611.51G/7–551: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
77. Saigon tel 2355 June 29 rptd Paris 944. Emb concurs with well-reasoned analysis made by Heath in reftel re situation IC and US policy toward IC.
It cannot be overemphasized that US interest in IC during present critical world situation stems almost entirely from desire prevent IC falling under Commie control. It was for this reason that US embarked upon econ and mil aid prog in IC. It also cannot be over-emphasized that, while US aid and support have obviously played important part in developments in IC, it is only French arms and resources which can during present crisis, in absence marked change in policy of US and perhaps of other free world nations, hold this area and serve as check to Commie advance in Southeast Asia. As repeatedly stated by Dept, primary responsibility in IC is that of [Page 443] France and this thesis was clearly accepted both by French and by US in FonMin talks at Paris in May 1950.
Against this background and keeping in mind that IC is only one part of overall US-French pattern of common effort, Emb believes that we shld exert every care to avoid any actions which would tend to mar that common effort and thus result in detriment of our own overall interests, it is possible that French, while appreciative of our mil and polit aid in IC, do not give adequate recognition to important part that our gen support, including recognition of Assoc States as well as mil and econ aid, have played in bolstering French position in IC. It is not certain that first order of doubt re IC, mentioned in Saigon’s reftel, has largely disappeared—that is, apprehension that French have moved too slowly and too grudgingly. However, basic fact remains that France has primary responsibility in IC and US can only move slowly to encourage French through discreet and continual pressure to do things they shld in IC which wld represent continued evolution of independent position of Assoc States within French Union, unless, of course, US is willing to contemplate affirmatively major shift in responsibility for keeping this area out of Commie hands. So long as present crisis continues, Vietnamese shld never be permitted to forget essential irreplaceable contribution French are making toward their independence and fate they wld meet if French were to withdraw. Nor must we ourselves forget ever present danger of having Vietnamese place us off against French. It must also be remembered that continuation present French effort IC represents very heavy burden to France and that in months to come French Govt to be formed must face problem finding further funds for operations in IC.
Ours is difficult role in present situation and we do not believe it desirable to allow what seems to be increasing drift into misunderstanding of our role in IC to continue without taking prompt steps to check it. In this connection De Lattre’s ref to Heath of desire to postpone discussions regarding ECA (Saigon tel 2635 [2865] June 30 rptd Paris 952)1 may be related to statement by FonOff official re possible French approach Washington for clarification US objectives IC (Embtel 8220 June 30 Saigon 430).1 For this reason Emb repeats recommendation in its tel 8220 June 30 that Dept have full and frank discussion US policy and objectives IC with Amb Bonnet and Daridan2 as soon as possible.
Dept pass Saigon sent Dept 77 rptd info Saigon 9.