and which we think necessary in order sustain Viet will to fight?

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Imponderables

Foregoing inventory debits and credits fails assay imponderables which have so often transformed scene in IC without warning and with little regard to logic. The imponderables constitute the spiritual order of battle of opposing forces in which the will and genius of De Lattre is arrayed against Stalinist dynamic. The critical imponderable is the extent to which De Lattre’s spark can light the tardy flame of Viet’s patriotism and fuel the ardor of the Fr.

C. Suggestion for conversations with De Lattre

1. Polit

(a) Strategic concept.

Leg is not competent to suggest what answer US govt will give De Lattre’s primary question: US action in case Chi invasion. Leg feels that answer will have be given sooner or later, especially if Korean armistice takes place. Leg’s own concept (MAAG reserves opinion) has always been that some kind US armed participation will be necessary, exerted if possible through the UN. It believes that the kind of high priority and expense programs we have inaugurated IC cohere more with that concept than with one of withdrawal and nonintervention. We recognize that this assessment may require re-examination at highest US levels of the Asian “off-shore” concept or of whether in view changes in strength relationships in the area and in US and UN potential, the “off-shore” chain can not better be defended in the deltas and defiles of SEA.

(b) Fr Union.

We might reassure Gen that we recognized independence AS within framework Fr Union and we do not intend go back on that formula. We envision expenditure of some $500 million by end next year to help make it work. (Leg believes it most important that De Lattre be given, either by dollar figures or some equally telling comparison, an idea of relative scale of US aid to Vietnam, so that he may have better understanding our intentions and our support).

(c) Future of Union.

It is timely and proper for us indicate our interest in future form and philosophy Fr Union. From time to time we have recd indications that it wld be molded as evolution required; for example, we understand that modification of plans for High Council is now under consideration. We have always hoped for liberal interpretation of basic accords moving toward membership status within Fr Union more comparable to that in Brit Commonwealth and when we recognized Vietnam we thought that such concept was necessary sustain Viets will to fight. We might indicate to Gen frankly that we are not committed to any particular static definition of relationship between Fr Union such as that contained in Mar 8 or Pau agreements. We wld not of course say to Viets that we envision modification these accords nor any new organic act defining their status nor encourage them seek such change. Fr should be aware that we reserve our own opinion as to tempo evolution AS toward independence. We welcome statements such as those made recently by Gen reaffirming the thesis of evolution. We can agree, however, that timetable stipulations at this time may have disqualifying drawbacks.

(d) Consultation.

Occasionally we may differ with Fr or Viets policies here, or with their timing, and wld like express privately to Fr or to Viets in all loyalty our point of view. We believe our stake in success entitles us to do so. At same time our policy remains one of supplementing not supplanting the Fr and we are deeply conscious, of burden they bear here as well as in def Western world. We have no desire whatsoever weaken bonds of the Fr Union which we know makes resistance to Commies possible in SEA; we merely hope see vital, viable union.

(e) Leg believes some such restatement our original thinking on IC is required if we are to avoid future misunderstanding with the Gen.

2. Economic

With ref econ subjs first concern is financing Viet’s natl army:

(a) Anticipated total cost Viet’s Natl Army will increase from 42 billion francs 1951 to over 60 billion 1952. Theoretically extra funds cld be obtained locally by taxation or by bond issue, though not unless AS and Fr willing resort to force in tax collection policy or block flow funds to Fr and apply strong pressure invest in bond issue. Extra funds theoretically cld also be obtained from Fr, but in view Fr budgetary situation this appears highly difficult. Only remaining source wld appear be assistance in some form by US. Leg recommends however that view importance speedy building up of Viets Army, desirable ensure that financial considerations do not constitute serious block even if this means that part of 1952 deficit may have to be financed directly or indirectly by US. View urgency also, Leg hopes that lack precedent will not preclude Dept consideration, shld request be presented, of direct subsidy in addition current shipment materials.

(b) Before committing itself to additional assistance US Govt shld insist as prerequisite upon Vietnam’s promise present full budgetary picture and current statements of receipts and revenues thereunder. Lack this info has hindered US planning throughout 1951 both in military and econ fields.

(c) Re Fr request additional assistance, Dept may also wish raise question facilitating trade between IC and Japan. Dept well aware Fr mercantilist approach in its trading position and Leg aware shortage foreign exchange may force temporary import restrictions on non-Fr products, but within limits available exchange modest replacement Jap imports for Fr shld contribute to latter’s rearmament drive and shld, depending on comparative prices, help IC economy.

3. US programs in IC

With ref various US programs IC, Leg does not imagine there will be sufficient time discuss these in detail.

If De Lattre brings subj up or if there is evidence that his misapprehensions about the philosophy and purposes ECA operation may not have been removed, these cld be explained to him again.

I assume that during General’s visit there may be an opportunity to review relationship Fr and Amer intelligence operations in IC within framework of world-wide cooperation and with ref developments at NATO or following Singapore conf. In meantime General shld have highest assurance that none these activities is or will be in any way incompatible with Fr position IC.

We might propose De Lattre series working level confs upon his return IC (such as those arranged for Jessup and Griffin mission)⁴ between heads Amer missions and their opposite numbers in Fr admin to discuss problems and difficulties encountered in our mil and econ aid programs and informational effort. Number General’s anxieties can, of course, be easily cleared up in Washington such as his concern about size Amer missions, purpose US informational programs, and recognition by Leg, ECA and all other missions of the primacy of the Fr admin in defense of IC. (End of msg)

Sent Dept 419, rptd info Paris 171.

Gullion

1. From August 18 to October 17, Minister Heath was absent from Saigon for consultations in Washington and brief visits in Paris and London.
2. This telegram was transmitted in seven parts. The extracts appearing here are from sections one, six, and seven.
3. The reference telegram concerned an impending trip by General de Lattre de Tassigny to the United States. After some months of U.S. deliberations as to the proper timing and circumstances for a de Lattre visit, Heath had delivered a written invitation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 26 (telegram 234 from Saigon, July 26, 751G.551/7–2651). In telegram 352, August 9, Heath and General Brink speculated as to the points which de Lattre might raise in Washington during the September visit and offered suggestions regarding the program of activities (751G.551/8–951).
4. Reference is to the Far Eastern trip of Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large (December 1949–March 1950) and the economic survey mission to Southeast Asia headed by R. Allen Griffin (February–April 1950). For documentation on the two missions, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, pp. 1 and 690 ff, respectively.