Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

751G.5/7–2351

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] July 23, 1951.

Subject: French Ambassador’s Call on you at 3:00 p. m. July 23rd.

Your office has been advised by the French Embassy that the French Ambassador wishes to discuss with you the possible effects on Indochina of a truce in Korea, more particularly the possibility of a diversion of Communist forces from Korea to Indochina.

We believe that the Ambassador is likely to approach the complicated problem identified above by attempting to secure from you the answers to three questions:

1. What increased assistance to the forces of the French Union in Indochina will the United States supply in the event of a large scale Chinese intervention in the struggle with Ho Chi Minh?

A. It is recommended that you say that an answer to this question can only be supplied by the President of the United States, after consulting his principal civilian and military advisors, and then only at the moment the contingency has arisen. You might point out that it is impossible to make such decisions in advance since other factors bearing upon that decision cannot be known in advance. You may go on to say that the United States has accorded its military assistance program to Indochina a priority second only to that accorded the Korean program. You might take this occasion to press upon the French Ambassador the importance to the successful defense of Indochina of the National Armies which, in our opinion, provide the only prospect for the manpower necessary to do the job.

2. The French Ambassador is likely to ask your opinion as to whether France or the Associated States should take recourse to the United Nations in the event of a large scale Chinese intervention in Indochina.

A. It is recommended that you say to the French Ambassador that of course this decision is one for the Republic of France, the Associated States and the Council of the French Union.

3. The French Ambassador is likely, averting to his first question, to ask you if the United States-French-British military conversations lately concluded at Singapore may cause the United States Government to change or increase the character of its participation in the defense of Indochina and Southeast Asia. You may reply that you understand General de Lattre to have said that he could hold Indochina if he were given approximately seven infantry divisions with appropriate naval and air units. You may say to Ambassador Bonnet that he knows the United States is not now planning to deploy ground forces in Indochina. That you understand the British do not plan an increase in their efforts in Indochina and that you suppose the only source of this manpower would be the French Union.

Background Information

We find it almost impossible to forecast Chinese and Russian intentions in Indochina at the present stage of the truce talks at Kaesong. We are inclined to sort out the possibilities as follows:

a. If a genuine truce is achieved which results in the significant reduction of Chinese forces in Korea, it seems to us almost certain that the Chinese will increase their support, in both matériel and men, to Ho Chi Minh and the Burmese Communists. We are inclined to believe that Communist strategy in this circumstance would not require an invasion of Indochina or Burma by “Chinese Armies”. It would not be necessary to the accomplishment of their immediate objective which is, in our view, to keep Southeast Asia in a state of instability and fear.

b. If no truce is achieved in Korea and the fighting continues it seems unlikely that the Chinese will be able significantly to increase their support of Ho Chi Minh or Burmese Communists.^* If, however, the truce talks break off because it becomes evident that the Chinese have been talking peace in order to prepare a build-up, I think we must then assume that the Chinese are prepared to drop their mask not only in respect to Korea but in respect to Indochina, Burma and Indonesia. If, therefore, the Chinese resume hostilities in Korea we should assume that as soon as they are able they will increase their efforts to control Southeast Asia through invasion and subversion.

Mr. Lacy will be present during your conversation with Ambassador Bonnet.

1. A marginal notation indicates that this memorandum was seen by H. Freeman Matthews, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
2. The forgoing relates to equipment. The estimated capability of invasion remains. [Handwritten footnote in the source text by Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.]