890.00/11–2751
The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs ( Allison ) to the ECA Assistant Administrator for Program ( Cleveland )
Dear Harlan: Your letter of November 8, 1951 to Dean Rusk with which you enclose a paper entitled “Action Program in Asia”1 has received considerable attention and thought here in FE. While no exception can be taken to the importance which your paper places on the Asia problem, nevertheless we are considerably concerned at what seems to be the rather far-reaching nature of some of the specific proposals.
The introductory part of the paper, particularly the second point raised, certainly implies that the United States Government should assist the new governments of Asia with large plans for economic improvement which, as the paper says, might “give some hope for bettering their appallingly low standards of living”. This statement seems to be at variance with statements made by Mr. Bissell in the [Page 119] talk he gave in New York before the Far East Council of Trade and Industry on October 19, when in speaking of some of the problems in Asia, particularly that of raising the standard of living, he said, “I believe it to be a fundamental principle of our strategy that the United States Government and United States resources cannot be used to make a frontal attack on these problems.” He went on to say, “All we can hope to do is to help the governments and the people of these countries to discharge a responsibility which is rightfully theirs and which must inevitably in any case be theirs because of the physical facts and circumstances. We could not afford an amount of aid that would make a dent in the standard of living.”
The third point mentioned in the introductory pages of your paper emphasizes that these new countries of Asia are the targets of a major Soviet and Chinese Communist power drive and the paper goes on to say that the favorite Communist technique is “to exploit the natural xenophobia of independence movements”. No one can disagree with this statement, in fact the Department of State has been operating on that assumption in all its work in Asia. However, it seems to me that a program of the nature and scope proposed in the ECA “Action Program in Asia” cannot help but contribute greatly to the ease with which the Communist propaganda can exploit “the natural xenophobia of the independence movements”. Programs of the nature implied in the ECA paper would unquestionably call for a large degree of control over foreign governments’ economies by American advisers and technicians and their would be great danger that the natural xenophobia of these newly independent governments would be directed squarely at the United States. There have already been definite evidences of this in Indonesia for example. In that country the Indonesian Government has shown definite alarm at the large number of Americans in Indonesia and apparently take the position that having just evicted the Dutch imperialists and colonists it does not desire to come under the sway of American colonists, even those who come with the best motives.
It also appears that the program outlined in your paper oversimplifies the nature of the problem in Asia by apparently treating all of the various countries alike, at least in broad outline. In Europe, where the ECA has operated with considerable success and efficiency, there was a generally stable area to work with where most of the countries concerned have common tradition and similar problems. This is not so in Asia where we have to consider all types of countries, from highly industrialized ones such as Japan to satrapies in Borneo. While the two countries which I have just mentioned are not involved directly in the program you envision, nevertheless no program for any part of Asia can disregard the influence of such factors.
[Page 120]With respect to the specific recommendations in the paper under reference, we take special objection to Point One wherein it is proposed that the President “declare as a new extension of United States foreign policy that the United States proposes to give particular support to newly independent countries to help them to stand on their own feet”. Such a statement would, it seems to us, make impossible the normal functioning of diplomacy and would place a weapon in the hands of the other countries which could be used against us at any time. I cannot help but wonder what the result would have been in the Philippines if at the time of the Bell Mission recommendations there had been an announced United States policy that newly independent countries would receive particular support on a substantial scale from the United States and that this support would be “continued long enough to help these countries lay the foundations for their economic development”. I think the answer is obvious.
I find it difficult to understand the exact meaning of the sentence in numbered paragraph two of the recommendations where it is said “in that region (Asia) the need for support to newly independent peoples overlaps our concern for the security of the area in the face of Soviet-backed aggression and our general interest in helping with the economic development of underdeveloped countries”. You further say in the same section that aid to Formosa “should be justified on security grounds as a special case, which it is”. It seems to me that all aid to any of these countries in the Far East under present world conditions must be justified on security grounds. With actual fighting going on in both Korea and Indo-China on a large scale and with the possibility of further military activity always with us, it does not seem to me that any aid to any country can be justified unless it can be shown that it will contribute to the security of the United States. I do not mean that the word “security” should be interpreted in a narrow sense and certainly the provision of economic and technical assistance is one of the most effective methods of insuring that security. However, the tone of the paper in question certainly gives the impression that aid should be given to the under-developed countries of Asia whether or not in any particular case it would contribute directly to United States security.
The result of adopting the program outlined in the paper under reference would seem to be that the United States Government would be projected into a virtual partnership responsibility with each of the governments concerned to raise their respective standards of living, per capita income, etc. The program also seems to ignore current Congressional attitudes with respect to enlarging American financial commitments and responsibilities in Asia and the disastrous consequences of failing to make good on our promises.
[Page 121]I regret that we appear to be taking such a negative attitude toward your proposal, but we do feel strongly that the adoption of such a program would open a vast Pandora’s box with untold consequences to the United States Government. As you know, the Department of State has been in the forefront in recommending definite projects for economic and military aid to the nations of Asia whenever in our judgment such programs would contribute to the foreign policy and security interests of the United States. In fact the Department of State argued in vain for some time before the true needs of Asia were accepted by other agencies of the government, and there can be no question with respect to our recognition of the importance of the task to be done. We do feel that the most efficient use of the available resources can be made by taking a close look at the various individual programs and tailoring them to meet specific needs in specific countries rather than a grandiose scheme which would be regarded both in the United States and the countries concerned, and again I quote Mr. Bissell’s speech in New York, as “beyond their means and beyond ours”.
I was surprised to have called to my attention the other day the fact that ECA had cabled this program out to the various missions in Asia with the request for their comment without any indication that such a program had neither been cleared through the Department of State nor sent forward with its knowledge. Under the circumstances I have felt it necessary to have a brief message sent to the missions concerned informing them that the program had been forwarded without the knowledge of the Department of State and that the Department had definite reservations with regard to its acceptability.
I will be glad to discuss this matter with you personally at any time and I know that the officers of FE will be only too glad to go over the details of particular programs with your people whenever you desire.
A copy of your letter and this reply is being furnished to Mr. Only, Acting Director of Mutual Security.
Sincerely yours,