310.2/3–251: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
1537. Legtel 1320, January 27.1 I have heard nothing further re readiness this month Vietnam application for UN membership although prolonged cabinet crisis would doubtless have deferred any such plans. In view Deptel 1071, February 16, I have not volunteered interest in subject during recent conversations with Huu and government members. We agree, of course, that careful exploration member sentiment should precede submittal Associated States applications and that until Asian views, to which India lamentably seems key, change in all or part, no encouragement should be offered to States re applications. We believe, however, that we must continue to impress upon Asian Governments in every manner diplomatically feasible changes in status of Associated States which have occurred since last December and which are still occurring. Process of transfer of ex-French national services has just begun and only immigration, posts and telecommunications and certain sections of foreign commerce have as yet been transferred to Vietnamese administration due to unreadiness latter to take them over. As balance national services so transferred, as real activation national army develops, and as parliamentary assembly project to which both Bao Dai and Huu now committed takes shape, actual degree of independence will seem more persuasive.
We would suggest, however, that consideration of UN discussion and vote cannot be limited to its political effect on Associated States alone but must include France as well. It now seems generally agreed that major Chinese thrust would cause French and Vietnamese to appeal to UN. Most critical period for future of Far East would be presumably first few weeks immediately following upon unmistakable signs of Chinese invasion IC. Basic question is whether French Union forces would be committed to utmost in resisting this invasion prior to or during UN negotiations or whether these same negotiations would be used as occasion to husband or withdraw French Union forces. Two matters will in all probability control French decision: First, understandings which exist between US and UK on one hand, France on other during present pre-invasion period, and second French estimate of probable UN response to appeal for assistance. We cannot appraise in Saigon question whether antiaggression member sentiment might be mobilized if formal membership applications behalf Associated States were already pending, whether such applications immaterial to UN decision, or whether more favorable UN action might be anticipated if first hearing for Associated States [Page 387] was on issue of Communist aggression. We are convinced that such questions must be concern of highest councils of French policy and as such are most germane to US position re Associated States UN applications. If previous understandings with their Western allies are unsatisfactory or if UN support believed questionable in event Chinese Communist aggression, pressure in France will, of course, mount against indefinite commitment French Union Army here. Preservation of French forces in IC might then well become principal French concern.
Sent Department 1537, repeated info [garble] Hanoi unnumbered.
- Not printed.↩