751G.00/2–1251: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon ( Gullion ) to the Secretary of State
1419.1. While I shall see President Huu tomorrow and expect hear his latest explanation current cabinet crisis,1 it possible that it may continue for some time to come as indicated Legtel 1418.2 I should therefore like to know whether Department wishes me take any positive steps. It will be recalled that in Legtel 1157 of January 1 Legation listed number measures to be taken by US “if IC was to be held”. One of these, to which highest priority attached, was “pressure on Bao Dai to form and lead government of national union”.
2. During Minister Heath’s absence I have not asked see Bao Dai, nor have I been convoked by him except for brief New Year’s ceremony described Legtel 1380.3 In meantime, it has become increasingly clear that Huu and his own advisors do not know why or are not prepared admit that he being systematically put off by Bao Dai in his efforts form government. Tuyen’s latest explanation is that Bao Dai attempting chasten French, who expressed their views on proposed cabinet in vigorous fashion, by holding up approval cabinet until last possible moment before De Lattre’s scheduled departure for France.
3. De Lattre would probably not desire return to Paris leaving vacuum on Viet side of government here. It seems to me that Bao Dai running risk of collision of wills with De Lattre which can only end in damage to Viet sovereignty or in worsening relations between French and Viets.
4. Whether or not we should put any “pressure” on Bao Dai, Department may wish me try find out what he trying to do. If he trying get rid of Huu, it may be that he not unalterably opposed to proposals made to him recently by Huu element, such as formation of assembly and definition prerogatives of chief of state, and may grant these to government headed by Governor Tri.
[Page 381]5. While I do not think it would be proper or wise at this stage to express any opinion about Huu’s leadership or on any of individuals proposed for cabinet, Department may wish Legation to point out:
- a.
- That it obviously dangerous to Viets’ national security to continue their cabinet crisis, and prejudicial to opinion that may be formed abroad as to viability of its government for present cabinet crisis to continue (My British colleague has already expressed himself in this sense to Huu and given Huu permission cite his views to Bao Dai);
- b.
- That although we not in position to say that time has come when it feasible constitute appointive assembly and government of national union, we think these desirable goals and would help strengthen international position of Vietnam.
6. Would Department therefore instruct me as soon as it may be feasible to do so whether,
- (a)
- Department wishes me see Bao Dai,
- (b)
- If so, whether I should confine myself to simple explanation present internal political situation, or
- (c)
- Convey to him something like views contained in paragraph 5 above, either as my personal thinking on subject or as reaction my government.4
Priority sent Department 1419, repeated info Paris 614, Hanoi unnumbered.
- Since January 20, Prime Minister Huu had been negotiating unsuccessfully with various political and religious elements in search of the basis for a more broadly constituted government.↩
- Telegram 1418 from Saigon, February 12, is not printed.↩
- Telegram 1380 from Saigon, February 6, is not printed.↩
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In telegram 4778 from Paris, February 13, Minister Heath (in Paris for discussions with French and U.S. officials on his return trip to Saigon) stated the following: “I think it would be useful for Gullion to see Bao Dai but do not believe he should state that it is obviously dangerous to Viet national security to continue their Cabinet crisis or that foreign opinion is being prejudiced as respect to viability of Vietnam Government were Cabinet crisis to continue. I believe we should avoid any accusation of intervening in Vietnamese internal politics.” (751G.00/2–1351)
The same day, in telegram 1051 to Saigon, the Department of State advised Gullion as follows: “Unless interview with Huu radically alters considerations outlined reftel [telegram 1419 from Saigon], Dept agrees it wld be desirable you seek interview Bao Dai. You shld express US Govts growing concern over prolongation cabinet crisis and, as suggested, sound out Chief of State’s reasoning and objectives in crisis. Concentrate remarks on considerations outlined para five a and b. It is important that you avoid any implication US favors or disfavor current or any other slate both in Bao Dai and Huu conversations. You may wish refer to fact indecision favors fence-sitters and generally undermines prestige Chief of State and his Govt.” (751G.00/2–1251)
On February 13, Gullion met with Huu. Telegram 1425, February 13, indicated that he listened to the views of the Prime Minister but did not set forth a U.S. position (751G.00/2–1351). Three days later, Bao Dai received Gullion at the latter’s request. In telegram 1454 from Saigon, February 18, Gullion reported expressing himself in the sense of paragraphs 5 a and b of telegram 1419. Bao Dai stated that he was aware of public and international concern over the crisis, disclaimed personal responsibility for it, and assured Gullion that a new government would be announced in a day or two. (751G.00/2–1851)
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