Office of the Historian

SEAC Files: Lot 53D2551

Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee, February 7, 1951, 10:30 a.m.—12:30 p.m., at the Department of State

February 7, 1951, 10:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.
secret
SEAC M–13

Present:

  • Members
  • Mr. Livingston T. Merchant (Alternate), Dept. of State2
  • Major General Harry J. Malony, Department of Defense3
  • Mr. A. Allen Griffin, Economic Cooperation Admin.4
  • Others:
  • Department of State
  • Messrs. Samuel T. Parelman, Executive Secretary
  • Donald R. Heath
  • Willard Galbraith5
  • William S. B. Lacy
  • John F. Melby6
  • Robert G. Efteland, Secretary
  • Department of Defense
  • Brigadier General F. G. Brink
  • Commander B. L. E. Talman
  • Mr. Kenneth T. Young7
  • Economic Cooperation Administration
  • Messrs. Shannon McCune8
  • Edwin Arnold9

Preliminary Remarks by Minister Heath on the Situation in Indochina

1. Mr. Heath reported that the situation was much brighter now than it had been three months ago mainly because:

a.
The French forces now had a first-class commander, General de Lattre, and the tempo had picked up from a previous pedestrian rate.
b.
U.S. military aid was arriving in time and in amounts sufficient for the French and Vietnamese effectively to contest the Viet Minh.
c.
The Pau Conference Agreement had been consummated resulting in about 90% independence for the three Associated States.

2. Mr. Heath listed the following factors on the debit side of the ledger:

a.
The possibility of an invasion by the Chinese Communists which would be particularly bad if it took place now and if their best troops were used. He sensed a mystic hope on the part of the intuitive and vigorous De Lattre that the Chinese would not come in. If the Chinese do not cross the border at this time, if the French succeed in establishing their defensive perimeter some 60 miles from Haiphong, and if supplies continue to come in, the French and Vietnamese forces should be able to carry on an extensive delaying action.
b.
The political picture was quite gloomy, although vigorous men might be included in the new government which he expected to be formed in the near future. Progress in the political field was further complicated by an inadequate information service, the head of which had just been replaced. Minister Heath believed that the situation needed a Churchill at this juncture and that Bao Dai, while far from being idle, was certainly no Churchill. Another important factor was the glimmering of defection from the Viet Minh forces although this development is hindered because of strong family ties and because of the surveillance of the Communist police.

Preliminary Remarks by General Brink on the Situation in Indochina.

3. General Brink stated that the French Air Force had been doubled in the last four months. It would be capable of knocking down any Communist Chinese air cover put into battle unless the Chinese Communists drew from most of their South China units, which was not considered probable because of the situation in Korea and Formosa. He said that the navy was improved and now had some 60 vessels patrolling inland waters in addition to privateers (under the navy’s control) which were maintaining long-range reconnaisance and observing movements between Hainan and Communist-held China.

4. The army has received 80 good howitzers, large numbers of mortars, machine guns, and signal equipment. French units, including infantry, artillery and engineers, are operating out of Tonkin in numbers up to regimental combat teams and were much more mobile. They are able to commit the Viet Minh and determine the size and the direction of the attack through their ability to de-truck and take off cross country. Moreover, the Viet Minh are being affected adversely by the napalm bombs used by the air force.

5. The bad element in this otherwise favorable picture is that the French are taking great losses while they succeed in meeting the enemy, destroying his forces, and occupying his territory; and, for [Page 378] the present there are no unit or individual replacements forthcoming. At present there appeared to be no solution to a problem which about eight months from now would not be so important because of the availability of replacements by use of the Vietnamese now being trained. He remarked that General de Lattre was hoping to secure a division from France as the only possible solution to holding the Tonkin area (the Haiphong–Hanoi delta area). There will be some risk if these troops are not forthcoming since the loss of Tonkin would place the Chinese Communists in a better position to move into Thailand without crossing the mountains and to join Viet Minh forces in south and central Indochina. He stressed the importance of holding Tonkin since it might well decide whether the whole of Southeast Asia could be held.

[Here follows discussion on Indochina and other subjects.]

  1. Files of the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee, 1950–1951. For documentation, on the operations of this interdepartmental coordinating committee, see pp. 1 ff.↩
  2. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.↩
  3. Consultant on Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of Defense.↩
  4. Director of the Far Eastern Program Division, Economic Cooperation Administration↩
  5. Member of the Office of International Security Affairs.↩
  6. Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.↩
  7. Assistant to the Acting Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.↩
  8. Deputy Director, Far Eastern Program Division, Economic Cooperation Administration.↩
  9. Deputy Director, Far Eastern Program Division, Economic Cooperation Administration.↩