751G.00/7–3051: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State 1
261. I had fairly extended talk with Australian FonMin Casey2 after his call on Bao Dai at Nhatrang. He found Bao Dai intelligent with keen understanding of problems faced by his country but, it seemed to Casey, lacking will to exert strong leadership which situation demanded. He asked whether Bao Dai cld not be stimulated and inspired to greater public activity, whether it wld be practical assign high class counselor to him to that end. I replied as practical measure one had pretty much take Bao Dai as he was. It was neither in his psychological makeup nor in Viets imperial tradition to exert dynamic, out-in-front leadership that wld be expected of chief of state of western country at war. Bao Dai insisted he knew his people and that incessant public appearances was not what they expected or wanted of their emperor-chief of state. Their traditional conception of emperor was mystic one of high personality above daily business of governing but watching over his govt in interest welfare his people. I personally thought Bao Dai might be indulging in some rationalization in thus limiting his role but his observations doubtless did contain some truth. In any case, it was mistake get impression Bao Dai was idle and uninterested. He did make public appearances and addresses. He was rather remarkable politician who kept in touch with and meditated [mediated?] between various conflicting polit and regional groups in the country. He ought of course take more active public role and De Lattre was endeavoring stimulate and inspire him to [Page 467] such activity and with some success. I tried fol same line. Bao Dai was not however, man to be pushed.
Casey then inquired whether a PriMin more dynamic than Huu cld be found. I said it was not easy find such individual under present circumstances. Tri, one of most capable men, had gotten into squabble with Pres Huu partly at instigation his party, the Dai Viet, with result that he had had to resign. It wld presumably be several months before he cld be brought back into govt. The Catholic leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, who enjoyed fairly widespread prestige and reputation for honesty had been intransigent in his demands and in his dealing with Bao Dai and Huu Govt. If Huu was not prototype of wartime PriMin, he had, nevertheless will to govern, had conservative progressive program and had made progress in extending auth his govt. I thought he was personnally honest.
Casey said he rather subscribed to view that key to def SEA was IC and as such it was one of outer seas of Australia. I said I definitely entertained that view.
He then asked my opinion De Lattre and I paid tribute latter’s mil genius, his sincerity, his will and energy and said with regard polit program De Lattre had initiated in last few months, that it was premature say it wld fail.
Casey then said he planned expand the number Australian for missions and wanted place on [in] SEA. He had first thought of Bangkok and inquired what I thought of his sending rep Saigon. I said I thought it most desirable step. It wld have very great polit effect. While some thirty odd nations had recognized Assoc States, only four had actually sent diplo missions. Mil worth and idealism Australia were generally recognized. Casey appeared agree and said he wld merely send min and one secy. He supposed he cld depend on assistance Brit and Amer legs here helping his envoy. I said he cld fully count on cooperation with our mission here.
Comment: I hope that in Canberra and Wash Dept will, when occasion offers, encourage Australia establish representation in Saigon.
Casey said he was by-passing Taipei with regret; he wld have welcomed talk with Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers. He had sought both Wash and London’s view as to effect his visiting Formosa. Wash had been non-committal but London had expressed quite strongly opinion that Formosa visit wld be mistake.
I also spoke with Watt, Secy Australian FonOff.3 Watt said great question was whether Fr were really sincere in their announced policy of giving eventual independence to Assoc States and asked my view. I said that in my personal view there was no doubt that Assoc States [Page 468] wld achieve real independence within Fr Union. Even if Fr Govt tried turn clock back toward colonialism it cld not do so against resistance such action wld produce in Vietnam and against disapproval other countries on which Fr counted for support. Watt thought building Vietnam natl army wld be great guarantee for eventual independence. I agreed and remarked Fr in their own mil interest were forming this army as rapidly as possible. I warned however that sure efficient Viet army inculcated with discipline and spirit loyalty to established govt cld not be formed overnight.
Sent Dept 261 Paris, Hanoi, Canberra unn.