751G.551/7–1851: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State 1
157. De Lattre asked see me yesterday evening. I found him incensed by certain passages in Time–Life correspondent Dowling’s story of celebration July 14 particularly assertion that “truth of matter was that never in Indochina were below the surf ace Franco-Amer relations at lower ebb”. (For other statements in Dowling’s despatch objected to by De Lattre see Legtel 160 rptd Paris 57, July 18).2
1. De Lattre launched into long complaint against type of Amer correspondent’s writing, he asserted, tendentious and sensational stories seeking to “envenom” Franco-Amer and Franco-Viets relations here without appreciation Fr sacrifices and contribution towards holding pass against Communism; difficulties which wld be perilously increased here as result of cease-fire in Korea. I agreed that there had been several incidents of sensational and incorrect reporting, but reminded De Lattre he had generally had magnificent press in US. I cld not, as he suggested, exert any authority over free Amer press beyond giving facts when correspondents consulted me. Postponement signature ECA agreement unfortunately provided material for press despatch of type he disliked. Agreement shld, I felt, be signed earliest possible moment. De Lattre replied he agreed emphatically and for that reason had sent his financial counselor to Paris to speed up final approval. He referred to my ltr (Legtel 3, rptd Paris 1, July 1)2 in which I took exception to statement in his press release that Amer negotiators “must have known” that agreement cld not have been signed on June 30. I repeated my objection to the statement saying that we had no reason to doubt the assurance of Viet Govt that they were authorized sign agreement on that date. De Lattre argued our negotiators must have known that consultative procedure [Page 455] between Vietnam and Fr made that date impossible and that in any case “courtesy shld have suggested” that we consult High Commissariat to assure ourselves everything was in order. I replied that we had no reasons go behind Viet Govt assurance and since it was a bilateral agreement with Viets there was no reason again consult Fr, particularly in view fact we had formal assurances in writing from the Fr negotiator that Fr approval draft had been obtained. Further argument was terminated by De Lattre saying, “you can not convince me and I can not convince you. Let’s drop the discussion.”
2. Returning to the question Amer press reports on Indochina, De Lattre again expressed his concern over their effect on Franco-Amer relations and asserted that reporters must have gotten some of their incorrect material from members ECA mission and possibly also from junior members Leg and Amer consulate in Hanoi.
I said I welcomed chance discuss state our relations here and our policy and that I was in some position to speak with authority. Dept had confirmed that Amer cooperation and actions here were to supplement and not to supplant or undermine position of Fr in Indochina. As regards ECA operations, they wld be carried on with proper consultation and due regard and sympathetic understanding of Fr position. (Note: I did not go beyond this gen assurance in this conversation at this time in view objections raised by Blum ECA chief (see Toeca 841, July 123)) to the specific assurances proposed in para numbered 2 my 2355, June 29, rptd Paris 944. I am firmly convinced however, for reasons advanced in my 2355 that these precise assurances must be given, preferably before De Lattre departs for Fr next week.
As regards assertions members ECA Mission and Legation were taking line at variance with our policy in IC, I intended shortly brief all members Legation and US missions here to the end that they fully understood value to cause of freedom French efforts IC and validity French aims that the Associated States of IC remain in French Union. I wld warn them that they must not give encouragement by listening without comment to improper—I repeated improper—criticisms of French sacrifices and intentions and that I wld consider any violation of this rule as insubordination.
On other hand, I had two things to request of him of which the first was very important and was that he take steps to stop false and anti-American reports of his entourage and secret police regarding American aims and operations in IC. I remarked that I knew that every intelligence service and secret police which relied in part on paid informers recd false and tendentious reports and I was certain that was case here. De Lattre demurred saying he did not think he [Page 456] had recd any anti-American reports. I replied I felt certain he had. One such report he had given much credence to was that American Consulate Hanoi was subsidizing Dai Viet paper Thoi Bao now closed. As another example I felt fairly sure Chinese language specialist my Legation, who of excellent character and standing, had been represented to High Commissariat as being a secret service agent. De Lattre wld not agree that he was recipient false stories about American activities but took note my statement. I continued that minor request of mine was that there be fuller exchange info. We were receiving good cooperation as regards economic and military intelligence but French studies and info on VM and Commie activities IC were only partly made available to us. I asked that officials be instructed give us full info on such points and he agreed that he wld do so but without much enthusiasm.
3. De Lattre then took up question of newspaper stories that France was considering some sort truce with Ho Chi Minh and VM. Without definitely asserting that French Govt wld never undertake such action, he said he wld not and cld not make such a compromise. It wld mean rapid loss IC’s independence to Chinese and Commie imperialism. With loss his only son in battle he had, he said, a greater moral authority and duty fight on here until Associated States were fully secured. He was confident victory although danger of greater Chinese aid and even participation in VM military operations had greatly increased with prospect of Korean truce. De Lattre said he was going see job through here. Stories that he wld accept governorship French Morocco were completely without foundation; he had no ambition accept any other position France cld offer him. His trip France wld be very brief (see Legtel 158, rptd Paris 55, July 18).4
4. De Lattre informed me that he wld be glad attend opening of American library either July 23 or 24 and wld make few remarks.
Comment: Dept will notice that in my conversation with De Lattre I said most of things which I advocated in mytel 2355, June 29. It will be necessary, I feel, however, have another frank talk with De Lattre and in that case I hope be authorized make without change all statements advocated mytel 2355.
The resentment caused by the postponements signature ECA agreement and Time–Life correspondent’s despatch referred to in this telegram have given De Lattre, I believe, some salutary worry with regard Franco-American relations IC.
Sent Dept 157, rptd info Paris 54.