851G.00R/6–3051: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State 1
2364. At the first opening I broke in on De Lattre’s long monologue recounted in my tel 2363 of June 302 to inquire why the French Govt had so unexpectedly refused to permit the Vietnam Govt to sign its economic agreement with the US scheduled for today. I said I feared there might be unfortunate results from this action. Congress was considering the fon aid bill which included both arms and econ aid for the Assoc States.
De Lattre said that he regretted the occurrence but preparations shld not have been made for the signature until it was certain that the accord had Fr approval. He indicated that high commissariat had [Page 440] advised the Vietnam Govt that the exchange of letters with the Fr Govt asking consent to sign wld take five or six weeks and the Viet letter had only gone forward a few days ago. It was not the intrinsic importance of the proposed accord but the fact that it was the first separate treaty to be negotiated and signed by Vietnam. Therefore, France must insist on exact compliance with the consultative provisions set forth in agreements with the Assoc States. If the Viets were to be allowed from the start to negotiate and sign international treaties without full prior consultation and approval the foundations and future of the Fr union wld be imperilled. I remarked the Fr negotiator Pennavaire had certainly given the impression if not definite assurances that the proposed agreement had received Fr Govt approval. De Lattre said that Pennavaire was not empowered to give such assurances. He was an economist-technician whereas the accord had political and juridicial aspects which cld only be passed on by the appropriate Ministries. He added that the Fr Govt was particularly insistent in the case of this accord since the Viet del to the ILO meeting at Geneva had recently signed a technical aid agreement “without being empowered to do so or having consulted with France. I inquired if the accord cld not be signed on the understanding it wld not become effective until approved by the High Council of the Fr Union. De Lattre said the instructions he had received from the Min of Assoc States were formal that signature shld not take place but moreover the Fr Govt had now proposed certain changes, mainly of form rather than of substance, which wld have to be negotiated.
Then observed that it was of great importance that this accord be signed at the earliest possible date. De Lattre replied he thoroughly agreed; that he wld insist that the High Council of the Fr Union Govt be set up and meet in July, on which occasion he felt approval of the accord wld quickly be granted. If it proved impossible to set up the High Council, then the substitute procedure of consultation with the interested Fr Ministries and Pres Auriol wld have to be employed and this wld mean a further delay of five or six weeks, postponing signature until August.
At this state De Lattre’s aide brought in two stories filed by AP correspondent Topping an hour previous. Among other things the despatches stated that Fr action in refusing “abruptly” to allow the signature as scheduled was regarded “in dipl circles as a slap in the face to the young Viet Govt”. The stories also alleged that the draft accord was disapproved by Fr Govt because it gave Viets too much power over established Fr commercial interests.
De Lattre exploded. He asked whether I approved of the story. I said it was unfortunate that this version shld appear at this moment and suggested that the Fr might issue a statement of their point of view. De Lattre asserted the stories were designed to embroil Fr [Page 441] relations with Vietnam and the US. He inquired whether he wld not be justified in expelling Topping from IC. I told him that wld be a great mistake. On the heels of this exchange Topping was suddenly ushered in. De Lattre, after remarking that he had been given great facilities, upbraided him for having written a “false” and “tendentious” story without having tried to report the Fr point of view. Topping replied he had consulted Fr officials. He refused to name them and I interjected that a correspondent should not be expected to reveal his sources. De Lattre said there are only three or four officials qualified to discuss the matter and asked why Topping had not come to see him. Topping replied he cld not disturb the HICOM for every story. De Lattre rejoined that a story of this importance fully justified Topping in asking to see the HICOM. He wld have been received. Topping then said it was a mistake that the HICOM did not have a press spokesman. De Lattre replied that he himself and four or five top members of the High Commissariat were always available as spokesmen.
I interrupted again to say no one cld doubt Topping’s journalistic honesty and his courage (he stood up very well to De Lattre’s tirade), and I again suggested that De Lattre might issue a statement. De Lattre went on to give Topping much the same argumentation recounted in the first part of this tel. He further said that the changes in the text proposed by Fr Govt were essentially formal and agreement on them cld be reached in a single meeting between STEM chief Blum and the Fr and Viet negotiators.
Characteristically, after storming at Topping, De Lattre became friendly and humorous and accompanied Topping and me to my automobile.
Sent Dept 2364, rptd info Paris 951, Hanoi unn.